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International financial support for civil society 
development in the Western Balkans has 
spanned over two decades, initially starting 
as humanitarian intervention in the wake of 
the various violent conflicts in the region and 
gradually modulating its focus to prioritise 
democratic consolidation synchronised with 
European integration. However, despite the 
longstanding interaction between local civil 
society organisations (CSOs) in the Western 
Balkans and international agencies, there 
are three important questions that have been 
largely overlooked within the existing research 
on civil society development in the region: 
 a comparative understanding of the 
rationale underpinning donors’ commitment 
to remain present in the Western Balkans 
for the foreseeable future; 
 how donors interact regarding the 
development of specific civil society 
programmes; and
 how key representatives from international 
agencies perceive the current state of civil 
society in the region and the impact of their 
own interventions.
The results contained in this report build on 
an initial survey of 48 donor organizations 
published in pilot study “Donors’ Strategies 
and Practices in Civil Society Development in 
the Balkans. Civil Society Lost in Translation?”. 
The pilot study, which was conducted in 2011, 
revealed that the EU is not only the most 
influential donor in terms of the amount and 
variety of the assistance provided, but it is also 
a driver and agenda setter for other donors’ 
presence and interventions. In addition, the 
research showed that modalities of donors’ 
assistance do not always reflect needs of 
CSOs in the Western Balkan region, and 
there is absence of long-term core funding 
to support democracy-building activities. 
Another phenomenon confirmed by the 
research was that donor support tends to 
assist and benefit already established and 
developed CSOs, often neglecting smaller and 
less-developed organisations. One of the main 
recommendations of the research was that 
structured donor coordination – to include a 
wide array of bilateral, private and multilateral 
donors – was needed to avoid duplication 
and increase the effectiveness of donors’ 
assistance to CSOs.
Extending the Research:  
Methodology
Whilst the initial research provided a good 
snapshot of the donor presence in the 
Western Balkans, it was perceived necessary 
to gather detailed and additional data about 
how donors determine their priorities and 
devise their aid programming; more analysis 
of their motivations for engagement in the 
region and their plans for the future was 
required. For this purpose, the questionnaire 
data were complemented with more fine-
grained interview data from representatives 
of international agencies involved in aid 
programming for this report. The respondents 
from the survey in the pilot study had identified 
the EU and USAID as the most important 
donors in the Western Balkans. The budgetary 
data collected in the survey indicated that in 
addition to these two donors, both SIDA and 
the Open Society Foundation have a strong 
presence in the region in terms of civil society 
support. For such reasons, these four donors 
were identified as primary respondents for 
this report and representatives from each of 
their offices in the region were interviewed. 
For the primary respondents, it was also 
important to distinguish between strategic 
actors involved in aid planning (e.g. directors 
and heads of development cooperation) 
and those involved in programming (e.g. 
task managers and officers for civil society 
support). Through consultations with BCSDN 
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and its partners, the research team identified 
further donors that are pivotal actors in some 
places in the Western Balkans. These donors 
were used as additional respondents for this 
study. Moreover, to minimise duplication 
with previous studies and to better link with 
existing research, the researchers cooperated 
with Kosovar Civil Society Foundation (KCSF) 
and used their interview data from a recent 
study on civil society development in Kosovo 
instead of collecting new data. The final list of 
respondents is presented below.
To draw out the specific expertise of the 
respondents, the researchers developed two 
separate interview schedules for strategic 
and programme-level personnel. Strategic 
personnel were asked about: motives for 
remaining in the Western Balkans; long-term 
plans for the future; how their strategies are 
developed; how local priorities are reflected 
in programming decisions; coordination 
with other international agencies; whether 
they have a specific approach to civil society 
development; and their perceptions about 
local CSOs. On the other hand, programme-
level respondents were asked about 
practices and modalities relevant to civil 
society development, particularly: details of 
programmes; how programmes are converted 
into projects or other actions; implementation 
of programmes; and their relationship 
with local CSOs. The complete interview 
questionnaire is included in Annex 2.
The information in the following sections is 
based on 84 semi-structured face-to-face 
interviews with representatives of international 
agencies conducted between September 2013 
and February 2014. Most of the interviews 
were recorded and transcribed verbatim in 
their original language. When interviewees 
did not wish to be recorded, the information 
was collected through taking notes. A number 
of interviewees agreed to meet with the 
researchers, but did not want to be quoted in 
this report, and are thus not included in the 
final set of respondents.
Structure of the Report
The following sections of this report synthesise 
the interview data collected for this research, 
along with the data from the pilot study and 
the aforementioned KCSF report on donor 
strategies in Kosovo. The first part of the 
Primary Respondents                   
•	 EU
•	 USAID
•	 Open Society
•	 Swedish SIDA
Supplementary Respondents                          
Albania: WB, Swiss  Cooperation Office, UNDP, OSCE, German Embassy , Dutch Embassy, US Embassy
Bosnia-Herzegovina: Norway/NORAD, World Bank, UNDP, GIZ, Swiss Cooperation Office , UK Embassy
Macedonia:  UNCT Swiss Cooperation Office , Netherlands Embassy, GIZ, UK Embassy
Montenegro: World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF, German Embassy, GIZ, UK Embassy
Serbia: Norway/NORAD (also covers  Macedonia, and Montenegro), World Bank, Swiss Cooperation 
Office , UNDP, OSCE, UNICEF, Netherlands Embassy, GIZ, UK Embassy, ERSTE Foundation (covers the 
whole Western Balkans), Balkan Trust for Democracy (covers the whole Western Balkans) 
Kosovo: KCSF interview data and personal interviews with Swiss Cooperation Office, UK Embassy, 
Kosovo Foundation for Open Society (KFOS), OSCE, Swedish SIDA.
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Donor Strategies (Strategic Personnel)                  
• Discuss the motives for donor presence and plans for the future
• Discuss how donor strategies are developed
• Discuss to what extent donors take into account local priorities in the development of their strate-
gies:
• Discuss donor coordination
• Explore donor approach to development and the how they envisage the role of civil society
Donor Strategies (Strategic Personnel)                  
• Discuss the details of the programme
• Discuss how programmes are turned into projects
• Discuss how the programmes are implemented
• Relationship with local CSOs
• Explore how donors control the implementation of programmes
• Supplementary respondents
report examines donor responses regarding 
the role of CSOs in donor programming before 
formulating a typology of modalities of donor 
assistance related to civil society development. 
The second section concludes with general 
donor perceptions about civil society across 
the region and also highlights country-specific 
issues, as well as respondents’ perspectives 
about the long-term sustainability of CSOs 
in the region. The second part consists of 
a series of county-level summaries. For 
each country in the Western Balkans, the 
following are examined: current levels of donor 
budgetary support; motives for continued 
presence in the country; long-term plans; 
modalities of aid planning and programming; 
donor coordination; and donor assistance 
to CSOs. The final part of the report offers 
conclusions based on the data collected during 
the research. These findings inform a set of 
recommendations for international donors to 
more effectively develop local civil society in 
light of the broader social and political contexts 
in the Western Balkans, particularly given 
recent citizen-led mobilisations across the 
region without active CSO participation. 
Part I  Regional Outlook
1. The Role of Civil 
Society in Donor 
Programmes
1.1. The Substance of  
Civil Society Assistance
One of the key objectives of this research was 
to establish what role donors envisage for civil 
society in their programmes. The substance of 
civil society assistance in the Western Balkans 
(WB) has been researched by academics and 
practitioners elsewhere. Nevertheless, in 
view of the donors’ ever changing agendas 
and priorities, there was a need to update and 
build a more in-depth analysis of how donors 
envisage the role of civil society. 
The existing literature suggests that there 
has been a shift in donors’ agenda from 
democracy-promotion to building good 
governance in the mid-2000s. Civil society 
development was indeed high on the priority 
list of international donors in the early 2000s. 
At the time, civil society was seen as a key 
element in pushing forward the process of 
democratisation through civic activism. The 
idea was to encourage civic engagement 
and generate demand for democracy ‘from 
the ground up’ in an attempt to develop 
participation, active cooperation, deliberation 
and reciprocal trust.1 Most donors have moved 
on from this agenda in the second half of the 
2000s. The bulk of foreign assistance now 
goes towards increasing the capacities of the 
state administration and building ‘democratic 
governance’ in which CSOs play a key role 
in monitoring the activities of the state, 
contributing to policy-making and pressuring 
the government to carry out reforms. As a 
result, civil society development has become 
‘a subordinate objective prioritised in the 
context of building the political and institutional 
1 Brown, Keith (ed.) Transacting Transition: The 
Micropolitics of Democracy Assistance in the Former 
Yugoslavia (Bloomfield CT : Kumarian Press, 2006)
capacity of states rather than specifically in 
terms of democratic consolidation’.2 In other 
words, civil society development is not an end 
in itself, but a means for policy development 
and implementation. 
Overall, our research corroborates these 
findings. Multilateral and bilateral donors 
primarily work with state institutions, with 
varying degree of assistance to civil society. 
For instance, GIZ, which is one of the most 
important bilateral implementing agencies 
in the region, almost exclusively channels its 
aid to state institutions. CSOs are secondary 
actors that are occasionally involved in 
the implementation of some projects.  An 
interviewee from GIZ Macedonia thus stated 
that civil society support is a side-effect of 
their intervention, not an intended objective.3 
This preference for channelling aid to state 
institutions often derives from the perception 
that this type of assistance is more effective 
and sustainable than civil society assistance. 
This view is epitomized by the statement of the 
UNICEF Representative in Podgorica:
Well, we have a budget of a couple of a 
million a year. But we do not really fit 
into your model of a donor, like the NGO 
comes with a project and gets funding. 
We’ve passed that in the Balkans, it’s 
not really our role here nor should it 
be. We are actually quite sceptical that 
sometimes it does more harm than good 
with NGOs. (...) The paradigm of we’re 
coming and doing a lot of activities and 
then giving money to NGOs to support 
these activities – this is the past, people 
shouldn’t work like this anymore. 
Because of the Paris declaration, 
there should be a focus very much on 
government reform. Where reform is not 
happening, it is for civil society and media 
to advocate for that and of course we do 
2 Fagan, Adam. Europe’s Balkan Dilemma: Paths to 
Civil Society or State-Building (I.B Tauris, 2010)
3  Interview with an official at GIZ in Macedonia.
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This shift in the focus of assistance from civil 
society to state institutions is largely driven 
by the process of EU integration which is the 
main objective for most donors in the region. 
According to Torgny Svenungsson, the Head of 
Swedish Development Cooperation in Serbia, 
the main focus of SIDA’s intervention in Serbia 
is ‘padding the way for the EU accession and 
that is about the capacity of the administration, 
of agencies, of ministries, of municipalities to 
be able to comply with the Acquis and with the 
directives and the EU regulations’.8 As a result, 
civil society assistance is seen by most donors 
as complementary to the broader government 
assistance programmes. 
From this perspective, civil society has three 
principal functions in donor programmes. 
The first is to monitor the activities of the 
state and act as a watchdog towards state 
institutions in order to push for government 
transparency and accountability. Civil society 
is thus primarily seen as a mechanism of 
checks and balances which constitutes a key 
element for building good governance. The 
second function attributed to civil society is 
to provide input to policy-making and law-
making, and to advocate progressive change 
in society. Many donors consider that civil 
society should play a key role in creating a 
dialogue between elected representatives 
and their constituents in order to get citizens 
actively involved in decision-making. Finally, 
donors often resort to CSOs when there is 
no willingness or capacity to act on specific 
issues on the part of the government. CSOs are 
indeed often used to create pressure or open 
public dialogue about issues that are not on the 
agenda or to circumvent public bodies that are 
not willing to cooperate. In some cases, donors 
draw on service-provision CSOs to carry out 
‘pilot projects’ which are then ‘offered’ to the 
government. 
8 Interview with officials at the Swedish Embassy in 
Serbia. 
human rights diplomacy but it’s behind 
the scenes.4
As a result of this focus on government 
reform, there is a general trend among 
donors of re-directing activities from CSOs to 
state institutions. When the UK embassy in 
Podgorica opened in 2006/2007, 100 per cent 
of assistance was allocated to CSOs. Since 
then, funding has increased but the priorities 
have changed. Today, only one third of projects 
are channelled through CSOs.5 
There are nonetheless important differences 
between donors and among donor offices in 
different countries. For example, the Swiss 
Cooperation Offices have different approaches 
in different countries. On the one hand, the 
Swiss Cooperation Office (SCO) in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (BiH) closed down its civil society 
development programme between 2002 and 
2004 because it was considered that the 
capacities of the state administration had 
increased. This was part of a strategic shift 
from civil society support to state institutions 
support, which is seen as being more 
sustainable. Accordingly, in the medium- or 
long-term, the state should take over those 
activities where CSOs are currently seen as 
‘natural partners’.6 On the other hand, the 
SCO’s office in Pristina has developed a civil 
society programme in response to the shift 
in donor support from civil society to state 
institutions. This decision was brought in 
response to the ‘need for supporting medium-
size projects and organisations with flexible 
instruments that can respond to emerging 
needs in the areas of minority integration, 
gender equality and citizen participation in the 
dynamic context of Kosovo’.7
4 Interview with the UNICEF Representative in 
Montenegro.
5 Interview with an official at the UK Embassy in 
Montenegro.
6 Interview with officials at the Swiss Cooperation 
Office in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
7 Retrieved from http://www.swiss-cooperation.admin.
ch/kosovo/en/Home/Domains_of_Cooperation/
Democratic_Governance_and_Decentralisation/
Democratic_Society_Promotion on 29 April. 2014.
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1.2. Donor Views on Civil Society  
Development
In line with earlier studies, this research shows 
that, on the whole, civil society development is 
no longer a priority on the donor agenda. Most 
of the donors that have supported civil society 
development in the past consider that this is no 
longer a priority because they reckon that there 
is an established civil society in the region. 
For instance, the Fund for an Open Society 
in Serbia (FOS) does not any longer provide 
generic capacity building or training for CSOs. 
According to Jadranka Jelinčić, the Fund’s 
Executive Director, this is something that was 
necessary 20 years when civil society was 
being established. Nowadays, FOS supports 
the development of specific expertise for CSOs 
to be able to take part in policy-making or EU 
integration processes.9 
This shift in donor approach to civil society 
assistance is visible across the region. Silva 
Pešić, the Human Rights Advisor at the UN 
in Macedonia, suggested that there was a 
time when donors invested a lot in developing 
civil society which was seen as a pillar of 
democratisation. This has led to the emergence 
of a strong and capable civil society, while 
the state administration was lacking capacity. 
Since then, the bulk of donor assistance 
has been re-oriented towards building state 
capacity while the space for civil society has 
been narrowed down.10 
The main argument against civil society 
development programmes is that civil society 
should not be funded for its own sake. Instead, 
CSOs should only be supported to carry out 
specific tasks. This view transpires from the 
statement given by a World Bank official in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina:
9 Interview with Jadranka Jelinčić, Director of the FOS 
in Serbia. 
10 Interview with Silva Pešić, Human Rights Advisor 
at the Office of the UN Resident Coordinator in 
Macedonia.
I cannot believe that any donor has the 
objective to fund civil society. If this is 
true, I think that this is disastrous. The 
aim should be to achieve some progress 
in something, and the way to achieve 
this goal may be through partnerships 
with civil society organizations, that 
is, through funding some civil society 
organizations programmes. Why do I 
react in this way? Precisely because, 
in this country, the mantra of funding 
civil society has turned to the opposite, 
where civil society organizations were 
created not to respond to some objective 
social need, but primarily because there 
were resources for funding certain civil 
society activities, because there were 
entire programmes of assistance to civil 
society. 
These programmes have encouraged 
the formation of a number of civil society 
organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
many of which are not sustainable and 
many of which were formed in a supply-
driven manner, and not in a demand-
driven manner, not to respond to the 
objective needs of the community, society 
and so on. Each of us can find a need, 
but the truth is that these organizations 
were formed in order to use the available 
donor funds. Today, when those funds 
are no longer there, we see that many of 
these organizations have disappeared. 
Today, we see the formation of new 
organisations which are really demand 
driven and this is the real thing.11
In line with this train of thought, donors 
increasingly tend to perceive CSOs as partners 
rather than recipients of assistance. The UNDP 
in Serbia used to dedicate 70-80 per cent 
of its projects to civil society development, 
capacity-building or some other form of 
assistance to civil society. Since the capacities 
of CSOs have reached a certain level, UNDP’s 
11 Interview with an official at the World Bank office in 
BiH.
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mode of cooperation with civil society has 
evolved towards using the expertise of these 
organisations in specific areas. Instead of being 
prioritised as recipients of assistance, CSOs 
compete for funding with private companies 
or state institutions by applying for tenders.12 
Similarly, UNICEF partners with CSOs in trying 
to push their agenda forward in Montenegro. 
CSOs are exclusively supported in a non-
financial way through advice or technical 
assistance.13 The same applies for the SCO in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina which includes CSOs in 
most programmes as a necessary component 
for achieving the objectives of those 
programmes.14 From this perspective, CSOs 
are seen as a means to achieve specific ends.
The Scandinavian bilateral donors are a notable 
exception to the donors’ fading interest in civil 
society development. The Norwegian Embassy 
in Belgrade still supports the broadening of 
CSOs so that there are civil society actors in 
key fields of social development, which may 
explain why it dedicates so much funding to 
civil society. According to Roger Jorgensen, 
the Deputy Head of Mission of the Norwegian 
Embassy in Belgrade, the overall objective 
is to make a general contribution to social 
and political development through a broad 
development of the field of actors in civil 
society.15 The Swedish government sees civil 
society both as a means and as an end. This 
means that SIDA has a section related to 
building a civil society enabling environment, in 
general, but then they also see the possibility 
to work with civil society in specific sectors 
or result areas. SIDA supports civil society 
as an end in itself because it considers that 
civil society is a key for the functioning of 
democracy. According to an official from 
the Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo, there 
is a very clear message from the Swedish 
12 Interview with an official at the UNDP office in Serbia.
13 Interview with the UNICEF Representative in 
Montenegro.
14 Interview with officials at the SCO office in BiH.
15 Interview with officials at the Norwegian Embassy in 
Serbia.
government that civil society is a priority, that 
‘every country needs a strong civil society 
as an alternative voice, partly giving a voice 
to citizens in a democratic function sort of 
sense’.16 SIDA also engages with CSOs as a 
means for achieving specific goals such as 
gender equality, justice reform or environment 
for which CSOs often play an important role 
both as a watchdog and in terms of advocacy.
1.3. Country-Specific Issues
While most of the assistance channelled 
through CSOs in the region is aimed at building 
good governance, democracy promotion is still 
a priority on the donor agenda in Macedonia, 
and to a certain extent, in BiH due to the specific 
political circumstances in these countries. Also, 
many donors are still working on post-conflict 
reconstruction in Kosovo where inter-ethnic 
relations remain a major issue.
MACEDONIA
Several donors have stated that the political 
situation in Macedonia started to go downhill 
after the Bucharest summit in 2008 when the 
country’s bid to join NATO was turned down. 
Since then, the ruling party is alleged to have 
endorsed nationalism and populism in an 
attempt to take control over every part of 
society, including civil society. The situation 
was made worst by the postponing of the EU 
negotiations which, according to an official 
from the Dutch Embassy, has substantially 
diminished the leverage of the EU. While in the 
past, government representatives gave a lot 
of importance to the recommendations issued 
in the EU progress report, this is allegedly no 
longer the case. As a result, the government 
and the political elites are less inclined to 
cooperate with civil society and Macedonian 
politicians are increasingly challenging the 
legitimacy of civil society on the basis that 
CSOs do not genuinely represent the citizens.17 
16 Interview with an official at the Swedish Embassy in 
BiH. 
17 Interview with an official at the Dutch Embassy in 
Macedonia.
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The perceived resurgence of authoritarianism 
in Macedonia has led several donors to 
refocus their assistance from EU integration 
to democracy promotion and human rights 
protection. The Foundation Open Society 
– Macedonia (FOSM) has decided to close 
a project called ‘Citizens for a European 
Macedonia’ which consisted in organising 
debates around Macedonia on the name of 
the country, the EU and NATO integration 
processes, economic problems, etc. because 
they realised that EU integration is no longer 
the most important priority, that it is more 
important to focus on democracy and basic 
human rights which have been put under 
threat.18 Both USAID and FOSM reintroduced 
their media programmes, which were closed 
in 2005 and 2007 respectively, in response to 
the government’s crackdown on independent 
media. Supporting the media is seen as key for 
allowing other activities (monitoring, advocacy) 
to take place. Without independent media, 
CSOs working in the field of monitoring and 
advocacy cannot inform the public about their 
activities and their findings.
The current political situation is not a matter 
of consensus among donors in Macedonia. 
The EUD representatives have downplayed 
the influence of the political context on 
their activities. In their view, the change of 
government has not influenced their work 
because the government priorities have 
remained the same. Accordingly, things are 
moving slower but the postponing of the 
negotiations process has not diminished the 
leverage of the EU.19 The EUD officials in Skopje 
primarily see civil society as a partner in the 
process of EU integration. Irena Ivanova, the 
Civil Society Task Manager at the EUD, stated 
that the EUD does not only perceive civil 
society as their grantees, but that they seek 
to utilise the expertise of CSOs in different 
areas. In her view, CSOs are a valuable 
18 Interview with an official at the FOSM office in 
Macedonia. 
19 Interview with officials at the EUD office in 
Macedonia.
source of expertise which can compensate 
for the lack of institutional memory in 
government institutions where there is a high 
turnover owing to the frequent changes of 
government.20
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
In the case of BiH, the work of donors has been 
heavily affected by state disfunctionalities and 
the lack of political will to work together at 
different levels of government. According to a 
SIDA official in Sarajevo, the political situation 
affects donors in several ways. At the highest 
level, there is often no effective institution at 
the national level. National institutions either 
do not exist or do not have political support 
for being functional. In the case where there 
are effective national institutions, these 
institutions are often undermined by the 
entity, which prevents the development and 
adoption of national plans and strategies. 
Finally, the parliament and other institutions 
are constantly the theatre of political squabbles 
which divert the politicians’ attention and 
energy from much needed reforms.21 
This political environment has had a very 
concrete impact on donor activities in BiH. For 
example, the EUD has helped BiH to develop 
strategies in social inclusion with UNICEF. 
However, it took one year to get the strategy 
approved (in parliament) and it still has not 
been approved by the Council of Ministers.22 
SIDA’s project on juvenile justice, which 
involved developing a national strategy for 
juvenile justice, did not bear fruit because 
of the Republika Srpska’s opposition to the 
adoption of this strategy.23 In response to this 
state of affairs, the EU has decided to cut the 
IPA 2013 allocation for BiH by half and suspend 
the preparation of the Country Strategy Paper 
for IPA II. The EU has conditioned IPA II upon 
20 Ibid.
21 Interview with an official at the Swedish Embassy in 
BiH.
22 Interview with an official at the EUD office in BiH.
23 Interview with an official at the Swedish Embassy in 
BiH.
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the establishment of a national coordination 
body for the implementation of IPA and the 
development of sectoral strategies by the 
Bosnian administration.
Bilateral donors have also taken measures in 
response to the precarious political situation in 
BiH. The UK embassy has recently reintroduced 
a programme focusing on strengthening civil 
society as it was considered that there is 
insufficient dialogue between political elites 
and the public.24 This initiative followed the 
visit of UK Foreign Secretary, William Hague, 
to BiH and the realization that the political 
process was ‘stuck’. The representatives of 
the UK embassy suggested that there is a 
trend among CSOs to move from advocacy to 
service-delivery, which they seek to revert. 
Rather than using CSOs for service-delivery, 
they seek to increase the capacity of CSOs 
to lobby and advocate on various issues. 
In a similar vein, the Norwegian embassy 
has refocused its assistance to civil society 
on rights-based advocacy CSOs in order to 
promote bottom-up social change. According 
to a representative from the Norwegian 
Embassy, this is complementary to the 
assistance provided to state institutions as a 
‘functioning democracy also needs to have an 
equally well functioning civil society sector’.25
KOSOVO
While the overriding priority of most donors 
in Kosovo is to build good governance and 
accountability, some donors are still actively 
involved in post-conflict reconstruction. 
For instance, 70-80 per cent of the UK’s 
Conflict Prevention Programme in Kosovo is 
directed towards minorities.26 Together with 
the EU, the UK embassy provides financial 
support for the return of refugees. This is 
a very expensive programme as it involves 
building houses and helping returnees to 
24 Interview with officials at the UK Embassy in BiH.
25 Interview with an official at the Norwegian Embassy 
in BiH. 
26 Interview with an official at the UK Embassy in 
Kosovo.
develop income generating activities. The 
UK embassy draws on private companies or 
CSOs to implement these activities. Another 
typical example of post-conflict reconstruction 
is the ‘Reconnecting Mitrovica’ programme 
developed by the Kosovo Foundation for 
Open Society (KFOS). This is one of the key 
programmes in KFOS’s forthcoming strategy. 
According to Luan Shllaku, the Foundation’s 
Executive Director, the objective of this 
initiative is to change the political and social 
climate in Northern Kosovo and to promote 
democratization through the expansion of 
civil society.27 This programme will be carried 
out in cooperation with the EU which will 
substantially invest in the development of civil 
society in North Kosovo in the coming years.
         
2. Modalities  
of Civil Society  
Assistance  
2.1. Typology of Civil Society  
Assistance
The modalities of donor assistance to civil 
society constituted a very important part of this 
research. Although this may seem as a merely 
technical issue, it is only through the analysis 
of how assistance is channelled to CSOs that 
we can understand the relationship between 
donors and civil society. The way in which civil 
society assistance is delivered determines the 
level of ownership that local actors have in the 
development and implementation of projects, 
and the modus operandi of most CSOs. This 
section provides an overview of the most 
common approaches to civil society assistance 
in the Western Balkans and an analysis 
of donors’ rationale for resorting to these 
mechanisms or avoiding them.
27 Interview with Luan Shllaku, Executive Director of the 
KFOS in Kosovo.
19Balkan Civic Practices # 11
Project grant-making
Project grant-making is the most widespread 
modality of assistance to civil society. It 
consists in donors issuing grants to CSOs for 
short to medium-term projects (usually up 
to 2 years). These grants are generally issued 
through Calls for Proposals (CfP): donors 
identify priorities and objectives they want to 
see achieved and CSOs apply with projects that 
seek to attain these objectives. The methods of 
granting vary considerably between donors in 
terms of procedure and in terms of the level of 
CSO ownership in the development of projects. 
For example, while some donors have rolling 
calls throughout the year, others have set 
deadlines for application. 
The level of cooperation between donors and 
CSOs in the development of projects varies 
from case to case. Some donors issue ‘blind 
calls’ for which the priorities and criteria are 
entirely defined by the donors. In this case, 
CSOs apply with fully developed projects that 
fit into these pre-defined priorities. Others 
cooperate with, or provide assistance to, 
CSOs in the development of projects. This 
usually takes place either through informal 
communication between donors and CSOs 
before a formal application for funding has 
been made or through donor assistance in 
the development of those projects which have 
been shortlisted. In some cases, donors send 
a request for application from a closed list 
of CSOs. For example, KFOS usually makes 
restricted calls for proposals.28 It first invites a 
selection of CSOs to participate in workshops 
on specific issues. During these workshops, 
CSO representatives from the region are invited 
to present examples of successful projects. 
KFOS then hires coaches to help CSOs develop 
their projects before opening a formal CfP. The 
Dutch embassy in Albania also resorts to this 
procedure because their capacities are not high 
and they prefer to work with stable CSOs.29 
28 Ibid.
29 Interview with an official at the Dutch Embassy in 
Albania.
Donors have a preference for project grant-
making because this allows them to provide 
funding to a broad range of CSOs. This is seen 
as having a bigger impact than providing long-
term funding to a limited number of CSOs. 
This rationale is advanced by Svetlana Ðukić, 
the Civil Society Task Manager at the EUD in 
Belgrade, in the following terms:
We now have projects for up to 18 
months. Our resources are limited to 
100,000 euros. I do not see the point of an 
extension of the period of implementation 
of the projects to 48 months if you have 
limited resources. So, we have €2m 
per year for the whole of Serbia. Which 
means that, on average, 20 organizations 
can get funding. Another method would 
be to help five organizations, and no one 
else, so that they have their operating 
costs and institutional costs covered 
for, let’s say, the next 4 years. And this 
is now a question of strategic choice – 
what is better? So we have opted for this 
mechanism of giving up to 18 months 
for specific project activities within the 
scope of the resources that are available 
to us. We do not provide €300-400,000 
grants so that they could have long 
term [support]. And I do not know what 
would be the benefit of giving long-term 
[assistance]. (...) I essentially do not see 
what this would make better for civil 
society. I mean, I would love to hear it 
because I often hear it.30 
Another reason for the popularity of project-
grant making is that this mode of assistance 
gives donors a lot of flexibility in terms of 
defining priorities and substantial control in 
the implementation of projects. There is a 
perception among donors that it is much easier 
to carry out monitoring and evaluation for 
projects than to assess to what extent CSOs 
have fulfilled their annual plans (see below). 
30 Interview with Svetlana Ðukić, Task Manager for Civil 
Society at the EUD office in Serbia.  
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Besides, project grant-making allows donors 
to fund short-term initiatives tackling specific 
issues. Many donors consider that this is a key 
dimension of CSO activities, which is why even 
those donors that prioritise other modalities 
of assistance often include a project grant-
making dimension in their programmes.
Nevertheless, many donors would concede 
that this form of assistance has led to the 
development of ‘donor-driven’ civil society (see 
Chapter 3: Donor Views on Civil Society). Since 
most of the time CSOs have little ownership 
in the definition of priorities, they end up as 
implementing agencies pursuing donors’ 
agendas. As a result, CSOs are devoid of their 
substance and they are cut off from their 
constituents. For these reasons, some donors 
have resorted to institutional support for CSOs.  
Institutional grant-making
Institutional grants consist in providing 
CSOs with multi-year budget support for the 
implementation of their long-term strategic 
plans and objectives. Instead of applying 
for funding with projects that seek to meet 
priorities set by donors, CSOs get financial 
assistance on the basis of their annual plans. 
In principle, donors select beneficiaries on the 
basis of whether they support an organisation’s 
vision and mission. CSOs thus have full 
ownership in the identification of priorities and 
the implementation of projects.
Very few donors provide this type of assistance 
in the Western Balkans. This is exclusively 
done by the Swiss Cooperation Offices in 
Macedonia and Kosovo, SIDA in Kosovo, and 
the Norwegian Embassy in Belgrade which 
covers Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. 
The SCO office in Macedonia highlighted 
institutional support as their main approach 
to civil society assistance. In the first phase of 
the project Civica Mobilitas, which is one of the 
biggest civil society programmes in Macedonia, 
two-thirds of the grants disbursed by the SCO 
were institutional grants and one-third were 
project grants. The institutional grants cover 50 
per cent of the recipient CSO’s annual budget 
for a three-year perspective. The renewal of the 
support each year is conditioned upon the CSO 
implementing its annual programme.31
It is important to emphasise that those donors 
who provide institutional grants also provide 
project grants because some CSO activities 
are time-limited and specific to a certain 
context. Luan Shllaku from KFOS argues that 
it is unprofessional to pre-define the amount 
of institutional versus project funding.32 In his 
view, the point is to use both instruments to 
reach some goals. Visare Gorani Gashi from 
the SIDA office in Kosovo also considers 
that donors should resort to both project- 
and institutional grants because these two 
instruments serve different purposes. In her 
view, while institutional grants allow CSOs to 
get some liberty and stability, project grants 
are necessary for supporting ad hoc, goal-
oriented initiatives.33
The main rationale for supporting CSOs 
with institutional grants is that this allows 
organisations to develop and implement 
their own ideas and projects instead of being 
donor-driven. A SIDA official in BiH stated 
that the main rationale for core funding is 
that ‘it allows an organisation to be true to 
its own mission and mandate’. Supposedly, 
this type of assistance allows CSOs address 
the needs of their communities and establish 
strong links with their constituencies. The 
SCO representatives in Macedonia stated that 
they opted for this type of support because 
they ‘would like to see civil society, all NGOs, 
working for their constituencies; that [CSOs] 
have a basis rooted in Macedonia and work for 
the citizens –  to work for the citizens and not 
mainly work for the donors. This is the ideal’.34
31 Interview with officials at the SCO office in Macedonia.
32 Interview with Luan Shllaku, Executive Director of the 
KFOS in Kosovo.
33 Interview with Visare Gorani Gashi, Programme 
Officer for Development Cooperation at the Embassy 
of Sweden in Kosovo.
34 Interview with officials at the SCO office in Macedonia.
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Besides giving ownership to CSOs, institutional 
grants also give them more long-term 
security, which allows organisations to have 
more creativity in their work. The Norwegian 
embassy in Belgrade opted for this type of 
support because it allows CSOs to work 
on long-term goals. According to Roger 
Jorgensen, ‘the energy of reaching those 
goals can be reduced by overly focusing on 
project activities in a short term’.35 The SCO in 
Macedonia also opted for institutional support 
in order to stimulate more creativity and give 
organisations a bit of security. They are aware 
that with project funding, CSOs spend most of 
their time applying for projects and reporting, 
which leaves them with little space for quality 
work. Institutional funding is thus deemed to 
reduce transaction costs, it gives CSOs much 
more time so that they could effectively use the 
grants.36 
There is, nonetheless, a lot of reluctance to 
giving institutional funding among donors in 
the Western Balkans. The typical argument 
against this type of assistance is that it 
leads to inertia, inefficiency and waste of 
funds. This conviction is based on the view 
that institutional funding allocated by the 
state authorities has led to the emergence 
and maintenance of organisations that are 
completely inactive or inefficient. According 
to Džemal Hodžić, Programme Manager at 
the EUD in Sarajevo, organisations should not 
be funded just to exist. In his view, it is much 
more efficient to fund targeted projects that 
will deliver tangible results:
Here’s a trivial example: there are 
often wartime associations in each 
municipality, and not one but five. They 
all receive grants from the municipal 
budget. It is mostly for offices, phone, 
personal assistants, etc... There are no 
project activities and, if there are any, 
these are some celebrations, some 
35 Interview with officials at the Norwegian Embassy in 
Serbia.
36 Interview with officials at the SCO office in Macedonia.
commemorations, and that’s it. However, 
if the money was redirected to provide 
professional training for war disabled 
or demobilised, unemployed, former 
soldiers, this would create the conditions 
for their employment. For example, you 
have a hundred demobilized combatants, 
all of whom are unemployed. Out of 
this money, you take 10 of them and 
provide them with training and perhaps 
even some equipment that they need, 
for example, for greenhouse vegetable 
production. Those 10 [veterans] 
generate their own income, they cease 
to be unemployed, they are no longer a 
problem. You have this problem of 100 
reduced by 10. This is an efficient use of 
resources. But to give them operating 
grants only to exist, that is not very 
efficient nor, let’s say, desirable at the 
present time when there is not enough 
money.37 
Some donors consider that the time of 
institutional funding has passed. This view was 
prevalent among Open Society Foundation 
representatives who consider that institutional 
grants essentially serve for the creation and 
broadening of CSOs. Luan Shllaku thus argues 
that there is no point in giving grants for the 
mushrooming of CSOs in 2014. Instead, he 
considers that it is now time to identify what 
needs to be changed in society and support 
those organisations which can do the job.38 
According to Jadranka Jelinčić from FOS, a 
donor’s tendency to resort to institutional 
grant-making depends on the ability of 
CSOs to elaborate long-term strategies and 
development plans. In her view, many CSOs 
lack this ability because they are dependent 
on donors who are not willing to align their 
priorities with those of civil society.39 Many 
donors also consider that institutional grants 
37 Interview with Džemal Hodžić, Programme Manager 
at the EUD in BiH.
38 Interview with Luan Shllaku, Executive Director of the 
KFOS in Kosovo.
39 Interview with Jadranka Jelinčić, Director of the FOS 
in Serbia.
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make CSOs even more donor-dependent than 
project-grants and that this type of assistance 
would make it very difficult for them to monitor 
and evaluate the work of CSOs.
In spite of these reservations, an 
increasing number of donors is considering 
introducing institutional grant-making in 
their programmes. There are indeed some 
indications that the EU could resort to this 
type of assistance.40 According to the EUD 
officials in Montenegro, the EU rules allow for 
institutional funding, but the EUD has chosen 
not do so because this ‘has simply not been 
identified in the needs of the overall assistance 
package for this country’.41 SIDA is also 
considering introducing institutional grant-
making as a tool for supporting civil society 
in its new regional strategy. According to a 
SIDA official in BiH, core funding as a model 
of civil society assistance is quite common in 
African countries. However, this is not the case 
in the Balkans because ‘there are not many 
donors here who have sort of a development 
perspective’.42
Civil society assistance through  
implementing partners
This type of assistance, which is progressively 
being phased out in the WB, involves 
donors delivering support to CSOs through 
an organisation from their home country, 
an international organisation or a private 
consultancy. These implementing partners 
usually have long-standing partnerships with 
local CSOs. The common procedure for the 
allocation of funding is that implementing 
partners develop projects in cooperation with 
local CSOs before submitting their applications 
to donors. 
SIDA has thus implemented all its civil society 
programmes in the Western Balkans through 
40 Interview with Resident Advisor at the TACSO offices 
in Serbia and Albania.
41 Interview with officials at the EUD office in 
Montenegro. 
42 Interview with an official at the Embassy of Sweden in 
BiH.
partner organisations from Sweden and other 
countries. The same applies to USAID with 
the exception of BiH where USAID’s office has 
been using local partners since 2001. Some 
donors have channelled only parts of their 
programmes through implementing partners. 
For instance, the EU’s Technical Assistance to 
CSOs (TACSO) project is being implemented by 
the Swedish consultancy SIPU International. 
Bilateral donors have extensively resorted to 
international organisations such as UNDP and 
OSCE for implementing their programmes. 
These agencies are competing for donor 
funding with local CSOs because their own 
budgets are shrinking. In some countries, Open 
Society Foundations also act as implementing 
partners for other donors in addition to being 
grant-giving foundations. 
Donors primarily resorted to this type of 
assistance because they considered that local 
CSOs did not have the capacity to absorb 
and administer funding. USAID resorted 
to American organisations because they 
were familiar with USAID procedures, which 
substantially reduced their transaction costs. 
SIDA’s rationale for resorting to Swedish 
implementing partners in BiH and Kosovo 
was that there were few CSOs with developed 
capacities right after the conflict, so this was 
a mechanism to reach out to very small, not 
well-established, organisations.43 SIDA officials 
consider that the situation is still ‘quite fragile’ 
in Kosovo in terms of CSOs that would be able 
to absorb the assistance according to the rules 
and regulations of Sweden.44 
Another important argument in favour of 
this type of assistance is that it promotes the 
transfer of technical capacities, knowledge, 
experience and organizational thinking from 
well-established Western organisations 
to local CSOs. The continuous relationship 
between implementing organisations and 
local CSOs facilitates the development of 
knowledge and expertise which allows them 
43  Ibid.
44  Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Kosovo.
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to offer innovative solutions. In Kosovo, 
Swedish organisations contributed to the 
building of local capacities, especially for 
women organisations which play a particularly 
important role there. Visare Gorani Gashi 
argues that channelling assistance through 
implementing partners was a win-win situation 
because these are organisations that have 
credibility both in technical terms and in terms 
of knowing the context which allowed them 
to support the development of local CSOs’ 
capacities.45
In some cases, donors channel their support 
through implementing partners because they 
consider that it is politically too sensitive to do 
it via CSOs. A representative from the Dutch 
Embassy in Macedonia thus stated that they 
resort to implementing partners because it is 
sometimes ‘politically too sensitive to channel 
it through the civil society, especially because 
civil society is very much aligned with the 
political parties’.46 The Embassy is thus funding 
a Dutch-Belgian consultancy in order to advise 
the committee which has been established 
in order to overcome the political crisis in 
parliament. There are also some instances 
where donors resort to implementing agencies 
in order to avert corruption. In Albania, the 
EU’s service contract for supporting children’s 
rights was given to UNICEF which is in charge 
of the grant management in order to reduce 
the risk of misuse of funds.47 Besides being 
more reliable, donors generally consider 
that international implementing partners 
provide better quality of service than local 
organisations.
In spite of this, most donors have decided to 
phase out this type of assistance for several 
reasons. First of all, the long-standing 
cooperation between implementing partners 
and selected CSOs limits the number of 
45 Ibid.
46 Interview with an official at the Dutch Embassy in 
Macedonia. 
47 Interview with Resident Advisor at the TACSO office in 
Albania,
beneficiaries and the possibility to include 
new partners and new initiatives in the 
programmes. Most implementing agencies 
have their pool of partner organisations which 
limits the possibility for new organisations 
to benefit from assistance. In addition, this 
mode of assistance limits the ownership and 
developmental potential of local CSOs. Once 
the capacities of local organisations are built-
up, their opportunities for further development 
are limited because they tend to stay ‘below 
the radar’ owing to the preponderance of 
implementing partners. As a result, the 
fact that donors resort to implementing 
partners occasionally creates tensions within 
civil society. As one official from the Open 
Society Foundation for Albania (OSFA) noted, 
‘sometimes we see that OSCE and UNDP is 
getting funding from the EU and this really 
creates tension within civil society and those 
organisations that strive to survive in this 
environment’.48 Last but not least, donors are 
increasingly reluctant to draw on implementing 
partners because this is very costly. 
The pace at which this modality of assistance 
is being phased out varies between donors 
and countries. As noted above, USAID in 
BiH has been implementing its civil society 
programmes through local partners since 
2001. The local USAID office resorted to local 
organisations whenever there was capacity 
at the local level because they believe that 
local partners have a higher stake in projects 
than foreign organisations. USAID offices 
in the Western Balkans had the option of 
implementing their programmes through local 
organisations as long as they demonstrated 
that these organisations have the capacity to 
implement those activities.49 Nevertheless, 
USAID’s offices in the remaining Western 
Balkans countries have only recently started 
to resort to local implementers as part of the 
global USAID Forward reform. SIDA is also 
gradually phasing out the use of Swedish 
48 Interview with an official at the OSFA office in Albania.
49 Interview with an official at the USAID office in BiH.
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partner organisations, although at different 
speed in different countries. SIDA gives 
substantial importance to exit strategies in 
this process. The phasing out is gradual so 
that local organisations would not be left on 
their own without achieving a certain stage of 
maturity. According to the SIDA representative 
in Kosovo, this involves more focus on capacity 
building for local CSOs, especially in terms of 
assisting organisations in identifying priorities 
and needs, and strengths and weaknesses.50  
CSOs as implementing partners
This is a widespread form of indirect support 
for CSOs through their engagement in the 
design or implementation of specific activities 
involving different stakeholders. It involves 
either commissioning CSOs to carry out 
specific tasks (research, training, monitoring, 
service delivery, advice, coordination, etc...) or 
consulting organisations in the implementation 
of projects with other actors. 
There are important variations in the way 
donors engage with CSOs as implementing 
partners. For the implementation of specific 
projects or tasks, CSOs are usually selected 
through tenders in which they compete with 
public or private bodies. In this case, the 
ownership is entirely in the hand of the donors, 
CSOs have little or no say in the identification 
of priorities and the development of projects. 
However, in some cases, projects are allocated 
without tenders or CfP. For instance, the 
ERSTE Foundation develops projects in-house 
and enters into partnerships with CSOs that are 
deemed most suitable to implement specific 
projects or tasks.
UNICEF in Serbia has established strategic 
partnerships with organisations working in the 
field of child protection. In this case, CSOs are 
heavily involved both in the design and in the 
implementation of projects.
This form of engagement with CSOs is 
increasingly popular among donors as a result 
50 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Kosovo.
of the overall shift in donor agenda discussed 
above. In line with this, many donors have 
moved on from giving grants for capacity-
building to CSOs to using CSOs for the 
implementation of specific activities. Donors 
engaging with CSOs in such a way believe 
that civil society should recognise donors as 
potential partners which can influence policy-
making rather than seeing them as a source 
of funding. For example, the OSCE  provides 
CSOs in Kosovo with privileged access 
to public institutions by involving them in 
activities focused on building the capacity of 
the Assembly.
While this type of assistance contributes to 
asserting civil society as a legitimate and 
fully-fledged partner in policy processes, 
there is no financial assistance attached to it. 
The CSOs involved in this type of cooperation 
with donors usually get funding from some 
other sources. Many donors prefer to support 
CSOs in a non-financial way in order to avoid 
financial dependency. The problem with this 
approach is that it assumes that civil society 
is fully developed, independent and financially 
sustainable. This is unfortunately still not the 
case in the Western Balkans and, as the next 
section will show, any donors are aware of it. 
3. Donor Views  
on Civil Society
3.1. Common Issues across  
the Region
Civil society is donor-driven
The most common criticism donors across 
the region directed at civil society is that 
many CSOs are donor-driven. Accordingly, 
many organisations in the region are ‘empty 
shells’ in the sense that they do not have their 
own agendas but that they are exclusively 
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implementing donors’ programmes. In the 
view of many donors, these organisations do 
not constitute genuine civil society because 
they are not oriented towards tackling societal 
problems and addressing the needs of their 
communities. These are institutionalised 
organisations which ‘pay a lot of attention to 
management, administration and reporting 
instead of doing something concrete’.51 
Allegedly, many of these organisations are 
opportunistically formed to implement specific 
foreign-funded projects and they often cease to 
exist once the projects end. As a result, various 
donors have pointed out that it is sometimes 
difficult to make a distinction between 
genuine CSOs and organisations that act as 
consultancies. Brigitte Heuel Rolf, the Country 
Director at the GIZ office in BiH, suggested that 
they would like to work more with civil society, 
but that it is not easy to find competent and 
reliable partners among CSOs:
We are interested to work with civil 
society but often there are no suitable 
actors. You don’t find potential 
organisations. Many organisations here 
in Bosnia that call themselves CSOs are 
in the end consulting companies. (...) We 
are looking for possibilities to increase 
our cooperation with civil society; we 
are interested to work with them. It’s 
not easy to find competent and reliable 
partners. You have organisations where 
in the beginning you think that it looks 
like a CSO but in the end it often boils 
down, because maybe this is also a 
consequence of funding difficulties, 
that they are finally rather consulting 
companies than CSOs.52
Paradoxically, donors are generally aware 
that their practices have contributed to 
generating donor-driven civil society. Jadranka 
Jelinčić thus argues that there is an inherent 
51 Interview with an official at the East-West 
Management Institute in Montenegro.
52 Interview with Brigitte Heuel-Rolf, Country Director 
at the GIZ Office in BiH.
tension between the changing priorities of the 
donors and the need of CSOs to specialise in 
a specific field and address the needs of the 
community. This is particularly problematic for 
institutionalised CSOs which require funding 
to cover their running costs and are therefore 
prompted to adapt their activities to the 
priorities of the donors. Jelinčić argues that 
this tension between donor priorities and CSO 
agendas is one of the main challenges for civil 
society sustainability.53 Selma Sijerčić from 
USAID in BiH argues that donors have made 
CSOs donor-dependent by making them work 
on one-year projects in different fields, which 
inhibited the long-term strategic development 
of CSOs and the building of contacts between 
CSOs and local constituencies:
You have a project for a year, you 
complete it and you are over, you 
took the money and you are done. 
You did not work on the long-term 
and on cooperation. It is essential to 
think strategically. If an organization 
works on public procurement, do 
not put it in charge of projects for the 
protection of human rights. [...] They 
then do everything and nothing because 
they have no money, [they] have no 
other options. They have not oriented 
themselves towards local sources of 
funding. They forgot the citizens, [they 
forgot] to include the citizens. We now 
have a problem with civil society.54
Note that donors generally consider that there 
is a ‘two-track’ civil society in the region. It is 
generally believed that there are, on the one 
hand, the established and professionalised 
organisations that are somewhere in between 
activism and the state and, on the other, the 
grass-root organisations which are deemed 
to be the healthier part of civil society because 
they are genuinely oriented towards their 
communities. Therefore, this criticism applies 
53 Interview with Jadranka Jelinčić, Director of the FOS 
office in Serbia.
54 Interview with Selma Sijerčić, Project Management 
Specialist at USAID in BiH.
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only to the first segment of civil society, a 
segment which is nonetheless the biggest 
recipient of donor funding.
Civil society lacks legitimacy
The second most common criticism of civil 
society among donors is that it lacks legitimacy 
because it is disconnected from the local 
population. This criticism is closely related 
to the one discussed above. Civil society’s 
disengagement from local communities is seen 
as a consequence of the professionalization 
and institutionalization of many organizations, 
and them being more oriented towards donors 
than towards the needs of the citizenry.  A 
representative from the UK Embassy in 
Belgrade thus stated that CSOs have become 
‘professional in relation to donors and in 
terms of fundraising and unprofessional in 
terms of identifying the needs of the citizens, 
mobilising their support and transforming their 
hardships in political messages addressed to 
the authorities’.55
Donors see the lack of representativeness as 
a major issue for civil society.  In their view, 
CSOs have to be accountable to someone if 
they want to represent the public interest. 
This is currently not the case because few 
CSOs in the region are membership-based 
organisations.  Some donors expressed doubts 
about the ability of foreign-funded CSOs to 
enact social change because they are alien 
to ‘ordinary people’. They consider that civil 
society needs to be grafted upon local culture 
and local ways of doing things in order to make 
a difference on the ground. Besides reducing 
the capability of CSOs to carry out their 
mission, donors see the lack of constituency 
as a major impediment to the sustainability of 
organisations. As a result, some donors are 
increasingly turning to membership-based 
organisations which they see as being more 
sustainable.  The OSCE in Kosovo has chosen 
to focus on this type of organisations:
55  Interview with an official at the UK Embassy in 
Serbia.
I have actually, and I hope they will do 
it, coached my colleagues in the new 
public participation actions to look to 
these organizations because those 
are sustainable organizations, those 
are organizations that actually are the 
grassroots; many of them are not very 
interested in participating in public life 
as organizations [...] and they are the 
grassroots so they would have something 
to contribute maybe. Maybe it’s more 
sustainable in the future to work with 
these organizations and try to bring them 
closer to institutions and maybe not fund 
from a donor perspective. Donors fund 
think-tanks that may do good work but 
you may see staff circulating from one 
field to the other for the past ten years 
and once the donor money is gone they 
will probably not be sustainable anymore 
because the planned government funding 
will not be sufficient to sustain the activity 
of  these organizations at the current 
level.56
In some cases, donors are increasingly 
re-directing their support to ad-hoc civic 
activism. Vladimir Milchin, the Executive 
Director of FOSM, argues that there is 
increased civic engagement through informal 
groups in Macedonia as a result of a general 
dissatisfaction with ‘traditional civil society’.57 
According to Milchin, ‘traditional civil society’ 
refers to the institutionalised, bureaucratised 
organisations which know how to write 
projects for the EU and the Americans, but 
never engage in politically-sensitive issues, 
while ‘informal groups’ are ad hoc coalitions 
that mobilise on specific issues. FOSM is 
planning to increase funding for ad hoc/
informal groups as they consider that their 
numbers will increase in the future. Other 
donors are funding programmes aimed at 
56 Interview with an official at the OSCE Mission in 
Kosovo.
57 Interview with Vladimir Milchin, Executive Director at 
the FOS office in Macedonia.
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developing links between CSOs and their 
constituencies. The next phase of the SCO’s 
‘Civicas Mobilitas’ project in Macedonia will 
focus on constituency building. It is a big 
project – CHF 8 mil (approx. EUR 6.63 mil) for 
4 years – which will be implemented by an 
Danish consultancy (NIRAS) and a local CSO 
(MCIC). According to the SCO representatives, 
this is an attempt to have a rooted civil society 
and to make a stronger connection with 
citizens and the social and political reality.58
Civil society is apathetic or politically 
imprudent
Some donors have criticised civil society for 
having failed to adapt and respond to changing 
political circumstances. The situation varies 
between countries. In Serbia, some donors 
consider that civil society is going through a 
crisis of identity because it does not know how 
to position itself towards the new authorities. 
While civil society was an opponent to the 
Milosevic regime in the nineties and an active 
supporter of the democratisation process in 
the 2000s, it finds itself in a precarious position 
now that the political elites from the nineties 
have come back to power. Several donors 
have thus noted that civil society is disoriented 
because the situation is no longer ‘black or 
white’.  Some donors pointed out that political 
elites in Serbia are not interested in the concept 
of public dialogue with civil society because 
they consider that democracy is a relationship 
between the authorities and the citizenry that 
functions exclusively through elections.59 The 
precarious situation in which civil society finds 
itself prevents it from asserting itself and being 
in position to pressure the government.
On the other hand, in Macedonia, some donors 
have deplored the fact that civil society has 
become trapped in daily politics. Beti Bakovska 
from the Dutch embassy suggested that 
there is a huge divide in Macedonia between 
58 Interview with officials at the SCO office in Macedonia.
59 Interview with an official at the UK Embassy in 
Serbia.
those organisations that are opposed to the 
government and cannot or do not want to get 
access to government funding, and those that 
are close to the government and get state 
funding without being accountable for what 
they are doing with these funds. Bakovska 
expressed her deep disappointment with 
civil society because it has not been able to 
‘outsmart the government’:
I think that, to put it bluntly, they haven’t 
been able to outsmart the government 
and I think [that this] was kind of an eye 
opener for many people, like myself, 
who supported civil society for a long 
time and thought that the capacities of 
the civil society were built – they were 
not, apparently. A lot of funds, efforts, 
etc. that was used to build the capacities 
of the civil sector, practically did not give 
yield or effect. The people who were 
really good in the civil society, when 
the money wasn’t there anymore, they 
shifted to different areas of work. And 
what has remained, apparently, does not 
have sufficient political sense to make 
results [out of what] they are doing.60
There is a similar pattern in Albania, where 
several donors have pointed out that many 
CSOs are politically affiliated. In BiH, there 
is a general impression that civil society is 
apathetic and unresponsive to the political 
crisis. The representatives of the UK embassy 
consider there is no interest on the part of 
CSOs to change the system. They deplored 
that ‘we’ve got lame-duck CSOs which are not 
advocating the change we need’. In their view, 
CSOs should lobby for the interests of the 
citizens, which is not happening at the moment 
as ‘there is no public reaction to political 
events’.61
60 Interview with Beti Bakovska, Advisor on Good 
Governance and Culture at the Dutch Embassy in 
Macedonia. 
61 Interview with officials at the UK Embassy in BiH.
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Other issues
Some donors have highlighted the lack of 
expertise in specific areas as one of the most 
pressing issues for civil society in the region. 
This lack of expertise within civil society is 
particularly visible in the field of law and 
various aspects of EU integration. This is due 
to the fact that most of the capacity building 
and trainings over the past decade have had 
a very general focus, dealing with generic 
issues such as project management, strategic 
planning, advocacy, etc. In relation to this, 
various donors have criticised the EU’s TACSO 
programme for providing generic trainings in 
writing projects, strategic planning or public 
advocacy whereas what is really needed are 
thematic trainings that would increase the 
expertise of organisations in their fields of 
activity.  Some donors argue that, over the 
past decade, the increase in expertise in EU 
integration and human rights within the public 
administration has been accompanied by a 
decrease in expertise within civil society.62  
For instance, the representative of the UK 
embassy in Macedonia suggested that donors 
have worked for years on the development 
of civil society without working on the 
expertise of CSOs, apart in a few areas such as 
environment or human rights.63
Another issue that came up in the interviews 
is the lack of CSO visibility. This is particularly 
problematic in Serbia, where civil society 
inherited a negative image from the nineties 
when the Milošević regime portrayed CSOs as 
foreign henchmen. Since 2000, the situation 
has not improved much because there is little 
cooperation between CSOs and the media.64 
The lack of access to media is also a major 
issue in Macedonia, where several donors have 
reintroduced media programmes in response 
to the government crackdown on independent 
62 Interview with an official at the East-West 
Management Institute in Montenegro.
63 Interview with an official at the UK Embassy in 
Macedonia.
64 Interviews with officials at the USAID and BTD offices 
in Serbia. 
media (see above). Montenegro is a notable 
exception to this. Several donors have pointed 
out that there is a very good collaboration 
between CSOs and media in Montenegro. As a 
result, CSOs have a high degree of visibility and 
they are recognised as an important factor in 
society.
3.2. Country-Specific Issues
Donor views on civil society vary considerably 
across the region. On the one hand, civil society 
is generally considered to be ‘very developed’ 
in Serbia and Montenegro. On the other hand, 
civil society is overall considered to be weak 
and fragile in Albania and Macedonia, and to 
some extent in BiH and Kosovo. 
In both Serbia and Montenegro, civil society 
is deemed to play a key role in monitoring 
the government and holding state institutions 
accountable. Jadranka Jelinčić from FOS 
thus argues that, although the perceived level 
of corruption in Serbia is very high, there is 
a civil society that has the capacity to call 
for accountability and hold the government 
responsible.65 Donors have particularly praised 
the role of CSOs in addressing corruption in 
Montenegro. Some have suggested that civil 
society there plays such an important role in 
monitoring and pressuring the government 
that it has partly taken over the role of the 
judiciary. Montenegrin CSOs have indeed 
instigated several investigations that have led 
to high-profile arrests. Several donors have 
suggested that there is a good cooperation 
between CSOs and media in Montenegro, 
which substantially contributed to CSO visibility 
and prominence in society.66
In Albania, there is a common view that CSOs 
still lack capacity and that they are overly 
dependent on donor funding which is shrinking. 
An OSFA representative described civil society 
65 Interview with Jadranka Jelinčić, Director of the FOS 
in Serbia.
66 Interview with an official at the East-West 
Management Institute in Montenegro.
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in Albania as ‘a tree with the roots in the air’.67 
According to this view, donors put a lot of 
money to build CSO capacities and increase 
CSO’s human resources between 1993 and 
2003. However, these resources were suddenly 
redirected to the government and this ‘has 
been happening again and again’. Several 
donors have pointed out that CSOs are often 
politically affiliated and some have suggested 
that they are very often a one-man show and 
that they are very much business-oriented. 
Others gave a more positive assessment. 
The representative from the Dutch embassy 
suggested that Albanian civil society is quite 
colourful: there are some organisations which 
donors consider to be reliable in terms of 
implementation of projects and management 
of funds and there is another ‘grey area’ of new 
organizations popping in and organizations 
surviving only on projects.68 The USAID officials 
suggested that, while civil society in Albania 
is less developed than in other countries, it is 
growing, developing and ‘more advanced than 
a lot of people think’.69 
In Macedonia, civil society is heavily affected 
by the political situation. Several donors have 
pointed out that the state-civil society relations 
are very tense since the change of government 
in 2006. Accordingly, there is no willingness 
on the part of the executive to cooperate with 
civil society and those organisations that are 
criticizing the government are systematically 
exposed to attacks via the media. This is also 
the case for some donors, such as FOSM 
which has taken a more politically engaged 
stance in their work. Some donors are critical 
of civil society for having become trapped 
in daily politics. A representative from the 
Dutch embassy suggested that CSOs ‘have 
not managed to be above what is happening 
in society, but have rather been a reflection 
of what is happening in society’.70 Donor 
67 Interview with an official at the OSFA office in Albania.
68 Interview with an official at the Dutch Embassy in 
Albania. 
69 Interview with officials at the USAID office in Albania.
70 Interview with an official at the Dutch Embassy in 
assistance is alleged to have produced an over-
populated but under-empowered civil society 
which has been brought close to extinction 
due to the withdrawal of donors. This view 
is shared by the FOSM representatives who 
stated that civil society in Macedonia is falling 
apart in view of the fact that the official number 
of organisations has fallen from 11,000 to 
3,500, out of which 10 per cent are active and 
able to get funding.71
In BiH, several donors have pointed out 
that, while many CSOs see themselves as 
important and influential, civil society is 
actually quite weak. In their view, CSOs lack 
capacity and they have a low impact and low 
levels of accountability. Most donors attribute 
this state of affairs to the fact that CSOs 
are overwhelmingly donor-driven.  A SCO 
representative suggested that Bosnian civil 
society is not ‘ripe’ because most organisations 
have emerged in response to the availability 
of foreign funding rather than in response to 
local needs.72 As a result, these organisations 
lack a broader view on the role of civil society 
in societal development. Some donors have 
pointed out BiH’s political context as an 
impediment to civil society development. 
According to a USAID representative, civil 
society lacks influence because the authorities 
in BiH do not even know what civil society is 
– they perceive civil society as nothing more 
than foreign-funded CSOs that can bring some 
project money.73 
Although donors recognise that civil society 
has achieved significant progress in Kosovo 
over the past 15 years, there is a common view 
that it is overwhelmingly donor-driven and that 
it is still at an early stage of development. Luan 
Shllaku from KFOS noted that, after 99’, CSOs 
mushroomed in response to the availability 
of funding and lack of employment. Now, the 
Macedonia.
71 Interview with officials at the FOSM office in 
Macedonia.
72 Interview with officials at the Swiss Cooperation 
Office in BiH.
73 Interview with an official at the USAID office in BiH.
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availability of funding has decreased, there is 
‘few money for many ideas’.74 There is also 
less activism as the state has taken over many 
of the tasks performed by civil society earlier. 
Several donors have highlighted organisational 
issues and the lack of strategic orientation as 
major challenges to civil society development 
in Kosovo. The SIDA official thus stated that 
few organisations in Kosovo have built their 
profile in terms of scope of intervention and 
that many are struggling with organizational 
management and internal democracy.75 An 
official from the UK embassy suggested that 
many CSOs ‘are still wandering’ but that these 
CSOs have nonetheless played an important 
role and that donors ‘could not have done their 
jobs without them’.76
3.3. Civil Society Sustainability
While they are aware that civil society is 
dependent on donor funding, donors are 
divided on the question of civil society 
sustainability. Some donors consider that the 
question of CSO sustainability is inadequate 
when the lifecycle of civil society projects 
lasts one or two years. In this context, it is 
impossible to talk about long term impact, 
let alone sustainability. Others consider that 
the question of financial sustainability is 
misplaced: CSOs are obsessed with how they 
are going to fund themselves instead of looking 
at how to develop links with the community 
and thus become genuinely sustainable. For 
example, Vladimir Milchin from FOSM opposes 
the very idea of civil society sustainability 
because he considers that this leads to the 
institutionalisation/bureaucratisation of civil 
society. In his view, sustainability should be 
about whether an organisation is achieving its 
mission, not about whether it is managing to 
get funding from year to year as donors usually 
see it.77
74 Interview with Luan Shllaku, Executive Director of the 
KFOS office in Kosovo.
75 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Kosovo.
76 Interview with an official at the UK Embassy in 
Kosovo.
77 Interview with Vladimir Milchin, Executive Director at 
the FOSM office in Macedonia.
Donors generally consider that the number 
of CSOs is bound to shrink because civil 
society has been inflated by the availability of 
foreign funding. There is a common view that 
CSOs need to professionalise and specialise 
themselves in specific sectors in order to 
become sustainable. In addition, donors 
consider that CSOs need to become more 
visible by publicising their work and involving 
the community so that people know what they 
are giving money for. Generally, donors see 
the solution to the financial sustainability of 
civil society in the diversification of sources of 
funding through:
 Increased access to state funding; 
 The development of philanthropy;
 CSOs developing profitable activities;
 CSOs developing links with the community 
and becoming membership-based 
organisations;
 The development of CSO networks at the 
local, national and regional level.
The question of state funding is key because, 
in most countries, the state is the primary 
source of funding for civil society. For example, 
in Serbia, state funding for civil society in 
2012 was about EUR 67 mil, which is much 
more than the totality of donor funding for 
civil society.78 However, this figure includes 
funding for political parties, sports clubs, 
churches, etc. Very little funding actually goes 
to CSOs. In addition, state funding is allocated 
in a non-transparent manner: the current 
Serbian regulations allow the administration 
to allocate funding without opening a CfP or 
a tender. The situation is similar in the other 
Western Balkan countries. In BiH, state funding 
for CSOs amounts to approximately EUR 70 
mil per year, half of which is disbursed by the 
municipalities.79 However, 47 per cent of the 
78 ‘Annual Summary Report on Budget Expenditures 
for the Associations and Other Civil Society 
Organisations in 2012 as Support to Programmatic 
and Project Activities’, Government of the Republic 
of Serbia, retrieved from http://civilnodrustvo.gov.rs/
media/2012/10/en-mini-zbirni-za-sajt.pdf on 7 May 
2014.
79 Interview with Džemal Hodžić, Programme Manager 
at the EUD in BiH.
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beneficiaries are sports organisations, 34 per 
cent veteran associations, and a lot goes to 
religious organisations. According to Džemal 
Hodžić from the EUD in Sarajevo, less than 
2 per cent of the beneficiaries are human 
rights organisations or CSOs dealing with 
social issues.80 In Montenegro and Kosovo, 
the levels of state funding for civil society are 
substantially lower. The Montenegrin case is 
specific in the sense that a substantial part 
of the state funding has been suspended 
as a result of the government’s initiative to 
centralise the allocation of funds for civil 
society which was initiated in 2011 but never 
completed. This is a major problem for 
Montenegrin CSOs because most of the donors 
have withdrawn and the levels of EU funding 
have remained the same. 
Donors generally consider that CSO 
sustainability should ideally be ensured 
through the establishment of genuine 
partnership between government and civil 
society. According to Torgny Svenungsson 
from the Swedish Embassy in Belgrade, 
this requires more than just regulating the 
allocation of state funding to civil society:
So I think, to us, I would say the strategic 
thinking on how you would in the long 
run be sustainable as civil society passes 
by establishing a functional relation 
between civil society and government 
at its different levels, recognizing each 
other’s different roles. So it is not creating 
a civil society dependant on the state, but 
it is a civil society that is in constructive 
dialogue with government and is pushing 
the government and is scrutinizing 
the government but also supplying 
proposals, constructive proposals.81
Donors generally agree that, at the current 
stage, cooperation is most advanced 
between CSOs and independent institutions 
80 Ibid.
81 Interview with officials at the Swedish Embassy in 
Serbia. 
(Ombudsman, Office for Human Rights, etc.), 
not so much with core government institutions. 
The state-civil society relations are deemed to 
be the most advanced in Montenegro where 
CSO participation in policy-making has been 
institutionalised. Montenegro is indeed the only 
country where CSOs are formally involved in 
the negotiations with the EU.
Although most donors recognise the need to 
develop state-civil society relations, few of 
them actually pursue this objective in their 
programmes.  The officials from the SCO in 
Macedonia stated that, for the moment, they 
are focusing on the efficiency and effectiveness 
of CSOs, and the sustainability of the results.82 
The question of CSOs’ financial sustainability 
is left for a later period – the SCO is waiting 
to see the mechanisms deployed by the EU 
in this respect. The only notable international 
initiative to reform state funding for civil 
society is being carried out by the EU and the 
UNDP in BiH through the Reinforcement of 
Local Democracy (LOD) project which seeks 
to promote transparency in local funding for 
civil society. The project, which is funded by 
the EU and implemented by UNDP, focuses on 
municipalities because they are the biggest 
provider of funding for CSOs in BiH (around 50 
per cent of total state funding).83 The objective 
is to build the capacities of municipalities to 
identify priorities in consultation with civil 
society and allocate funding in an impartial 
and transparent manner. The project also 
aims to raise awareness among CSOs that 
municipalities are potential donors.
Municipalities applying for participating in 
the LOD programme are required to have 
established contacts with local CSOs. Those 
selected get technical assistance for organising 
public calls and selecting beneficiaries. This is 
done according to the LOD methodology which 
has been developed as a tool for an inclusive 
and transparent allocation of municipal funds 
82 Interview with officials at the SCO office in Macedonia.
83 Interview with Samir Omerefendić, Project Manager 
at the UNDP office in BiH.
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to CSOs in line with the procedures used by the 
EUD. Once the municipality has established 
its team and procedures, it launches CfPs 
whose priorities are defined in cooperation 
with local CSOs. The selected projects are 
financed by the EUD and co-financed by the 
municipality. Any CSO from BiH is eligible to 
apply, but the project must be implemented 
in the municipality which issued the Call. LOD 
is thus a form of sub-granting whose primary 
objective is to standardise the procedures for 
allocating funding for CSOs at the municipal 
level. In the period 2007-2013, the project had 
3 phases with over 200 projects funded. The 
EU has contributed to the funding of these 
projects with EUR 5 mil, the municipalities with 
EUR 500,000. The fourth phase of the project 
started in June 2014.
LOD has been recognised as an example 
of good practice across the region. Samir 
Omerefendić, Project Manager for the LOD 
programme at UNDP, argues that this project 
has contributed to a greater recognition of 
civil society among state officials. At the 
municipal level, state officials regularly 
enter in cooperation with CSOs, which was 
unimaginable a few years ago:
The understanding of, and approach to, 
working with civil society is changing. 
Municipalities now reserve some 
budgetary funds dedicated to the co-
financing of projects that NGOs receive 
from some other sources. That was not 
the case a few years ago. This is a quite 
serious matter where municipalities 
stand behind local NGOs, give them 
letters of support, want to work with 
them as well as situations where 
municipalities tend to monitor how their 
funds are being spent by NGOs, and they 
expect feedbacks, reports and in general 
greater involvement.84
In spite of these encouraging developments, 
resolving the problem of public funding for 
84  Ibid. 
CSOs in BiH will require further actions, 
including legal measures in order to create a 
distinction between sport clubs and CSOs. In 
a separate project, the EUD provides technical 
assistance to the government for the creation 
of institutional mechanisms for cooperation 
with civil society. USAID has a complementary 
project which seeks to assist CSOs in their 
relationship with the government. However, 
there has been little progress on establishing 
state-civil society cooperation mechanisms 
because there is a lack of political will and 
understanding on why the government should 
consult with civil society. 
Most obviously, state funding is not the 
panacea for all CSOs. Donors are generally 
aware that those organisations dealing with 
politically sensitive issues, such as human 
rights, watchdog and monitoring organisations 
cannot count on state funding. However, it is 
considered that some of these organisations 
will always have access to global funds for 
human rights organisations such as the OSI’s 
global programmes. Some donors have 
emphasised the importance of bigger CSOs 
helping the smaller ones to get access to EU 
funding and to international CSO networks. 
The representatives from the EUD in Skopje 
thus stated that it is not only the government 
that should be in charge of developing civil 
society, but that this should also be the task of 
the more mature CSOs.85 They argue that there 
is a lack of awareness among bigger CSOs in 
‘sharing and structuring together’ and that the 
EU has sought to promote such practices by 
requesting the bigger CSOs to include smaller 
ones as partners in their projects. Donors thus 
perceive the established CSOs as a key element 
for the development and sustainability of civil 
society in the region.  
85 Interview with officials at the EU Delegation in 
Macedonia. 
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whose budget is EUR 350,000, while the 
US Embassy administers the Democracy 
Commission Small Grants Programme with 
a yearly budget of USD 500,000 (approx. EUR 
395,000). Finally, the Open Society Foundation 
for Albania (OSFA), which is one of the biggest 
private foundations in the country, has a civil 
society programme whose budget is around 
USD 150,000 (approx. EUR 118,000) per year. 
Several donors suggested that their budgets 
have been steadily decreasing over the 
past years. For example, the interviewee 
from USAID said that the amounts have 
been reduced by around two-thirds, from 
approximately USD 30 mil (approx. EUR 
23.7 mil) in 2002, to USD 10 mil (approx. 
EUR 7.9 mil)  just over a decade later.86 More 
worryingly, there is evidence of ‘donor flight’ 
from Albania. According to the interviewee 
from the SIDA office in Tirana, ‘It is not the 
same environment for donors as it used to be 
5-6 years ago, and this is particularly evident 
in the civil society donor group, I would say, 
but this is only my perception’. Furthermore, 
‘there are no major donors of that group, the 
international organizations such as the OSCE, 
UNDP, the Swiss are not providing the same 
support as they used to provide before so, 
apart from the EUD, it’s not the usual dialogue 
partners that we used to have to discuss 
about support to civil society, but that’s my 
impression’.87
4.2. Motives for Donor Presence
One of the main donor priorities in Albania 
is the rule of law, with the Dutch Embassy 
(after 2011)88,  OSFA89, and USAID targeting 
this area. The other issue that was specifically 
prioritised by the respondents was good 
governance, which was identified by OSFA90, 
86 Interview with officials at USAID office in Albania.
87 Interview with officials at SIDA office in Albania.
88 Interview with an official at the Dutch Embassy in 
Albania.
89 Interview with an official at the Open Society  
Foundation for Albania.
90 Interview with an official at the Open Society  
4. Albania
4.1. Levels of Donor Support
Albania has a relatively limited number of 
donors supporting civil society. Overall, the 
EU is the most important donor with a yearly 
budget of around EUR 93.2 mil out of which 
EUR 1.5 mil is earmarked for the Civil Society 
Facility (CSF). The CSF’s budget could be 
increased to EUR 2 or 2.5 mil in the future, 
and Albanian CSOs also could benefit from the 
EIDHR and CBC programmes (see section 4.6).  
The second most important donor is Germany 
with EUR 31.5 mil allocated for the period 
2012-2014. However, most of the German 
aid consists in loans and does not directly 
benefit civil society. Switzerland is also heavily 
involved in Albania in terms of development 
cooperation. The Swiss Cooperation Office 
(SCO) in Albania has a budget of around CHF 
88 mil (approx. EUR 73 mil) for 4 years. Civil 
society is included in the democratisation and 
local governance programme whose budget 
is CHF 25 mil (approx. EUR 20.7 mil) and the 
health programme with a budget amounting 
to CHF 10 mil (EUR 8.3 mil). One of the biggest 
supporters of civil society in Albania is the 
Embassy of Sweden, which implements 
civil society assistance through Swedish 
organisations. These organisations are Kvinna 
till Kvinna, the Olof Palme Centre and Civil 
Rights Defenders and their respective budgets 
are SEK 14, 15 and 16 million (approx. EUR 
1.5 mil, EUR 1.6 mil, EUR 1.7 mil) for three 
years. SIDA also supports environmental CSOs 
through the Regional Environmental Centre 
(REC) with SEK15 mil (approx. EUR 1.6 mil) 
for three years. As in other WB countries, the 
Dutch Embassy runs the MATRA programme 
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SDC91 and USAID.92 Most importantly, however, 
international donors have highlighted that 
the over-arching long-term objective is that 
of European integration, which was explicitly 
referred to by the interviewees from OSFA, 
SDC, and USAID. An official from the USAID 
stated that their ‘number one goal is to 
assist in European integration and that’s 
Albania number one challenge’.93 From the 
EU perspective, the leading actor in the 
programming of aid is DG Enlargement and, 
according to the interviewee from the EUD 
in Tirana, ‘the aim of every euro spent is 
accession support’.94
4.3. Plans for the Future 
The donors’ plans for the future are shaped by 
the prospects of Albania’s integration in the 
EU.  An interviewee from USAID drew on the 
examples of the CEE countries that joined the 
EU in 2004 and the SEE countries that joined in 
2007 to suggest that there will be more funding 
from the EU as Albania nears accession. The 
interviewee reports that the USAID offices 
in Bulgaria and in Romania were closed in 
2008, the year after they joined the EU. The 
driving force in exiting these countries was 
EU accession, and the USAID official in Tirana 
extrapolated that this would be the case for 
Albania as well. However, for USAID, ‘at this 
time there is no discussion about phasing out 
or exit strategies in Albania’.95 This long-term 
commitment was also echoed by other donors, 
such as OSFA. As opposed to the scenario 
proposed by USAID, the interviewee from 
OSFA said that, for them, Albania’s accession 
in the EU would not  involve an immediate exit 
from the country. The Open Society office in 
Slovakia thus closed in 2013, despite the fact 
Foundation for Albania.
91 Interview with an official at the  Swiss Cooperation 
Office in Albania.
92 Interview with an official at USAID office in Albania.
93 Interview with an official at USAID office in Albania.
94 Interview with an official at the EU Delegation office in 
Albania.
95 Interview with an official at USAID office in Albania.
that the country joined the EU a decade ago, in 
2004. However, the respondent also noted that, 
levels of assistance would not increase due 
to the poor absorption capacities of Albanian 
organisations.96
4.4. Modalities of Aid Planning 
and Programming among Donors 
Most of the international donors active 
in Albania involve the Government in the 
planning and programming of their activities. 
This prevailing top-down way of creating 
strategies is best captured by the interviewee 
from the German Embassy, which has close 
cooperation with several Ministries: ‘the 
idea of financial cooperation is always that a 
government cooperates with a government so 
we have our yearly government consultations 
or government negotiations when we agree 
with the democratically elected government 
of the country on which projects we are 
going to pursue’.97 For some donors, 
this is done explicitly through a bilateral 
agreement between the Albanian and foreign 
Governments. This is the case for Swiss98, 
Swedish99, and American100 donor activities 
in Albania. The identification of World Bank 
priorities and projects in the country is 
approved by an Act of Parliament in Tirana, so 
the World Bank office has close contacts with 
the relevant Parliamentary Committees.101
Both donors and the Albanian authorities 
have pursued a sectoral approach in 
developing assistance strategies. OSFA 
conducts a number of meetings with certain 
96 Interview with an official at the Open Society  
Foundation for Albania.
97 Interview with an official at the German Embassy in 
Albania.
98 Interview with an official at the  Swiss Cooperation 
Office in Albania.
99 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Albania. 
The 3-4 year country strategies are set with the 
Albanian Government.
100 Interview with an official at the USAID office in 
Albania.
101 Interview with an official at the World Bank office in 
Albania.
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policy sections in the Albanian Government. 
USAID and other donors have fostered good 
relationships with the Albanian Government by 
sector. For example, there is particularly good 
cooperation between the USAID office and the 
Albanian Ministry of Justice around issues of 
rule of law102; SIDA has good cooperation on 
relevant initiatives with the tax authorities, 
statistics bureau, and the Ministry for 
Environment103; and for the EUD, the priorities 
are identified by the Albanian Government with 
the EU ‘there to fill in the gaps’.104
Many respondents mentioned their 
involvement in the donor sectoral Working 
Groups (WGs), which are attended by 
representatives from international donors and 
relevant Ministries, and which is coordinated 
by the Albanian Department of Strategy and 
Donor Coordination (DSDC). The interviewee 
from USAID indicated the importance of these 
WGs: ‘[they are] taking on a real coordination 
role to make sure that government is not only 
informed of what the donors are doing but that 
it takes an active part in the conversation’.105 
The Dutch Embassy is involved in the WG 
organized by the Ministry for Local Affairs 
to share information and coordinate around 
anti-corruption strategies.106 SIDA is active 
in the gender and civil society WGs107, whilst 
the Swiss are the lead donors in the areas 
of decentralization, regional development, 
and vocational training.108 The interviewee 
from SDC also indicated that there is 
significant variation amongst the WGs on the 
effectiveness of WGs, depending on the lead 
Ministry from the Albanian Government, an 
102 Interview with an official at the USAID office in 
Albania.
103 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Albania.
104 Interview with an official at the EU Delegation office in 
Albania.
105 Interview with an official at the USAID office in 
Albania.
106 Interview with an official at the Dutch Embassy in 
Albania.
107 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Albania.
108 Interview with an official at the  Swiss Cooperation 
Office in Albania.
observation that was echoed by USAID.109 
SIDA also indicated that another source of 
information about donor activities can be found 
on the DSDC website, which, along with the 
Albanian Donor Technical Secretariat (DTS), 
has compiled an up-to-date database of donor 
activities in the country.110
Some international donors also engage 
stakeholders at lower levels of government 
in the process of aid programming. The Swiss 
Cooperation Office includes consultations  with 
local government in this process111, whilst 
OSFA has involved municipal authorities 
by bringing together local civil society 
organisations and city hall officials to form 
‘local action plans’ to lobby for local funding 
based on the priorities identified.112 Another 
type of involvement of local government was 
a form of sub-granting implemented by the 
Dutch Embassy. In Diber qark (county), the 
money was given to the local government 
to decide priorities and make a call for 
proposals.113 On the other hand, on issues of 
gender, OSFA works with Local Action Groups 
(LAGs), which cover more than one local 
government unit in rural areas and consist 
of government / civil society / private sector 
coordination. Oxfam and SNV set up the LAGs 
in Albania. 
Although these are ‘top-down’ modes by which 
priorities are identified in aid programmes, 
there are also several ‘bottom-up’ ways in 
which international donors involve local 
actors. When programming the Civil Society 
Facility (CSF), the EU explicitly bypasses the 
Government.114 OSFA identifies the priorities 
109 Interview with an official at the USAID office in 
Albania.
110 See: http://dsdc.gov.al/dsdc/Donor_Database_33_2.
php (last accessed: 19 May 2014)
111 Interview with an official at the Swiss Cooperation 
Office  in Albania.
112 Interview with an official at the Open Society  
Foundation for Albania.
113 Interview with an official at the Dutch Embassy in 
Albania.
114 Interview with an official at the TACSO office in 
Albania.
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of civil society through formal and informal 
consultations with local CSOs. The resulting 
draft goes to the Executive Board of the 
Foundation, where it is reviewed, before the 
programme document is finalized.115 SIDA 
programming is ultimately decided by the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm, but 
according to a SIDA official in Tirana, identifying 
priorities ‘starts with consultations with our 
[SIDA’s] civil society partners, like what do they 
think are the problems, are we [SIDA] doing 
the right things, what should be done, what are 
their impressions’.116
The prioritization within aid programmes, 
however, is often formulated by actors that 
are not based in Albania. As mentioned 
above, SIDA assistance is implemented 
through the sub-granting of three Swedish 
framework organisations, which, in turn have 
responsibility for the programming: Palme 
Center, Kvinna til Kvinna, and the Civil Rights 
Defenders. Similarly, the Dutch Embassy 
relies on the Dutch organization SNV, since 
the organisation has been in the region for 18 
years and is a ‘guarantee’ that the mentoring 
programmes at a qark level would go 
smoothly. According to the interviewee from 
the Dutch Embassy: ‘they [SNV] were also 
operating there and had a more advisory role. 
They were advising them [local governments] 
on setting priorities, budgeting; they were kind 
of facilitating the whole procedure’.117
For many of the bilateral donors active in 
Albania, the decisions about programming are 
ultimately taken back in the ‘home country’. 
The Dutch Embassy feeds into decisions about 
programming, but the final decision is made 
at the Hague, such as the prioritisation of 
the rule of law in its strategies.118 The Swiss 
Cooperation Office strategies are agreed by 
115 Interview with an official at the OSFA office in Albania.
116 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Albania.
117 Interview with an official at the Dutch Embassy in 
Albania.
118 Interview with an official at the Dutch Embassy in 
Albania.
an Act of Parliament in Switzerland.119 For 
the US Embassy, Washington goes through 
the process of technical approval, because 
they look at the budget lines, though in most 
cases what is approved by the locally-based 
Democracy Commission is approved in 
Washington.120 USAID priorities are approved 
by US Congress, but crucially, there is flexibility 
to change strategies as needs dictate: 
‘It’s a strategy, so it gives us a fair 
amount of flexibility to work under, if 
needed, to develop situation changes, 
we have flexibility to design new 
programmes, to change existing 
programmes so within the strategy… 
[We] can have unilateral projects in the 
country if there is something that didn’t fit 
in the strategy or it wasn’t foreseen’.121 
There may be a similar devolution with 
SIDA, where the programming is currently 
determined more in Sweden than in the field, 
but by 2015, they expect to be able to make 
decisions in local offices, and they will not 
need to consult SIDA headquarters, though HQ 
approval may be required for big projects.122
A few donors also underlined the importance 
of conducting research or monitoring as 
part of the programming process. OSFA 
carries out extensive desk research before 
consulting stakeholders, so the organisation 
is ‘also working as a think-tank on various 
issues that are important to the development 
of society. So it’s a dual function of the 
organisation; we [OSFA] are a donor and an 
implementer’.123 For the EU, each Delegation 
has a Political, Economic and Information 
(PEI) section, whose monitoring is the basis 
for the Progress Reports and Operations 
119 Interview with an official at the  SCO office in Albania.
120 Interview with an official at the US Embassy in 
Albania.
121 Interview with an official at the USAID office in 
Albania.
122 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Albania.
123 Interview with an official at the Open Society  
Foundation for Albania.
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section (that implements EU support).124 These 
Progress Reports are crucial in formulating 
programmes. For example, according to a 
TACSO Resident Advisor, ‘the Progress Report 
has demonstrated … there is much to be done, 
support to Roma groups remains a very critical 
issue because Roma and Egyptian rights 
are still not taken into account, and that’s 
enough for the EUD here to mobilize additional 
systems in supporting such causes through 
making priorities for Roma and Egyptian 
communities under the current Call’.125
4.5. Donor Coordination
Although the donor coordination structures in 
the form of DSDC WGs (outlined in the previous 
section) require the Albanian Government to 
lead, respondents expressed concern about the 
capacity of the new Government in Tirana to do 
so. For example, the Open Society respondent 
said: 
‘I am not very impressed with this kind 
of coordination and this particular time 
there is very little coordination, because 
the government has been two months in 
place so, as part of their structure, it is not 
very clear how they are going to handle 
that, there is a sort of confusion like who 
is doing what at the current moment’.126 
With weak coordination from the state, 
there are instances of ad hoc coordination 
amongst donors in Albania. The German 
Embassy, for example, had attended an 
informal lunch meeting with other donor 
representatives on the day of the interview 
to discuss coordination around the water 
sector. This meeting was conducted because 
of low Albanian Government capacities, since 
the relevant Ministry would not be able to 
manage 20 donors all coming at once. Before 
the establishment of sector WGs, donors met 
124 Interview with an official at the EUD office in Albania.
125 Interview with an official at the TACSO office in 
Albania.
126 Interview with an official at the Open Society  
Foundation for Albania.
with each other, and Albanian partners did not 
attend, even though they were invited to do so. 
The informal meeting was quite fruitful, and 
donors ‘agreed on five points that are going 
to be put on the agenda for the next official 
meeting with the Ministry for Infrastructure 
that is responsible for water supply’.127 The 
Dutch Embassy has attended meetings, 
organized by the donors themselves, on the 
coordination of activities related to prison 
reform and civil society.128  OSFA highlighted 
the informal contact with the EUD in Tirana: 
‘we basically exchange information and also 
with the Delegation; it’s based more on our will 
than on some mechanism in place which you 
convene and you discuss’.129 The US Embassy 
interviewee also explained the Democracy 
Commission, which is a consultative body 
that includes civil society representatives and 
officials from other donors in Albania: 
‘[We] try to discuss about all the 
proposals that we [the US Embassy] have 
received, if there are similar projects that 
have been supported in the past, getting 
also information on the organisations 
and also getting information for co-
funding. If we are not able to fund some 
of the proposals, they may also jump in 
and help with that; in a way overlap with 
funding but also trying to coordinate if 
possible, the funding part as well’. 
Coordination in this way also ensures that 
there is no duplication in donor activities.130 
The interviewee from the German Embassy 
also cited the example of VAT redistribution 
as an example where there has been good 
coordination amongst donors.131 One model 
that was suggested by the World Bank 
127 Interview with an official at the German Embassy in 
Albania.
128 Interview with an official at the Dutch Embassy in 
Albania.
129 Interview with an official at the OSFA office in Albania.
130 Interview with an official at the US Embassy in 
Albania.
131 Interview with an official at the German Embassy in 
Albania.
39Balkan Civic Practices # 11
interviewee to avoid confusion amongst 
donors was to establish a ‘country system’ 
through which the procedures for assistance 
(e.g. procurement and financial management) 
will be standardised, making things easier for 
both donors and the Albanian government.132
The interaction amongst donors in Albania has 
led to a certain amount of exchange on best 
practice. For example, the German Embassy 
respondent said that ‘each donor brings in 
something they have from their scientific 
institutions or from their own countries or 
something they have cooperated on with an 
Albanian institution and they bring it in the 
circle of donors and for sure this influences our 
strategy’.133 According to SIDA, their approach 
to civil society development has been received 
favourably by the EU, which ‘presented some 
components of the EU Guidelines for Support 
to Civil Society; they talk about operation 
grants, core support, grass root organizations, 
I mean concepts that were not new to me, 
because in an open discussion with colleagues 
from the EUD they said that they found the 
Swedish model really very good’.134
Certain donors are understood to be the 
agenda setters in specific sectors. In the area 
of civil society development, the EUD sees 
itself as the donor that has taken the initiative 
to coordinate civil society support135, which is 
corroborated by SIDA:
‘There was a … presentation by the 
DG Enlargement of the support to civil 
society which was very useful especially 
for us who are in this process of how 
to make operational our strategy, so 
what will happen with our current CS 
programmes and then the discussions 
132 Interview with an official at the World Bank office in 
Albania.
133 Interview with an official at the German Embassy in 
Albania.
134 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Albania.
135 Interview with an official at the EU Delegation office in 
Albania.
that we had  is that it should follow and 
complement the EU support’.136 
The TACSO Resident Advisor reported that 
although the WG on civil society started with 
an OSCE initiative with a rotating leadership, 
‘it has become evident that EU assistance is 
the one that predominates. They are using our 
projects as technical secretariat, just keeping 
data on financial support so in that sense 
everybody is able to see their own support 
or to compare it with the support of other 
organisations’.137 The respondent from the 
German Embassy added that the lead donor 
depended on the sector. In the water sector, 
Germany and the World Bank are active. For 
example, Germany (including GIZ and KfW) has 
110 staff in Albania, so they have the capacity 
to write strategic papers and have more 
influence. Sweden is strong on professional 
education and good governance. The World 
Bank, the EU, and OSCE are strong in other 
sectors, and the Austrians are influential as 
well.138
One aspect of the SIDA model for developing 
aid programmes that was not mentioned by 
other respondents was that of intra-donor 
coordination, i.e. how different field offices in 
the region exchange and consult with each 
other. For donors that do not have such a 
model, it may be useful to develop this type 
of cross-country exchange. According to the 
interviewee from SIDA: 
Internally, we have had working groups 
working in the same area - civil society, 
gender, human rights. They were sitting 
together and working, from the countries 
of the region, based on the input that 
each country had from the consultations 
with their own partners, with their own 
context analysis, with their evaluations, 
reports, and we sat together in working 
136 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Albania.
137 Interview with an official at the TACSO office in 
Albania
138 Interview with an official at the German Embassy in 
Albania.
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groups… [All] the Embassies and SIDA 
discussed concretely how to work 
with CS in the result area that we have 
proposed to the Government, what will 
that mean for each of the Embassies, 
should we try to change the modalities, 
how we should complement with the 
EUD, with the EU support in the country, 
so these are the internal discussions we 
are having.139
4.6. Donor Assistance  
to Civil Society
Donors in Albania provide assistance to 
civil society through direct project grants, 
implementing partners and non-financial forms 
of support. The EUD supports civil society 
through the CSF and EIDHR programmes, but 
also through the IPA Cross-Border Cooperation 
(CBC) programme within which 100 contracts 
worth EUR 28 mil have been signed in the 
last five years. While the CBC is designed to 
support local government units in bordering 
areas, it is also open to CSOs which are 
actually the main recipients of funding from 
this programme. According to the TACSO 
representative in Tirana, 80 per cent of the 
CBC funds are channelled through CSOs.140 
Albanian CSOs are also eligible for the EU’s 
Youth in Action, Culture and Europe for Citizens 
programmes which are administered by the 
Albanian government. The EUD in Albania 
seeks to put more emphasis on supporting 
smaller organisations by encouraging them 
to enter in partnership with established CSOs 
when applying for EU funds. Also, most of 
the beneficiaries of the CBC programme are 
smaller, peripheral, organisations.   
Besides the EU, several other donors provide 
direct project grants for civil society. Although 
it does not have a stand-alone civil society 
programme, USAID supports CSOs through 
its Rule of Law, Good Governance and 
139 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Albania.
140 Interview with an official at the TACSO office in 
Albania.
Competitiveness programmes. The USAID 
grants range between USD 7,000 (approx. EUR 
5,500) and USD 2.5 mil (approx. EUR 1.96 mil) 
and last for up to three years. In Albania, USAID 
chose to work directly with local CSOs in order 
to help them build their capacities and avoid 
the extra costs associated with international 
intermediaries.141 In addition, the US Embassy 
administers the Democracy Commission Small 
Grants programme for which local CSOs are 
eligible. The Swiss Cooperation Office also has 
a Small Action Fund for CSOs with an annual 
budget of CHF 200,000 (approx. EUR 166,000), 
while the Dutch Embassy supports CSOs 
through the MATRA programme focusing on 
the rule of law and EU integration. OSFA, which 
used to provide institutional funding for CSOs 
‘a long time ago’, is now exclusively supporting 
civil society with project grants. Finally, the 
World Bank closed its Civil Society Fund in 
2012, but it still has a small programme with 
a budget of USD 50,000 (approx. EUR 39,000) 
focusing on empowering vulnerable groups. 
A number of donors resort to implementing 
partners for delivering civil society assistance. 
The Dutch Embassy channels its assistance to 
environmental organisations via the Regional 
Environmental Centre (REC) in order to reach 
smaller organisations operating outside Tirana. 
As mentioned earlier, REC also administers 
project grants for environmental CSOs on 
behalf of SIDA, which has so far delivered its 
civil society assistance through the Swedish 
organisations cited above. This is bound to 
change as SIDA’s contract with the Swedish 
framework organisations engaged in building 
the capacities of Albanian CSOs was due to 
expire in 2014.142 As mentioned in the regional 
section of the report, some donors resort to 
implementing partners in order to minimise 
the risk of misuse of funds and corruption. For 
this reason, the EU is supporting organisations 
dealing with children’s rights through UNICEF 
141 Interview with an official at the USAID office in 
Albania.
142 Interview with an official at the Swedish Embassy in 
Albania.
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and those dealing with Roma and Egyptian 
communities through UNDP.143
Finally, several donors stated that they provide 
non-financial support for civil society in 
different kind of ways. For example the OSFA 
officials stated that recent assistance was not 
in the form of direct project grants, but rather 
in providing support for organising protests 
and meetings on environmental issues.144 
Besides giving grants, the EU provides 
technical assistance through its TACSO project, 
while the People to People programme gives 
the opportunity for CSO representatives from 
all the WB countries to go to Brussels to be 
trained on a given subject and meet with EU 
representatives. USAID also provides some 
technical assistance for helping CSOs to 
develop organisational capacities and work on 
internal governance.  
5. Bosnia- 
Herzegovina
5.1. Levels of Donor Support
Over the past 20 years, BiH has been one of 
the biggest recipients of international aid in 
the world. It is estimated that USD 14 billion 
(approx. EUR 11.3 billions) in international aid 
was poured into reconstruction efforts in BiH 
between 1996 and 2007.145 This post-conflict 
reconstruction effort was coupled with post-
socialist democratisation and marketisation 
policies that were in place throughout the 
143 Interview with an official at the TACSO office in 
Albania.
144 Interview with an official at the Open Society 
Foundation for Albania.
145 Howard, Ivana. Mistakes Donors Make: Civil Society 
and Democracy Assistance in the Balkans. (Belgrade: 
Heartefact Fund, 2011), 31
region. During the last decade, the involvement 
of international donors in BiH has been 
substantially reduced. Since BiH is no longer 
considered to be a post-conflict zone, many 
multilateral agencies that were heavily involved 
in the country have either left or scaled 
down their activities. This applies to most 
UN agencies, except UNDP which nowadays 
counts for approximately 60 per cent of UN 
intervention BiH with a budget of USD 25 mil 
(approx. EUR 19.6 mil) in 2013.146 
Nevertheless, BiH remains a priority for a 
number of bilateral donors. For example, 
unlike other places in the Western Balkans, 
BiH remains a beneficiary of German bilateral 
development cooperation. In 2013, Germany’s 
assistance to BiH amounted to EUR 56 mil, 
with EUR 4.5 mil for technical cooperation and 
the rest for financial cooperation, mainly in the 
form of loans.147 Following Germany, Sweden 
is the second most important bilateral donor 
in BiH with a budget of EUR 20 mil, which is 
likely to decrease slightly in the future. Over 
the last few years, Swedish assistance to civil 
society amounted to approximately EUR 1.5-2 
mil annually.148 Switzerland has traditionally 
had a strong presence in BiH. The SCO has 
been active since 1996. Its activities have 
evolved from humanitarian aid in the 1990s 
to development cooperation in the 2000s. 
The SCO currently has a budget of around 
CHF 20 mil (approx. EUR 16.6 mil) annually, 
with an additional CHF 1.5 mil (approx. EUR 
1.2 mil) coming from the Human Security 
Programme which deals with transitional 
justice and coming to terms with the past.149 
While it is scaling down its programmes in 
neighbouring countries, USAID remains heavily 
involved in Bosnia with a total budget of USD 
146 Interview with an official at the UNDP office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 2012, UNDP allocated 4.7 
million USD to CSOs. 
147 Interview with an official at the GIZ office in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
148 Interview with an official at the Embassy of Sweden in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
149 Interview with officials at the Swiss Cooperation 
Office in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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20 mil (approx. EUR 15.7 mil) per year.150 So 
does Norway, whose overall assistance to 
Bosnia amounts to EUR 13 mil. The Embassy 
of Norway in Sarajevo administers the Civil 
Society Fund whose budget is approximately 
NOK 10 mil (approx. EUR 1.2 mil) and the 
Embassy Fund that counts for another NOK 
6 mil (approx. EUR 726,000).151 Finally, the 
British Embassy has an envelope of GBP 
1.75-2 mil (approx. EUR 2.2 mil-2.5 mil), but 
these funds are never entirely implemented. 
Approximately one quarter of the budget goes 
to civil society. In 2013, GBP 150,000 (approx. 
EUR 190,000) was allocated to capacity 
building for CSOs, this figure is set to increase 
in the future.152
Note that, at the time of research, the EU had 
cut the IPA funds for BiH by half and suspended 
the preparation of the Country Strategy Paper 
for IPA II as a means to pressure the Bosnian 
authorities to endorse the decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights and to 
establish a functional state administration.153 
5.2. Motives for Donor Presence
The Open Society Foundation (OSF) first 
opened its office in BiH in 1993 and initially 
funded humanitarian, media, and culture 
programmes implemented by organisations 
from different parts of the political spectrum. 
However, since the end of the war in 1995, OSF 
has returned to its core objectives of promoting 
the development of an ‘open society’, which 
requires a more selective approach to 
funding.154 The prioritisation of governance was 
explicitly mentioned by the respondents from 
the German Embassy (along with energy, adult 
150 Interview with an official at the USAID office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
151 Phone interview with an official from the Norwegian 
Embassy in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
152 Interview with officials at the UK Embassy in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
153 See section 1.3 in the regional part of the report and 
section 5.3 in this part of the report
154 Interview with an official at the Open Society Fund – 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
education, and public administration reform) 
and the SCO (along with health, economy, 
gender, and a separate transitional justice 
programme). The interviewee from USAID 
mentioned two earlier programmes: the Office 
of Transition Initiative (OTI) promoted the 
creation of CSOs; and the Democracy Network 
(DemNet), which ran to 2004, successfully 
strengthened the organizational capacities 
of 100 active BiH organisations.155 There is 
overarching priority  among donors to support 
the EU integration process, which has an effect 
on the long-term plans for donor involvement 
in the country (see below). For example, the 
interviewee from SIDA said: 
‘The EU and the accession process is 
a sort of a powerful instrument for 
development in this region and Sweden 
has something to contribute to that 
accession process as a donor, as a 
development assistance agent. So I 
think, even if this region is not from an 
economic or poverty level the neediest 
region in the world, it’s a conviction that 
Sweden can make a difference here and 
some sort of extra push here. I mean, a 
number of other donors have left already 
but Sweden remains here because I think 
they feel [that] a big push now in the 
next few years can make a big difference 
and  create a big return on investment in 
terms of these countries becoming EU 
members, strengthening the EU more 
generally, and stabilising the region’.156 
The SIDA regional strategy is designed to 
parallel the EU’s IPA 2014-2020 support.
5.2. Plans for the Future
As mentioned in the previous section, donors 
recognise that EU integration is a priority area, 
but that also affects the long-term strategies 
155 Interview with an official at the USAID office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
156 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
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of donors in the country. The current USAID 
strategy expires in 2016, and there will be 
a strategy following this, but a longer term 
presence in BiH will depend on the status of EU 
integration.157 The British DFID (Department 
for International Development) closed, because 
British aid is being channelled through the 
EU.158 SIDA has employed the aforementioned 
regional strategy (covering Albania, BiH, 
Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia) for 2014-2021 
that will allow flexibility for the Swedish agency 
to pull out of some countries if necessary, 
depending on the pace of EU integration: 
‘If some countries, Serbia for example, 
makes quick progress then we won’t 
support Serbia for 7 years. We will 
support through this strategy for only 
3-4 years. It gives us some flexibility 
and then we can shift the funds to other 
countries. Nobody is expecting Bosnia 
to be progressing too quickly on their 
path, or Kosovo - Albania maybe, Serbia 
certainly, and then obviously Montenegro 
and Macedonia’.159
5.3. Modalities of Aid Planning 
and Programming among Donors
The donor representatives interviewed 
for this study suggested that the fate of 
aid programming depends on clearing the 
impasse in the planning of EU assistance. As 
mentioned above, at the time of research, the 
EU had cut the IPA funds for BiH by half and 
suspended the preparation of the Country 
Strategy Paper for IPA 2014-2020. The EU 
has conditioned IPA 2014-2020 upon the 
establishment of a national coordination body 
for the implementation of IPA. As a result of 
the change in approach to drafting strategies 
between IPA I and IPA II, the administrations 
157 Interview with an official at the USAID office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
158 Interview with an official at the British Embassy in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
159 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
of the recipient states have more responsibility 
in developing the strategies for each sector. 
However, there is insufficient capacity for 
planning among governmental actors in BiH 
due to the fragmented governance structure. 
The EU wants to have one interlocutor in 
BiH, which is currently not the case since the 
Department for European Integration has 
no authority over governments at the entity 
level.160
Several bilateral donors have highlighted the 
lack of capacities and political will for policy 
planning at the central government level as 
a major problem. The GIZ Country Director 
suggested that there is a lack of political will to 
develop common strategies: 
It’s a lack of political will, it’s a lack of 
coordination, the lack of political will to 
develop strategies that are then valid for 
the whole country. Or at least develop 
something in both entities and bring 
them together. In energy for example, 
you cannot develop a Republika Srpska 
and a Federation strategy, it needs to go 
together. The country is so small. (...) 
Or economic development; You need to 
consider economic potential not only at 
the level of an entity or the level of BiH. 
You need to see it as part of the region. 
Strategies need to be developed on this 
basis. Of course you can start at entity 
level but then you need to bring it together 
at higher levels and there is a lack. 
Discussions are already difficult because 
competencies are not too clear.161 
Despite the weak capacities of the Bosnian 
state, donors continue to draft their strategies 
by consulting with Bosnian governmental 
authorities. Aid planning at the UN is based on 
the UN Development Assistance Framework 
(UNDAP), which covers a 4-5 year period and 
is developed through cooperation with state, 
160 Interview with an official at the EU Delegation office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
161 Interview with Brigitte Heuel-Rolf, Country Director 
at the GIZ Office in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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entity, and local government officials.162 GIZ 
primarily consults with state bodies in the 
development of projects.163
Although most donors have offices in Sarajevo, 
aid planning is substantially informed by 
decisions made at the donor headquarters. 
For instance, aid planning at SIDA has moved 
away from the sectoral approach towards a 
more regional, results-oriented approach in 
which the Swedish government sets objectives. 
While the field offices used to have a lot of 
autonomy, there has been a shift to a more 
top-down approach, where the Swedish 
Government is more involved. However, the 
country offices still have freedom to do what 
they want within the areas prioritised by the 
government.164 Similarly, there are general 
guidelines for assistance for the entire 
Western Balkans region sent from Oslo to the 
Norwegian Embassy in Sarajevo. From these 
guidelines, the Embassy prioritises activities 
based on continuous work on the ground and 
on consultations with diplomats, civil society 
actors, and politicians.165 The UK assistance 
is also decided centrally, in London. There 
is no country strategy, per se, but rather a 
general strategy, which makes it difficult to 
coordinate with other donors active in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The British Embassy consults 
with local authorities and CSOs to formulate 
projects which are then proposed to the 
headquarters in London.166 SCO develops its 
strategies on the basis of an assessment of the 
results of the previous country strategies and 
broader strategies for the Western Balkans, 
and on the basis of a needs assessment of 
different sectors on the ground (which do not 
change often, since the engagement is long-
162 Interview with an official at the UNDP office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
163 Interview with an official at the GIZ office in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
164 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
165 Phone interview with an official from the Embassy of 
Norway in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
166 Interview with an official at the British Embassy in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
term). This allows SCO to develop strategic 
goals and priorities.167
Besides consulting the government, some 
donors involve local civil society actors in 
the formulation of strategies. According to 
Center for Promotion of Civil Society (CPCS), 
USAID has the widest consultation with civil 
society. The interviewee from USAID said that 
the American agency sends their proposals 
to CSO networks in the country, but that 
CSOs do not provide good feedback, and are 
not constructive in helping out with project 
design.168 The EU’s attempt at setting up a 
formalised consultative mechanism with 
civil society has not been successful so far.  
Although the EU suspended the drafting of the 
Country Strategy Paper (CSP), it conducted 
one round of consultations with CSOs. There 
was a call for applications to set up a sectoral 
CSO structure akin to SEKO in Serbia (with 
seven sectors and three leading organisations 
in each sector), but for the time being, the 
CSO consultations were limited to gathering 
information for the CSP.169 SIDA only consults 
with key partners when devising strategies. 
According to the interviewee from SIDA: 
We sort of know more or less who to 
invite but we haven’t had sort of wide 
ranging consultations with civil society. 
We have some key civil society partners 
that we work with and that we know and 
we invite them. But we haven’t had like 
an open invitation for anybody to come 
and give their input on the strategy.170 
On the other hand, the UNDP has its own 
database of 300 CSOs with whom it has 
cooperated in the last 5-6 years. For UNDP, 
the input of small, rural, organisations is 
as important as the input of established, 
167 Interview with an official at the Swiss Co-operation 
office in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
168 Interview with an official at the USAID office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
169 Interview with an official at the EU Delegation office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
170 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
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urban, CSOs. The level of consultation with 
various stakeholders depends on the sector 
of intervention.171 The World Bank, though it 
mainly works with the Bosnian government 
officials, carries out consultations with civil 
society, media and the academic community 
in the development of its strategy. These 
consultations can be more or less formal. 
In BiH, these consultations were organised 
through five roundtables on different topics 
which involved all the local stakeholders.172 
5.4. Donor Coordination
The research identified several mechanisms 
for donor coordination in BiH: the Donor 
Coordination Unit attached to the Ministry of 
Finance (s.c. high-level coordination); sectoral 
coordination meetings organised by some 
ministries; Informal meetings among donors; 
and project-level coordination. However, the 
same fragmentation of Bosnian authority that 
plagues day-to-day politics in the country also 
stymies donor coordination. One example is 
that of ammunition destruction, where EUFOR 
cooperates with the OSCE and UNDP, on an ad 
hoc basis. However, the process of de-mining 
is stuck because the law on de-mining has not 
been enacted. According to the respondent 
from GIZ, donor coordination should be led by 
the government, which is unfortunately not the 
case in BiH: 
‘The Bosnian partners are not involved; 
because they are the ones who should 
be in the lead when it comes to sector 
strategies. It’s not for the donor to decide 
which strategy BiH should follow in the 
energy sector. But these mechanisms 
don’t really work in this country’. 173
The Ministry of Justice should be responsible 
for high-level donor coordination, but there 
171 Interview with an official at the UNDP office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
172 Interview with an official at the World Bank office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
173 Interview with Brigitte Heuel-Rolf, Country Director 
at the GIZ Office in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
was only one meeting in 2013. There are only 
meetings where some donors present their 
projects without linking them to the work of 
other donors.174 The interviewees from the 
British Embassy added that the complexity of 
the state makes coordination very difficult. The 
state has not taken the role of lead coordinator 
as it lacks capacity, and there is no European 
coordination mechanism. In addition, there is 
no overall country development strategy on 
which donors can align their activities.175
The interviewee from SIDA distinguished 
between the utility of the general and sectoral 
meetings, stating that the latter were far more 
effective: 
The bigger high-level ones … are very, 
very generic. Often you have these 
meetings where there are quite a lot 
of people there, there could be forty, 
fifty, sixty people there and then usually 
what they do is they invite somebody to 
present what their current activities are. 
It might be the Swiss Government, or the 
EU, or us. It’s just to me they are quite 
slow, they’re quite uninteresting. But, of 
course, but this is at the high-level ones. 
At the sector level - for example, the one 
led by the EU at the justice sector- that’s 
actually a very sort of functional one. It 
works well. It’s relatively focussed, it’s 
once every two or three months, it’s a 
useful exchange of information, and it’s 
a small enough group - only about 10-15 
people who are part of that.176 
The interviewee from the Norwegian Embassy 
concurred that a sectoral approach may 
be more fruitful.177 As mentioned above, 
there is also project-level coordination 
through steering committees, but the EUD 
174 Interview with an official at the EU Delegation office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
175 Interview with an official at the British Embassy in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
176 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
177 Interview with an official at the Norwegian Embassy 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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respondent said that this was not a sustainable 
mechanism, since it mainly consists of Bosnian 
institutional representatives who do not come 
to any agreement.178
Since the state is not able to shape donor 
coordination, donors pursue more informal 
channels of coordination, which was 
mentioned by the interviewees from SIDA, the 
British Embassy, the World Bank, and GIZ. For 
example, SIDA organizes a meeting every three 
months to coordinate around environmental 
protection, to fill the gaps of the official sectoral 
mechanisms.179 The UNDP said that there 
are coordination bodies for the civil society 
projects funded by the EU, which include 
representatives of the government. This has 
allowed UNDP to work together with TACSO on 
building the capacity of CSOs to write project 
proposals in municipalities benefiting from the 
LOD project. However, the EUD interviewee 
said that much of the coordination around 
civil society is done informally. According 
to the EUD respondent, USAID is the lead 
donor in the informal coordination of civil 
society programming in BiH, where the EU, 
USAID, and the Embassies of the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and Norway are most involved.180 The 
Norwegian Embassy interviewee added that 
this ad hoc coordination is done at the project 
level ‘if we find that there are other donors 
involved either with the same organization 
or the same topic- for example, gender is 
something that there are a lot of initiatives to 
coordinate on, and also LGBT’.181 The downside 
of this is that, since there is no formal 
mechanism, CSOs do not cooperate in the 
implementation of projects. Donors are aware 
that it is necessary to have better cooperation 
around civil society programming.182 Part of 
178 Interview with an official at the EU Delegation office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
179 Interview with an official at the World Bank office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
180 Interview with an official at the EU Delegation office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
181 Interview with an official at the Norwegian Embassy 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
182 Interview with an official at the USAID office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
the complexity of civil society programming 
is that it is often a cross-cutting issue, so it is 
not reduced to coordination in one sector. For 
this reason, this has led to instances when 
a donor implemented a project and, two or 
three years later, another donor initiated a 
project to tackle the same problem with a 
different approach, which created confusion 
among local stakeholders. The danger of 
having less structured, informal meetings is 
that it is difficult to have a complete picture of 
donor activities and priorities in the country, 
even with the database of donor projects in 
the country compiled by the Bosnian Donor 
Coordination Forum (DCF). The interviewees 
from the British Embassy were concerned 
that there is no clear data on where the funds 
are going. The donor mapping system is 
not complete and up to date. The database 
has always been retroactive, which raises 
questions about its purpose. It does not allow 
donors to identify partners.183
Overall, the objective of EU integration drives 
donor activities, so it is no surprise that the 
EU is seen as the main agenda setter in donor 
assistance in the country. USAID stated that 
they align their activities with the EU, because 
their objective is to have BiH on the European 
path. They seek to be complementary with the 
EU.184 For these reasons, SIDA works closely 
with the EU: 
We work very closely with the EU. We 
work with them closely on the ground 
here but also as a member state we 
influence the EU a lot. We follow-up 
quite closely on what they do here and 
we sort of sent via Stockholm guidance 
and information that then our Swedish 
colleagues in Brussels will then raise at 
various meetings, etc. That is something 
we prioritise, that follow-up of the EU.185 
183 Interview with officials at the British Embassy in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
184 Interview with an official at the USAID office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
185 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
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On the other hand, surprisingly, the British 
Embassy actually works quite closely with the 
Americans, not the EU, and the interviewees 
mentioned that there was a possibility for 
the Embassy to merge funds with USAID.186 
Although the donors recognize the key role 
of the EU as the agenda setter, they remained 
split on the EU strategy of pushing reform 
via strong conditionality, namely freezing IPA 
funding. According to the SIDA respondent, 
Sweden is remaining ‘on the fence’ for the time 
being: 
There’s a very split opinion between the 
member states as to how to deal with 
that. Some people want to do much more 
conditionality and put funds on hold to 
send a message to the government here 
to say that this is not OK. Others say 
that it’s not going to work, don’t bother. 
It’s a very split thing and at the moment 
Sweden is on the fence. Sweden doesn’t 
totally believe that that is an effective 
approach but at the same time they are 
concerned that is a problem that we just 
keep disbursing funds to these govern-
ment agencies and institutions while at 
the same time their politicians are not 
doing what they are promising to do.187 
By contrast, the USAID interviewee said that 
freezing the IPA funds will hit the beneficiaries 
rather than the government representatives, 
and was concerned that this measure will not 
affect political elites, who are the source of the 
problem.188
5.5. Donor Assistance to Civil 
Society
Although foreign aid to BiH has decreased over 
the past decade, the level of donor assistance 
186 Interview with an official at the British Embassy in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
187 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
188 Interview with an official at the USAID office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
to civil society remains relatively high for the 
region. According to Milan Mrđa from CPCS, 
there has never been so much funding for civil 
society in BiH as there is now. In his view, the 
problem of civil society in BiH is not the lack of 
funding but the lack of competencies.189
Most donors in BiH support civil society 
through project grants. With a budget of 
EUR 4 mil in 2011 (EUR 3 mil for CSF and 
EUR 1 mil for EIDHR), the EU is the most 
important foreign source of funding for CSOs. 
However, unlike in other WB countries, the 
EUD channels most of its aid through local 
municipalities as part of the Local Democracy 
(LOD) project. As described in the regional 
part of the report (section 3.3), LOD is a sub-
granting mechanism which seeks to build 
the capacity of the municipalities to support 
CSOs in an impartial and transparent manner. 
The EU co-finances projects which have been 
selected by the municipalities according to 
a standard set of procedures developed in 
cooperation with UNDP which administers 
the LOD project. Besides supporting CSOs 
through the LOD programme, the EUD seeks 
to promote networking among CSOs through a 
grant scheme that is exclusively aimed at CSO 
networks. The grant scheme for CSO networks 
and EIDHR are directly administered by the 
EUD in Sarajevo.190
Aside from the EU, USAID, Sweden and 
Norway provide substantial support to civil 
society. Most of these donors have focused 
their assistance on developing the capacities 
of a limited number of CSOs that are already 
established in their field. For example, the next 
USAID civil society programme involves  USD 
8.8 mil (approx. EUR 6.9 mil) for 5 years, half of 
which is aimed for re-granting administered by 
local partners (CPCS and CCI). This programme 
seeks to provide assistance to a select number 
of CSOs for 5 years in order to give them 
189 Interview with Milan Mrđa, Program Manager at the 
Center for Promotion of Civil Society (CPCD).
190 Interview with an official at the EU Delegation in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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some security and allow them to develop 
their capacities. According to the USAID 
representative, the objective is ‘that, in 5 years, 
there are 10-12 organisations that are active in 
this sector, as someone who can do something 
in the name of civil society and in cooperation 
with others’.191 In partnership with USAID, 
the UK Embassy provides support for CSOs 
to become leaders in specific sectors, secure 
sustainability, and build capacities for lobbying 
and advocacy. The Norwegian embassy 
focuses its support on advocacy oriented CSOs 
through both project grants and institutional 
funding. The interviewee from the Embassy of 
Norway suggested that they have a preference 
for giving large grants (up to NOK 1mil or 
approx. EUR 790,000) because they ‘would 
like to support projects and organisations of 
a certain size rather than very small ones’.192 
SIDA only provides institutional grants to the 
Centre for Investigative Reporting, but it is 
considering introducing core funding for other 
organisations.193 
Donors in BiH are pioneers in terms of shifting 
from international to local partners for 
administering civil society programmes. As 
mentioned in the regional part of the report 
(section 2.1), USAID has been implementing 
its civil society assistance in BiH through local 
partners since 2001. SIDA is also phasing out 
the use of foreign intermediaries faster than 
in other countries. According to a SIDA official 
in BiH, channeling assistance through local 
organisations is more beneficial ‘because these 
CSOs work together as partners, they see 
themselves as part of a common network, they 
support each other and stand side-by-side’.194 
As part of their organizational overhaul, SIDA is 
considering different models of support for civil 
society, such as establishing an advocacy fund 
191 Interview with an official at the USAID office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
192 Interview with an official at the Embassy of Norway in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
193 Interview with an official at the Swedish Embassy in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
194 Ibid.
for advocacy CSOs like the one established by 
the Centre for Civic Initiatives (CCI).  
Finally, a number of donors support civil 
society in an indirect way by including CSOs in 
the implementation of projects. For example, 
GIZ engages with civil society in its local 
governance and local government programme 
in the context of public-private partnerships. 
They also consult with civil society for adult 
education. Nevertheless, the GIZ representative 
stated that it is very difficult for them to 
engage with civil society because they cannot 
find adequate partners.195 The SCO engages 
with civil society in the planning and/or the 
implementation of most of its activities. For 
example, the local governance programme 
includes support for the Mesne Zajednice (local 
communities), while the justice programme 
involves support for CSOs working in the 
field of judicial transparency.196 The World 
Bank also implements some projects directly 
through CSOs, such as the Youth Programme 
which was implemented by the Mozaik 
foundation. Occasionally, CSOs are selected as 
implementors through tenders funded by the 
World Bank but administered by the state. To 
sum up, the World Bank official interviewed 
for this study suggested that CSOs should 
recognise the World Bank as a partner that can 
influence policy-making rather than a source 
of funding.197 In a similar spirit, the UNDP 
representative suggested that he sees CSOs 
as partners for service-delivery, for providing 
advice on specific issues and for coordinating 
activities.198 
195 Interview with an official at the GIZ office in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
196 Interview with officials at the Swiss Cooperation 
Office in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
197 Interview with an official at the World Bank office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
198 Interview with an official at the UNDP office in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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6. Kosovo
6.1. Levels of Donor Support
Like in BiH, the international community 
has deployed a major reconstruction effort 
in Kosovo following the 1999 conflict. It is 
estimated that the international aid outpaced 
the Marshall Plan in terms of dollar per capita 
amounts of aid 7 times in BiH and 4 times 
in Kosovo.199 According to Luan Shllaku, the 
Director of the Kosovo Foundation for Open 
Society (KFOS), the early 2000s were a time 
when there were many donors but few CSOs. 
The situation has drastically changed since 
then insofar as the availability of funding has 
decreased – there is now ‘few money for many 
ideas’.200 
In spite of this trend, Kosovo remains at the 
top of the agenda for both multilateral and 
bilateral donors in the WB. Besides hosting 
the EU’s largest civilian mission abroad (the 
EULEX), Kosovo also hosts the biggest OSCE 
Mission in the history of this organisation. The 
EU’s total annual commitment in Kosovo is 
around EUR 67 mil, out of which approximately 
EUR 2.6 mil are allocated to civil society.201 The 
OSCE Mission to Kosovo counts about 500-600 
members and a budget of around EUR 20 mil. 
Among bilateral donors, USAID has maintained 
a strong presence in Kosovo with a budget of 
around EUR 38 mil EUR (USD 54 mil) in 2010, 
out of which EUR 2.7 mil were allocated to civil 
society.202 The SCO is also heavily involved with 
199 Howard, Ivana. Mistakes Donors Make: Civil Society 
and Democracy Assistance in the Balkans. (Belgrade: 
Heartefact Fund, 2011)
200 Interview with Luan Shllaku, Executive Director of the 
Kosovo Foundation for Open Society.
201 These figures are for 2010, they were obtained during 
the pilot phase of the research. 
202 These figures are for 2010, they were obtained during 
the pilot phase of the research.
a budget of CHF 80 mil (approx. EUR 65 mil) 
for the period 2013-2016.203 As in other WB 
countries, the Scandinavian countries are very 
active in terms of development cooperation. 
Since 2008, SIDA’s budget has been SEK 80 
mil (approx. EUR 8.9 mil), out of which 30 -35 
per cent has been dedicated to civil society 
support. In 2011, Norway’s assistance to 
Kosovo amounted to EUR 16 mil, out of which 
EUR 2 mil were allocated to civil society.204 
Finally, the UK has the same programmes 
in Kosovo as in the other WB countries: the 
Conflict Prevention Programme with an annual 
budget of around GBP 2.5 mil (approx. EUR 
3.2 mil) and the Re-uniting Europe whose 
budget for 2013-2014 was about GBP 300,000 
(approx. EUR 380,000).205 
Several private foundations are operating in 
Kosovo. The most important of them is the 
Open Society with a total budget of EUR 3 
mil, out of which EUR 2 mil are channelled 
through the Foundation’s local branch – KFOS. 
KFOS gets an additional EUR 1-1.5 mil for 
implementing projects on behalf of other 
donors, mainly within the scope of the Roma 
programme.206
6.2. Motives for Donor Presence
As mentioned above, there is still a large 
donor presence in Kosovo, although not at 
the same level as there used to be during the 
post-conflict period. Big donors have stayed 
in Kosovo because they still consider it as a 
crisis zone. From 1998 to 2000, SCO focused 
on emergency relief, after which the agency 
has focused on: water and waste; economy and 
203 Interview with an official at the Swiss Cooperation 
Office in Kosovo. 
204 These figures are for 2010, they were obtained during 
the pilot phase of the research. Note that the overall 
budget was expected to remain constant for the next 
3 years.
205 Interview with an official from the UK Embassy in 
Kosovo. Note that, on top of this, the UK disburses 
around 2 million GBP for the secondment of 
personnel to EULEX.
206 Interview with Luan Shllaku, Executive Director of the 
Kosovo Foundation for Open Society.
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employment; governance and decentralization; 
health; and migration. There is a special ‘value 
added’ aspect to the Swiss involvement in 
Kosovo, since there is a large diaspora in 
Switzerland, though Kosovo is an SCO priority 
as much as other places in the Western 
Balkans.207 In addition to the two programmes 
mentioned above, the British Embassy also has 
a Drugs and Crimes fund that supports small 
projects for training the police and other state 
administration.208 KFOS opened its office in 
Pristina in 1994. Until 1999, it was the branch 
office of the Foundation for FRY. In the context 
of the repression orchestrated by the Belgrade 
government during the 1990s, the foundation 
focused on educational activities as Kosovo 
had a parallel education system at the time. 
After 1999, the focus became reconstruction 
and civil society development (creation of 
CSOs), as well as other activities, such as 
culture.209 The OSCE in Kosovo used not only to 
monitor elections, but also to organise them. 
Also, the OSCE served as part of the UNMIK 
administration.210 SIDA has been present in 
Kosovo since 1999, and until 2004-2005, the 
focus was on reconstruction and infrastructure, 
though there is more of a focus on civil society 
and other issues since then.211
6.3. Plans for the Future
From the interview data collected for Kosovo, 
the respondent from SIDA said that the 
agency is planning to remain in Kosovo until 
at least the year 2020.212 However, other 
interviewees stated that the involvement 
of their organisations would depend on the 
pace of EU integration in Kosovo. DFID left 
Kosovo as the last mission in Europe in 2012. 
In the coming years, the respondent from 
the British Embassy expected the ‘Reuniting 
207 Interview with an official at the SCO office in Kosovo.
208 Interview with an official at the British Embassy in 
Kosovo.
209 Interview with an official at the KFOS office in Kosovo.
210 Interview with an official at the OSCE office in Kosovo.
211 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Kosovo.
212 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Kosovo.
Europe’ programme would expand, while 
the ‘Conflict Prevention Programme’ will 
be reduced – echoing the move away from 
peacebuilding towards Europeanization. 
These programmes will be gradually closed 
as the country gets closer to the EU.213 The 
OSCE has a substantial presence in Kosovo. 
As mentioned above, it is the biggest mission 
in the history of the organization, though the 
staffing in Kosovo has been steadily decreasing 
over the years. According to an official at OSCE, 
the organisation’s presence will depend on 
Kosovo’s fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria 
on the path to EU integration.214
6.4. Modalities of Aid Planning 
and Programming among Donors 
General EU programming is developed 
through the triangular relationship between 
the EU Office in Kosovo (EUOK), the European 
Commission in Brussels, and the Kosovo 
Government. Programming is determined by 
the political documents alongside the dialogue 
between the EU, the Kosovo Government, and 
civil society actors. The Kosovar line ministries 
propose ideas for programming based on 
political documents, which are then collected 
by the Ministry for European Integration - the 
Kosovar counterpart to EUOK. The EUOK has 
specific task managers which cooperate closely 
with each line ministry in order to assist them 
in preparing their proposals for EU support. 
In contrast to the general programming, the 
planning of the two programmes focused on 
strengthening civil society – CSF and EIDHR 
– does not include Government to the same 
extent and  involves more consultations with 
CSOs. For the CSF, a strategic document is 
drafted in Brussels for the entire Western 
Balkans, while national allocations priorities 
are determined by EUOK. The EUOK regularly 
consults with civil society through the Local 
Action Group (LAG) for Kosovo. For EIDHR, the 
213 Interview with an official at the British Embassy in 
Kosovo.
214 Interview with an official at the OSCE office in Kosovo.
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strategic document is drafted in Brussels for 
the entire world (EIDHR is a global instrument), 
while EUOK can choose which global objectives 
will be selected for Kosovo. In addition to 
these instruments, civil society actors are also 
present in providing information as part of the 
Stabilisation and Association process (SAp).215
A representative from KCSF, which 
commissioned a previous study on donor 
strategies in Kosovo, stated that the 
Government in Kosovo has only had the 
capacity to become involved in the planning 
of IPA in the past 2-3 years, because of 
insufficient capacity before that. The problem, 
however, with IPA programming is that there 
is little local ownership, which represents a big 
problem when it comes to the implementation 
of legislation. Moreover, KCSF representative 
added that documents are in English and they 
are too technical for CSOs to read, understand 
and contribute: ‘it’s just about an email sent 
to NGOs saying that this is the strategic paper 
and you have 7 or 10 days to comment’.216 The 
respondent from KCSF added that there is a 
more structured consultation as part of SAp, 
where there are sectoral groups that include 
consultation with civil society actors and 
Government. By contrast, there are no formally 
structured consultation processes as part of 
CSF or IPA programming, a gap that KCSF is 
advocating to address.217
These weaknesses in consultation 
notwithstanding, the status of Euro-Atlantic 
integration and EU integration determine the 
priorities of other donors in Kosovo. For the 
Norwegians, EU progress reports are checked 
when making a strategy for the region and 
country. The Norwegian agenda in Kosovo is 
a political one: they support the Euro-Atlantic 
integration of Kosovo. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) in Oslo with the consultation 
from the Embassy writes its country by country 
strategy as well as a regional strategy. The 
215 Interview with an official at the EU Office in Kosovo.
216 Interview with an official at the KCSF office in Kosovo.
217 Interview with an official at the KCSF office in Kosovo.
Western Balkans regional strategy has to get 
the approval of the Parliament. Hence the 
annual budget is decided by the MFA and the 
Parliament. However, the Embassy’s input 
and comments are taken into consideration 
based on their experience and their evaluated 
needs.218 Consultation with CSOs has not been 
fruitful for the Norwegian Embassy – the 
respondent felt that CSOs do not have broad 
views on issues and that they tend to only 
concentrate on funding. Furthermore, most 
of the views from civil society are conflicting, 
so it is very difficult for donors to get the right 
perspective on issues from CSOs.219
SIDA and SCO also have this type of 
coordination between the home country and 
the field offices, with further information 
provided by local stakeholders. The Embassy 
gathers information on the ground, which is 
processed by the headquarters and sent to 
stakeholders for feedback. This subsequent 
needs assessment involves extensive 
consultations with local stakeholders. 
There were meetings with government 
representatives, CSOs and various interest 
groups, and not only with beneficiaries: ‘I 
was especially careful not to ask only our 
beneficiaries, because there is always the 
tendency to praise, and to give you, let’s 
say, not maybe that kind of realistic picture 
of the needs, so it was quite highly broad 
consultations period’.220
The SCO has three stages of aid programming. 
It starts with a situation analysis which 
includes a review of previous actions and 
a context analysis. This is usually done by 
consultants who carry out consultations with 
government, civil society, donors and other 
stakeholders. The second phase consists in a 
‘digestion’ of findings in consultation with all 
stakeholders. The third phase is an elaboration 
of the actions that will be undertaken and 
218 Interview with an official at the Norwegian Embassy 
in Kosovo, from the previous KCSF study..
219 Ibid.
220 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Kosovo.
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included in the strategy. Once the sectors 
and the sector objectives are identified, 
there is another round of consultations with 
the government at the project level.221 The 
primary local stakeholders consulted during 
the strategy are Pristina-based think-tanks, 
whilst CSOs are consulted in locations where 
the proposed projects are to take place. For 
example, non-formal consultations with a 
number of CSOs have been carried during 
the drafting of the Credit Proposal, while 
an External Review has conducted broad 
discussions with different CSOs in order to 
propose adjustments on this programme. For 
the Small Credit Line,  the planning is based 
on SCO staff’s experience and information 
from the colleagues within the office, while 
sometimes there are also non-formal meetings 
with different CSOs.222
By contrast, the British aid programming is 
determined in London by the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO). The Embassy 
develops its business plan according to the 
objectives set in London and local needs. The 
business plan forms the basis for the calls 
for proposals. The priorities set in London 
are usually broad enough to accommodate 
local needs.223 The UN mission in Kosovo 
has a similar procedure. The UN Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) are translated 
into local priorities. The MDGs are broad, so 
the country office has quite a bit of flexibility 
in setting Kosovo priorities. In general, 
this process is highly consultative and 
participatory, and draws from the Human 
Development Reports (HDR) and evaluation 
of past programmes. HDR is usually done 
by local experts and organizations, while the 
topics of each HDR are consulted in advance 
with government and civil society. HDR serves 
as a context analysis. As an example of post-
programme evaluation, UNDP has gone 
221 Interview with an official at the SCO office in Kosovo.
222 Interview with an official at the SCO office in Kosovo, 
from the previous KCSF study.
223 Interview with an official at the British Embassy in 
Kosovo.
through a Program Outcome Evaluation of the 
UNDP Kosovo work during the last five years, 
where local stakeholders have participated. 
In addition to these mechanisms, UNDP has 
a joint agreement with the government in its 
main program assistance. There are focal 
points in line ministries which participate in 
drafting the joint document since early stages, 
while a final agreement is reached also at the 
level of government as a whole. In the final 
stage of programming, each topic/area has 
its own consultation process through other 
tools such as meetings, roundtables, focus 
groups, interviews, and surveys, where local 
stakeholders discuss the initial proposal.224 
The OSCE programming process is more 
centralized. According to the interviewee from 
OSCE: 
The planning of the programmatic 
priorities is a centralized process 
which actually starts in the mission but 
it has to go on review and clearance 
on the Secretariat level, including 
the review of all participating states. 
So when the mission comes up with 
the programmatic priorities, they are 
communicated through two different 
documents to the participating states: 
first it is the programme outline which 
outlines the mid- and long-term 
objectives, and then there is the annual 
unified budget proposal which is then the 
one-year plan or one year resource plan; 
what resources are needed to implement 
the one year programme towards those 
medium and long-term objectives.225 
The OSCE consults with primary beneficiaries, 
both in government and CSOs, in developing 
programmes. The organization also has a 
wider consultative process, as described by the 
interviewee from OSCE:
224 Interview with an official from the UN office in 
Kosovo, from the previous KCSF study.
225 Interview with an official from the OSCE office in 
Kosovo.
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‘Based on these needs and the strategic 
priorities of the stakeholders, then we 
base and plan our programme. When 
I mention stakeholders, it’s not only 
necessarily the beneficiary who is getting 
the assistance or the support from us but 
also the other actors in the field, other 
international organizations, including the 
member states of OSCE.’226
At the other end of the spectrum, KFOS has 
full independence in the development of its 
strategy. The KFOS Board, which is mainly 
composed of seven representatives from CSOs, 
determines the programme.227 The template 
for annual strategy is provided by the OSI 
Headquarters in New York. The local staff 
(Executive Director and Program Coordinators) 
propose the strategic objectives. The draft 
strategy is presented in front of Local Board in 
Pristina and OSI Board in New York. The Local 
Board is involved also in defining the strategic 
priorities. The OSI Board in New York does 
not change or revise the Strategy; it is either 
approved or rejected. The Local Board is also 
mandated to propose new programs, which 
have to be approved by the OSI Board in New 
York.228
6.5. Donor Coordination
The EU integration process is seen as the 
common objective around which donors 
coordinate, making the EU the agenda-setter. 
For example, the new SIDA strategy in Kosovo 
is in line with IPA II.229 For KFOS, EU documents 
are more important with regards to policy 
objectives than funding specific mechanisms. 
However, if KFOS is informed that a specific 
donor (particularly major donors) allocates a 
high amount of funds for a specific topic, KFOS 
tends to finance other things, in order to avoid 
226 Ibid.
227 Interview with an official from the KFOS office in 
Kosovo.
228 Interview with an official from the KFOS office in 
Kosovo, from the previous KCSF study.
229 Interview with an official from the SIDA office in 
Kosovo.
duplication as well as have more ‘recognition of 
their funds’. In other words, if smaller amount 
of KFOS funds are put in the same objective 
with large EU/USAID funds, KFOS funds will 
be deemphasized.230 The respondent from the 
UN office in Kosovo also said that the EU is the 
main agenda-setter in Kosovo. Although the 
UN is a global intergovernmental organization, 
due to the EU accession process, the wording 
of MDGs for Kosovo has been translated into 
the EU language. EU accession process is also 
a governmental priority, so UN agencies try 
to be in line and contribute to EU accession 
process.231
However, the USAID added that it is also 
seen as an agenda-setter, due to its presence 
in Kosovar civil society. The 2002 USAID 
Advocacy Program was the first programme 
supporting advocacy CSOs and thus has had 
a strong influence on civil society in Kosovo. 
In addition, because most of USAID supported 
projects have been rather small, the number of 
organizations and individuals involved in USAID 
funded projects was higher, compared to other 
donors. By contrast, the EU had similar levels 
of funding, through bigger but fewer projects, 
so the number of organizations and individuals 
involved was lower.232
According to the SCO interviewee, there are a 
number of donor coordination mechanisms. 
The Kosovar Ministry of European Integration 
is responsible for coordination at a general 
level, but there are also a number of sectoral 
working groups within the Government with a 
lead Ministry and lead donor. In parallel, there 
are donor meetings organized by donors.233 
One of the respondents from OSCE cited the 
Assembly donor conference as a good example 
of donor coordination: 
230 Interview with an official from the KFOS office in 
Kosovo, from the previous KCSF study.
231 Interview with an official from the UN office in 
Kosovo, from the previous KCSF study.
232 Interview with an official from the USAID office in 
Kosovo, from the previous KCSF study.
233 Interview with an official from the SCO office in 
Kosovo.
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The Assembly had a donor conference 
where they invite all donors to provide 
their inputs, provide their plans of 
activities and areas of support and the 
Assembly and different directorates of 
the administration present their needs – 
that’s the first round. And then, we had 
a meeting with the Secretary General 
and the Donor Relations Officer there to 
present, in the light of what other donors 
have presented there, and in the light 
of the demands we have received, we 
adjusted our activities and presented 
those again and tried to accord them. 
And now in the final round, it’s a big 
round again, there will be a presentation 
of the final areas of support and 
supported activities and so far I think it is 
a good modus for this.234
In light of the Paris Agreement on aid 
effectiveness, SIDA has organized donor 
coordination around civil society since 2011. 
The meetings take place on a quarterly 
basis, involving 10-14 organisations, which 
excludes private donors. Occasionally, CSO 
representatives give presentations on the 
realities on the ground or around some specific 
issues.235 This forum also has an internal 
database where all donors are invited to 
provide information on the target groups, field 
of work, amount of funds, year of funding for 
their granted projects. This database is still not 
public, although SIDA is interested to ask other 
donors (or partners) to take the responsibility 
for maintaining this database and develop it 
further.236 The respondent from SCO felt that 
the forum, which meets every other month, 
is a good initiative. Participants exchange 
information and coordinate future actions. 
There are also discussions on what is missing 
and what should be done.237
234 Interview with an official from the OSCE office in 
Kosovo.
235 Interview with an official from the SIDA office in 
Kosovo.
236 Interview with an official from the SIDA office in 
Kosovo, from the previous KCSF study.
237 Interview with an official from the SCO office in 
Kosovo.
The EUOK felt that the forum had some 
benefits, but that it is mostly a space to 
exchange information rather than coordinating 
donor agendas and interventions.238 USAID 
also echoed this perspective, and the shift from 
specific civil society program to horizontal 
support for civil society (within different 
themes) was influenced by the information 
that the Swiss are designing a specific fund for 
civil society (Democratic Society Promotion); 
USAID thus saw that area would be more or 
less covered by other donors. USAID added 
that it tries to find potential synergies (e.g. 
cooperation of USAID funded Civil Society 
Strengthening Program with TACSO in 
assisting the NGO Registration and Liaison 
Department during 2010-2011) within the 
forum. The American agency also provides 
references to all interested donors on CSOs 
that were USAID partners.239 Along these 
lines, the OSCE interviewee added that the 
forum developed a matrix of project grantees 
to ensure that their inputs do not overlap and 
to be aware of other donors’ programmatic 
priorities, adding that the basic purpose of 
these meetings is ‘to blacklist grantees that 
don’t fulfil the criteria that donors have, to 
ensure that one project proposal doesn’t 
get double or triple funding’.240 On the other 
hand, KFOS is not invited, since it is a private 
donor. However, the interviewee from KFOS 
also felt that they were not included because 
many do not consider them as donors (they 
see them as a CSO), while many others do not 
consider them as a CSO but purely a donor 
agency. In reality, as an advocacy organisation 
and a grant-giver, KFOS has a dual role 
which is unique in the field.241 Finally, the 
British Embassy respondent was unaware of 
these meetings until told about them at the 
238 Interview with an official from the EU Office in 
Kosovo.
239 Interview with an official from the USAID office in 
Kosovo.
240 Interview with an official from the OSCE office in 
Kosovo.
241 Interview with an official from the KFOS office in 
Kosovo.
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interview with KCSF.242 Instead of participating 
in the forum, the Embassy relies on personal 
contacts with other donors and on the integrity 
of CSOs to ensure that there are no overlaps 
between projects.
Although there are structures in place, many 
donors were expressed criticisms towards the 
formalised donor coordination mechanisms. 
The interviewee from KFOS said that there 
was no centralized coordination, and that it 
would not make much sense to have a central 
coordination mechanism because donors are 
very different in their structures. Thus, donors 
should coordinate so that they do not obstruct 
each other and, if they cannot work in synergy, 
at least be complementary with each other. 
In reality, coordination is done in an informal 
way during bilateral meeting between donors 
which are organised on an ad hoc basis.243 The 
British Embassy interviewee added that the Aid 
Management Platform database managed by 
the Ministry of European Integration, the lead in 
donor coordination, is not up to date. Moreover, 
sectoral donor meetings are not very helpful 
because the government does not have the 
capacity to lead these meetings. As a result, 
as the KFOS representative suggested, most 
of the coordination is done informally between 
donors.244 Some respondents also added that 
there is no substantive donor coordination, 
and, as the UN interviewee surmised, meetings 
are focused on information sharing rather than 
coordination.245 According to the interviewee 
from the Norwegian Embassy, coordination 
of donors is not real coordination – they are 
usually meetings to see who is doing what. 
The problem is compounded by the fact that 
priorities become led by the donor agenda, 
not local needs, since there is no government 
strategic plan to guide donor strategies.246
242 Interview with an official from the British Embassy in 
Kosovo, from the previous KCSF study.
243 Interview with an official from the KFOS office in 
Kosovo.
244 Interview with an official from the British Embassy in 
Kosovo.
245 Interview with an official from the UN office in 
Kosovo, from previous KCSF study.
246 Interview with an official from the Norwegian 
Embassy in Kosovo, from previous KCSF study.
6.6. Donor Assistance  
to Civil Society
Donor assistance to civil society in Kosovo 
remains sizable despite the fact that many 
donors have scaled down their activities. There 
is one important particularity to civil society 
assistance in Kosovo: many donors seem to 
have a preference for channelling their support 
to CSOs through foreign intermediaries or 
local partners. For example, the SCO has two 
programmes focusing on civil society: the 
Democratic Society Promotion (DSP) and the 
Small Credit Line. The DSP programme, which 
is SCO’s most important civil society scheme 
with a budget of CHF 4 mil (approx. EUR 3.3 
mil) for 4 years, is administered by KCSF. SCO 
opted to implement this programme through 
KCSF in order to reduce transaction costs. 
This programme involves both institutional 
and project grants for advocacy-based and 
watchdog organisations working in the 
field of transparency, accountability and 
citizen participation. According to the SCO 
official interviewed for this study, they offer 
institutional grants in order to have ‘real 
applicants with their ideas and not to be donor-
driven’.247 The Small Credit Line is a smaller 
grant scheme that is administered directly by 
the SCO office.
As discussed in the regional section of the 
report, donors such as USAID and SIDA 
have for a long time resorted to foreign 
intermediaries to implement their civil society 
programmes in most WB countries. In Kosovo, 
USAID does not have a specific programme for 
civil society, but it involves CSOs horizontally in 
its thematic programmes. As part of the USAID 
Forward reform, the USAID office in Kosovo 
is increasingly channelling support for civil 
society through local partners. For example, 
the Centre for Social Emancipation (Qendra 
per Emancipimin Shoqeror - QESH) received 
a USAID grant for a program entitled ‘Kosovo 
247 Interview with an official from the SCO office in 
Kosovo.
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is Ready’ (KIR) that supports local advocacy 
initiatives to protect the LGBTI community from 
discrimination and human rights violations. 
The USAID Mission also made an award to the 
Kosovo Democratic Institute (KDI) to support 
a network of local NGOs, Democracy in Action 
(DiA), to monitor the local elections in the 
fall of 2013 and the parliamentary elections 
anticipated for the fall of 2014.248 With this shift 
in approach, USAID is providing higher grants 
to a smaller number of organisations. 
SIDA is also progressively phasing out the 
use of foreign intermediaries in Kosovo. Their 
contract with Kvinna till Kvinna is expiring in 
2014, while Civil Rights Defenders and Olof 
Palme Center will be there for another two 
years. Through these organisations, SIDA has 
provided both institutional and project grants 
to Kosovar CSOs. The implementation of civil 
society programmes has been in the hand of 
the Swedish intermediaries: they have freedom 
in selecting both the type of support provided 
and the beneficiaries. The interviewee from 
SIDA stated that they do not meddle in this 
process because they trust the implementing 
organisations.249
Donors in Kosovo thus attach a lot of 
importance to trust and partnership in the 
delivery of civil society assistance. While some 
resort to intermediaries for implementing their 
assistance, others allocate grants through 
restricted calls for proposals which requires 
a heavier involvement on the part of the 
donor. For example, KFOS has a very specific 
procedure for selecting beneficiaries. Before 
opening a Call for Proposals (CfP), KFOS 
invites a select group of CSOs to participate 
in workshops on specific issues. During 
these workshops, CSO representatives from 
the region are invited to present successful 
examples of projects. KFOS then hires coaches 
to help CSOs develop their projects before 
248 E-mail communication with an official at USAID 
Kosovo.
249 Interview with an official from SIDA Kosovo.
opening a CfP.250 The UK Embassy is also 
substantially involved in the development of 
projects which it funds. Before submitting 
a formal application, CSOs are requested to 
send concept notes on the basis of which the 
Embassy makes a pre-selection. The short-
listed CSOs are then required to provide fully 
developed project proposals which can be 
negotiated with the Embassy. Interestingly, 
even the EUOK resorts to this type of procedure 
to allocate funding for civil society. While the 
EUDs in the WB generally allocate grants to 
CSOs through open calls, the interviewee from 
EUOK stated that they increasingly resort to 
restricted calls in order to enable more CSOs to 
apply for EU funds. Restricted calls allow CSOs 
to put forward concept notes without having 
to submit a full application, which makes it 
much easier and more cost-effective for CSOs 
to apply for EU grants. While they may seem 
to be less competitive, restricted calls can 
be advantageous to smaller organisations 
because they involve a smaller initial 
investment in the application process, thus 
reducing the barrier to entry for smaller CSOs.
 
7. Macedonia
7.1. Levels of Donor Support
The levels and foci of donor assistance to 
Macedonia have changed in line with changing 
needs. For example, assistance from SCO, 
which has been present since 1992, changed 
from humanitarian aid in the 1990s to 
development cooperation in the 2000s. The 
Foundation Open Society Macedonia (FOSM) 
also initially provided humanitarian assistance. 
FOSM sought to tackle the isolation of the 
country engendered by the international 
250 Interview with an official from KFOS.
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embargo against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the Greek embargo against 
Macedonia through humanitarian aid and 
logistical assistance for the export/import of 
goods. There was also a big media programme 
to break the monopoly of state-controlled 
media. The Foundation’s budget, which mainly 
targets civil society, has been increasing in 
recent years. The budget in 2013 was EUR 4.5 
mil which includes projects funded by other 
donors, such as USAID and SDC.251 Apart from 
FOSM, SCO is the  only donor  whose level of 
financial support in Macedonia  has increased, 
doubling from CHF 40 mil (approx. EUR 33.2 
mil) in the 2009-2012 to CHF 80 mil (approx. 
EUR 66.3 mil) in 2013-2016, due to an increase 
of SCO budgets at a global level. 
There are also other international donors 
present in Macedonia. USAID assistance 
for civil society began with the Democracy 
Network Programme (DemNet), which ran 
between 1995 and 2004. This was followed 
by the Civil Society Strengthening Project 
which preceded the current USAID Civil Society 
Project.252 The Norwegian Embassy has a 
small Embassy Fund from their mission in 
Belgrade, which totals EUR 3 mil.253 The British 
Embassy runs the same two programmes 
as it does in Serbia: ‘Reuniting Europe’ and 
the ‘Conflict Prevention Programme’. The 
priority areas for the UK Embassy are: public 
administration reform, rule of law, good 
governance and human rights.254 The UN 
agencies act as implementers rather than 
donors. Most of their budgets come from 
other donors or from state/local authorities.255 
Respondents also highlighted the importance 
of non-Western donors. The interviewee 
251 Interview with an official from the Open Society office 
in Macedonia.
252 Interview with an official from the USAID office in 
Macedonia.
253 Interview with an official from the Norwegian 
Embassy in Serbia.
254 Interview with an official at the British Embassy in 
Macedonia.
255 Interview with an official at the UN office in 
Macedonia. 
from the Dutch Embassy suggested that the 
Chinese and Russian embassies are also 
quite active donors, albeit not in the field of 
civil society.256 The interviewee from the EUD 
office also confirmed this, by adding that China 
is providing substantial loans for transport 
infrastructure.257
Although FOSM and SCO said that their 
involvement in Macedonia is increasing, 
there has been a noticeable withdrawal 
of international donors from the country. 
ADA and SIDA have closed their operations 
in Macedonia. Another example is the 
Netherlands, for which Macedonia was on 
the list of priority countries for development 
cooperation aid between 1995 and 2008. 
The annual budgets during this period were 
between five and 15 million EUR, which 
was channelled through IMF or World Bank 
programmes (as budgetary support), as well 
as direct support through the Embassy. The 
assistance was implemented by international 
organisations and CSOs. However, the 
Netherlands deemed that Macedonia had 
‘graduated’, and was thus no longer eligible for 
development cooperation support.  The only 
remaining financial instrument is the MATRA 
programme, with an annual budget of less 
than EUR 500,000, which focuses on the rule 
of law.258 Similarly, Germany has closed its 
bilateral assistance programme to Macedonia 
in 2008. Since then, Macedonia is only 
included in the regional projects. Macedonia 
is included in four regional projects and can 
access financial support from four regional 
funds. There are also two ongoing bilateral 
projects – ‘Regional and Communal Economic 
Development’ and ‘Support to the Secretariat 
of European Integration’ – that will end in 2014 
and 2015 respectively. The current GIZ budget 
is EUR 2 mil annually, but this will decrease in 
the future (see below). 
256 Interview with an official at the Dutch Embassy in 
Macedonia.
257 Interview with an official from the EU Delegation 
office in Macedonia.
258 Interview with an official from the Dutch Embassy in 
Macedonia.
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7.2. Motives for Donor Presence
As discussed in Part I of the report, Macedonia 
stands out as a country where democratic 
governance and human rights protection 
are still a priority on the donor agenda. 
Several donor representatives have indeed 
expressed concerns about the deteriorating 
political situation in the country, in response 
to which some of them have re-focused their 
programmes from support to EU integration to 
democracy promotion. For instance, the SCO 
representatives stated that the SCO’s budget 
has increased more than in other countries 
because it is perceived that governance is 
worsening in the country: 
Macedonia was always a special 
program. Macedonia was always 
regarded as the candidate for EU 
accession since 2005 and there were 
a lot of hopes with Macedonia but 
this is decreasing now, as you know. 
Its EU accession never took place, 
its negotiation never took place and 
governance is regarded as worsening. 
I think this might have been the 
background to increase the development 
or the transition money from Switzerland 
towards Macedonia.259
For a more detailed discussion of donor 
agenda in Macedonia, see section 1.3 in part 1 
of this report.
7.3. Plans for the Future 
As mentioned above, a considerable number 
of donors have either withdrawn or cut down 
their activities in Macedonia. To a great extent, 
the phasing out of donor assistance was 
informed by the conviction that Macedonia 
was making good progress in terms of EU 
integration. A representative of the Swedish 
Embassy thus suggested that the decision to 
close the SIDA office in Skopje was based on 
259 Interview with an official from the SCO office in 
Macedonia.
the expectation that Macedonia would start the 
accession negotiations with the EU by 2012.260 
In a similar vein, the interviewee from GIZ 
declared that German assistance will decrease 
in the future because Macedonia is an EU 
candidate country and German assistance is 
now being channelled through IPA.
Several interviewees have expressed concern 
over this ‘Europeanization’ of donor assistance 
to civil society in Macedonia. The respondent 
from FOSM said that the problem is not that 
donors are withdrawing but that EU assistance 
to civil society is channelled via the state in 
Macedonia, and added that there is a certain 
level of hypocrisy in Brussels, because the 
EU draws on civil society to pressure the 
government while planning and implementing 
civil society assistance through the 
government.261 The respondent from the UN 
office argued that the opening of the IPA funds 
has led to the withdrawal of bilateral donors 
who used to provide assistance to grassroots 
organisations that do not have access to EU 
funds.262 Among those bilateral donors that 
have remained active in Macedonia, the SCO 
representatives were the only ones who could 
confirm their engagement in the country until 
2020 or longer.
7.4. Modalities of Aid Planning 
and Programming among Donors
Since the EU is the main actor on the donor 
scene in Macedonia, it is instructive to first 
examine the mechanisms of EU aid planning. 
The planning of EU assistance is based 
on an assessment of the past and current 
Enlargement strategies, an analysis of the 
selected criteria in these strategies, their 
achievements and their relevance for the 
coming period. The priorities are identified in 
260 Phone interview with an official from the Swedish 
Embassy in Macedonia.
261 Interview with an official from the Open Society office 
in Macedonia.
262 Interview with an official from the UN office in 
Macedonia.
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partnership with the government. The main 
interlocutor of the EUD within the Macedonian 
government is the Secretariat for European 
Affairs (SEA) which is responsible both for 
the process of EU integration and the overall 
aid coordination in the country (except for the 
German and French assistance and the IFIs, 
which goes via the Ministry of Finance). The 
government has an important role in drafting 
the MIPDs (now Country Strategy Papers) as 
each ministry is invited to give inputs to the 
strategy.263
At the moment, the dialogue between the 
EU and the Macedonian government on the 
preparation of strategy does not include civil 
society, but this will be required in the future. 
The EUD has taken on the responsibility to 
consult with EU Member States and civil 
society in ‘any step of the programming on any 
document’. However, these consultations seem 
to consist mostly in asking for feedback on 
strategic documents (which is similar to EUD 
consultations with implementing agencies and 
other donors): 
When we are discussing the strategic 
documents we invite them as our guests 
in the first two rounds, but our aim is 
almost all the time, once we have the 
first meeting, to do a joint presentation 
towards the civil society and towards the 
Member States, saying “these is our joint 
views, what is your opinion?”264 
The EUD added that its attempts at organising 
a more formal consultative process have failed 
due to the lack of interest on the part of CSOs. 
According to the interviewee from the EUD, 
there was insufficient interest when the EUD 
sent a request to form CSO working groups in 
2012 and, more generally, local organisations 
are not aware of the importance of aid 
planning: 
263 Interview with an official at the EUD office in 
Macedonia.
264 Interview with an official at the EUD office in 
Macedonia.
Their awareness of things is not on the 
right level and I will consider that those 
NGOs who are bigger in capacity and 
knowledge have to be responsible also 
to engage other smaller ones which 
could contribute when the programming 
document is being prepared.265 
However, another official at the EUD involved 
in IPA II said that the EUD has invited CSOs 
to participate in consultations when they 
have particular expertise that is helpful to 
the topic.266  The FOSM interviewee said that 
the level of involvement of a donor with civil 
society often depends on the personality of the 
people in charge. The respondent suggested, 
as an example, that the Ambassador at 
the EUD in Macedonia was very open to 
communication with civil society, while the 
current one is exclusively focused on the 
relationship with the Government.267
Several donors stated that they identify 
priorities for their programming based on the 
EU Progress Report and other EU documents. 
For example, the priorities of the Dutch MATRA 
programme are defined on the basis of the 
EU Progress Report and the political criteria 
for the country identified there. However, the 
interviewee added that they are amongst few 
donors in the region that fund projects on 
exporting culture from the home country as 
part of democracy promotion, e.g. Dutch design 
or Dutch contemporary dance. While the Dutch 
Embassy used to consult the government 
for bilateral development assistance, this is 
not the case for the MATRA programme. The 
primary consultative process with government 
is now taking place through the IPA process, 
though the Embassy does informally consult 
with CSOs within their ‘network of contacts’.268 
265 Interview with an official at the EUD office in 
Macedonia.
266 Interview with a second official at the EUD office in 
Macedonia.
267 Interview with an official at the FOSM. office in 
Macedonia..
268  Interview with an official at the Dutch Embassy in 
Macedonia.
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The SCO representatives stated that they rely 
on Macedonia’s Stabilisation and Accession 
Agreement (SAA) with the EU as the basis for 
their strategy, and that the overall goal of their 
support is ‘Macedonia becoming a socially 
inclusive market economy democratic political 
system in view of European integration’. The 
SCO organises roundtables with selected CSOs 
to consult them on Swiss strategies.269 The 
UK Embassy representatives also stated that 
the EU Progress Report is the main basis for 
defining priorities. In addition, all projects are 
geared at fulfilling the EU criteria and Acquis in 
specific areas. There is no consultative process, 
but there are regular contacts with government 
and civil society. In some cases, the Embassy 
conducts ‘stakeholder analysis’.270
This ‘top-down’ approach with less input from 
local stakeholders also characterises German 
aid planning. While the German bilateral 
assistance programme used to be developed in 
cooperation with the government, the priorities 
of the remaining regional programmes are 
entirely defined by the German government. 
Local actors do not have any say in the 
definition of these priorities (not even the local 
GIZ office). This is a top-down approach in 
which priorities are developed in function of 
German or global development interests. The 
objective is to prepare the region for the future, 
to support sustainable development. According 
to the interviewee from GIZ: 
It’s about development, not that you 
extinguish the fire, but that these 
development projects are working on a 
long-term basis, long-term effects, with 
sustainable effects. As far as German 
assistance, it is not to extinguish a fire 
that is now burning, but rather to prevent 
fires from igniting in the first place.271
269 Interview with an official at the SCO office in 
Macedonia.
270 Interview with an official at the British Embassy in 
Macedonia.
271 Interview with an official at the GIZ office in 
Macedonia.
By contrast, the UN develops its strategies 
in cooperation with government and in 
consultation with civil society. The United 
Nations Development Assistance Framework 
(UNDAF) is an overall strategic document 
for all UN agencies, which covers a period 
of 4-6 years. Each UN organisation then has 
its internal planning which has to fit into the 
overall priorities identified in the UNDAF.272 
It is prepared on the basis of a situation 
analysis and an assessment of the results 
achieved thus far. The UN then engages in 
broad consultations with government and 
CSOs. However, the UN does not have any 
formal procedure for consulting with CSOs at 
the strategic level. CSOs are included in the 
consultations on an ad hoc basis, on the basis 
of informal contacts and existing partnerships, 
as well as in project advisory and management 
boards, so they are consulted with regard 
to the implementation of projects (instead 
of aid programming). Of the UN agencies 
active in Macedonia, UNICEF has the most 
elaborate process of consultations with local 
stakeholders. The respondent from the UN 
office added that, a few years ago, the UN 
attempted to involve civil society in its strategic 
planning in a formal manner. However, this 
initiative did not take root and the enthusiasm 
for involving CSOs has been lost.273 
USAID employs contractors to carry out 
assessments. In 2009, they had a US-based 
company doing a very comprehensive 
assessment of the democracy sector 
in Macedonia. They also conducted an 
assessment of the USAID strategy for 2011-
2015 and an assessment of their previous civil 
society programme. The USAID interviewee 
claimed that local stakeholders were 
extensively consulted in the planning, but there 
does not seem to have been any formalised 
consultation procedure.274
272 Interview with an official at the UN office in 
Macedonia.
273 Interview with an official at the UN office in 
Macedonia.
274 Interview with an official at the USAID office in 
Macedonia.
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The FOSM priorities and activities are defined 
by the Foundation’s Board, the members of 
which are from Macedonia. The priorities 
defined by the Board are then presented to 
the President of the Open Society Foundation, 
who provides feedback and advice on how 
to improve the planning. The priorities are 
revised in function of developments on the 
ground.  FOSM is very flexible and can easily 
adapt to changes in the local context. However, 
FOSM does not conduct any direct formal 
consultations with civil society actors. Its 
needs assessment is based on the knowledge 
of board members who are experts in different 
fields and who are in permanent contact 
with CSOs. The respondent added that direct, 
formalised consultation with CSOs would be 
problematic, because priorities would be driven 
by the narrow interests of grantees.275
7.5. Donor Coordination
The Macedonian SEA is responsible for donor 
coordination, and is supposed to organise 
working groups in specific sectors. There 
are also smaller steering groups within the 
ministries that are beneficiaries of donor-
funded projects. However, according to the 
EUD interviewee, the Government has not 
engaged with donors since 2009 or 2010: 
From 2004 to 2009, first, it was very 
simple donor coordinating meetings, 
then they engaged into the program 
based approach working groups, 
which was also a good thing to start 
and could have, and I still believe that 
it can, produce quality inputs during 
programming… This was a good forum 
to discuss [strategies] but unfortunately 
it stopped. I don’t know whether they 
will engage once again; the Secretariat 
is trying, but there is no feasible/visible 
output (...). The government is not putting 
much emphasis on donor coordination.276 
275 Interview with an official at the FOSM office in 
Macedonia.
276 Interview with an official at the EUD office in 
Macedonia.
The GIZ respondent also highlighted that the 
existing mechanism does not function, and 
it has not given good results, to the extent 
that even the government is not satisfied with 
coordination. The coordination is not well 
documented and the monitoring and evaluation 
are ‘extremely poor’, because the government 
is ‘focused at getting something, but not 
focused on looking at the implementation 
and the impact’. The problem, according to 
the GIZ respondent, is that the Macedonian 
Government does not have the capacity 
to identify needs, negotiate with donors, 
and follow up with the implementation of 
projects.277
The interviewee from the Dutch Embassy 
said that the second mechanism, i.e. sectoral 
working groups, was also deeply flawed in 
addressing the practicalities of assistance 
(though they still participate in all of the 
relevant meetings): 
For us it is a little bit difficult to be 
involved in these groups, because 
different donors are sitting there and 
they all have a different understanding 
of the topic or of the framework that we 
are discussing. There are groups that 
they are organising and we are present 
in some of them. However, these groups 
are usually at different levels then 
what we would like to discuss, because 
we would like to discuss more the 
practicalities, and they are usually at the 
more abstract, very broad policy level.278 
The SCO respondent echoed the misgivings 
about the sectoral working groups: ‘In 
general, up-to-date coordination … normally 
the beneficiary country should take it in their 
hands. This is done through this sector based 
approach, but it’s not very active, let’s put it like 
that’.279
277 Interview with an official at the GIZ office in 
Macedonia.
278 Interview with an official at Dutch Embassy in 
Macedonia.
279 Interview with an official at the SCO office in 
Macedonia.
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In the absence of formal coordination led by 
the Macedonian Government, donors organise 
informal coordination meetings themselves. 
According to the British Embassy interviewee, 
it is easy to organise such meetings since there 
are few donors in the country.280 The Dutch 
Embassy also said that the small number of 
donors in the country facilitated informal donor 
coordination: ‘There are not many donors in 
Macedonia anymore and for example we have 
a big parliamentary project and there we have 
an informal donor meeting in Europe. All the 
donors who work on parliament projects 
meet regularly’.281 FOSM also holds informal 
bilateral meetings with various donors.282 
The respondent from GIZ added that there 
are thematic informal coordination meetings 
organised by various donors on an ad hoc 
basis, which allow avoiding the duplication of 
projects.283
In the absence of donor coordination 
mechanisms led by the Macedonian 
Government, the EUD took on the task 
of coordinating the work of donors in 
Macedonia284, particularly in the area of civil 
society. A second official at the EUD confirmed 
this, saying that the EUD is organising donor 
coordination meetings in the area of civil 
society in cooperation with TACSO. These 
meetings are attended by USAID, the SCO and 
the Dutch Embassy.285 The SCO interviewee 
confirmed participation in these meetings, and 
the USAID respondent added that the meetings 
started in 2012 and have become more 
systemic, and that TACSO leads in organising 
them.286
280 Interview with an official at the British Embassy in 
Macedonia.
281 Interview with an official at the Dutch Embassy in 
Macedonia.
282 Interview with an official at the FOSM office in 
Macedonia.
283 Interview with an official at the GIZ office in 
Macedonia.
284 Interview with an official at the EUD office in 
Macedonia.
285 Interview with a second official at the EUD office in 
Macedonia.
286 Interview with a second official at the USAID office in 
Macedonia.
On a more general level, the EU interviewee 
said that international donors in Macedonia, 
even non-Western countries such as China, 
see EU and NATO integration as driving aid 
objectives, with the former making the EU an 
agenda setter: 
We are the leader in the process because 
in the end this is the aim of the country. 
Their strategic priorities are EU and 
NATO integration. The number one 
priority. This would mean that everybody 
else has to be on the same line which is 
good for us also. At least we don’t have 
any conflict with different objectives for 
any foreign assistance in the country.287 
However, SCO is also very influential in civil 
society, which is acknowledged by the EU 
interviewee, who stated that they seek to ‘do 
a good match’ with SCO, because the Swiss 
are providing institutional funding which they 
see as an opportunity for smaller CSOs to 
prepare for EU projects.288 Moreover, the IPA 
CSF in Macedonia has been put on hold by the 
transfer to the Decentralised Implementation 
System (DIS)289, which has affected the 
influence of the EUD in the area of civil society. 
The SCO itself cites two other reasons why it 
sees itself as an agenda setter in civil society 
assistance. First, SCO has a very big civil 
society programme (Civicas Mobilitas) with a 
budget of CHF 8 mil (approx.  EUR 6.6 mil) for 
four years.290 Secondly, SCO participates in the 
grants committee which selects the grantees 
for the USAID-FOSM Civil Society Programme, 
despite the fact that SCO does not financially 
contribute to this programme. According to the 
SCO, FOSM and USAID involve SCO because 
the Swiss agency is an important actor in the 
financing of civil society in Macedonia.291
287 Interview with an official at the EUD office in 
Macedonia.
288 Interview with an official at the EUD office in 
Macedonia.
289 See: http://cfcd.finance.gov.mk/?page_
id=21&lang=en
290 See: http://www.civicamobilitas.org.mk/en/
291 Interview with an official at the SCO office in 
Macedonia.
63Balkan Civic Practices # 11
7.6. Donor Assistance  
to Civil Society
Through its IPA CSF and European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 
programmes, the EU is the biggest donor for 
civil society in the Western Balkans. These 
funds are administered by the EUD in all 
countries except Macedonia where the EUD 
has conferred the management of the CSF 
to the state authorities. This decision was 
brought in 2008/2009 when all the instruments 
under IPA component I were transferred to the 
Macedonian Government. Since then, the EUD 
has provided substantial technical assistance 
to the government to manage the CSF (for 
evaluation, monitoring, etc.).
The transfer of the CSF to the Government 
created a massive backlog in the allocation of 
funds: only one Call for Proposals for CSF has 
been launched under IPA (for funds committed 
in 2009) and, at the time of the interviews, the 
grants had not been allocated yet. At that point, 
CSOs had been waiting for 16 months for the 
approval of their proposals by the government, 
whereas the EUD used to conduct evaluations 
in 8 months and the new EU procedures 
require these evaluations to be completed 
in 6 months. According to an EUD offical292 
this backlog is due to the fact that tendering 
for CSF is more complicated than any other 
tendering done by the government. The EUD 
has provided substantial technical assistance 
to the government to manage the CSF (for 
evaluation, monitoring, etc.), but there is a 
lot of turnover among state officials working 
on civil society which is not favourable to the 
development of capacities and expertise. The 
EUD official also suggested that government 
officials cannot commit enough resources and 
time for the evaluation and that the oversight 
of the government’s procedures by the EUD 
adds to the length of the process.293
292 Interview with an official at the EUD office in 
Macedonia.
293 Interview with an official at the EUD office in 
Macedonia.
Many donors in Macedonia are critical of 
the fact that the CSF is now administered by 
the government. There is concern among 
donor representatives that the channelling 
of EU funds via the state authorities has 
restricted access to funding to those CSOs 
that are dealing with sensitive political and 
human rights issues and that are critical of 
the government. Some donors consider that, 
besides requiring a high financial turnover, the 
EU procedures are so complicated that CSOs 
‘have to be associated with the government 
in some way’.294 Vladimir Milchin, the FOSM 
Executive Director, suggested that EU 
funds are only available to professionalised 
organisations, which are rather passive when 
there is an urgent need to react to ongoing 
issues.295 In response to this, FOSM has 
deployed a small grants programme for CSOs 
dealing with pressing societal issues. 
In Macedonia, FOSM acts both as a grant-
giver and an operational organisation. FOSM 
is thus implementing and co-funding USAID’s 
Civil Society Programme whose objective is 
to empower citizens to request government 
accountability. USAID chose FOSM as 
implementing partner because they have a 
longstanding history of being ‘open and critical 
of all kinds of things going on’.296 Besides 
funding monitoring CSOs and civic activism, 
this programme includes support for thematic 
coalitions/informal groups centred around 
politically sensitive issues (LGBTI rights, 
environment, social issues, etc.). In addition, 
FOSM has two other programmes – ‘Citizens 
for a European Macedonia’ and ‘Inter-Cultural 
dialogue’ – which cover politically sensitive 
issues (government behaviour, inter-ethnic 
relations, identity issues) that cannot be dealt 
with by bilateral agencies that need to be in 
good terms with the government.297 USAID 
294 Personal interview.
295 Interview with Vladimir Milchin, Executive Director at 
FOSM.
296 Interview with an official at the USAID office in 
Macedonia.
297 Interview with an official at FOSM. 
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also has some other programmes that involve 
civil society, but are not specifically aimed at 
developing it, within its democracy portfolio 
(i.e. media, parliament, judicial strengthening, 
etc.). USAID’s Office of Innovation and 
Development Alliances (IDEA) in Washington 
provides funding opportunities for CSOs in the 
area of Democracy and Governance through 
the Development Grants Program that is 
available worldwide including Macedonia. 
In addition, the U.S. Embassy Democracy 
Commission Grants Program awards grants 
to CSOs and independent media for projects 
that support the development of democratic 
institutions in Macedonia.
Besides the EU and USAID-FOSM, SCO is 
a major source of support for civil society 
in Macedonia. The SCO’s ‘Civicas Mobilitas’ 
programme, whose implementation started in 
2008, will run for another 4 years with a CHF 
8 mil (approx. EUR 6.6 mil) budget and a focus 
on constituency building. In this new phase of 
the programme, SCO has opted to go for an 
international implementer (in cooperation with 
a local one) because they considered that there 
is no expertise in constituency building in the 
country and because this is a very sensitive 
issue.298 As described in the regional part of 
the report, the SCO in Macedonia essentially 
supports civil society through institutional 
grant-making. However, it also provides 
projects grants to fund short-term activities 
and initiatives to address issues that could not 
be anticipated.
The British and Dutch Embassies also provide 
some support for civil society. With 17 active 
projects at the time of research, the British 
Embassy provided grants to build expertise 
within civil society. On the other hand, the 
Dutch Embassy essentially resorted to CSOs 
for implementing projects within the MATRA 
programme that focuses on rule of law issues. 
The GIZ and the UN representatives stated 
that they also occasionally draw on CSOs for 
298 Interview with officials at the Swiss Cooperation 
Office in Macedonia.
implementing some projects, but that building 
the capacity of civil society is not a priority for 
them.   
8. Montenegro
8.1. Levels of Donor Support
Donor presence in the country is quite recent, 
either dating back to 2000 (when the MiloŠević-
led regime fell), or 2006 (when Montenegro 
gained independence). Most international 
donors have either withdrawn completely 
from Montenegro, or significantly reduced 
their operations in the country.  As a result, 
there are only a few important donors left 
in Montenegro. Among the multilaterals, 
the EU stands out with an annual budget 
of EUR 38 to 39 mil. The budgets of the UN 
agencies, the OSCE and the World Bank are 
significantly smaller.299 Two UN agencies are 
active in Montenegro: UNICEF and UNDP with 
budgets amounting to USD 2 mil (approx. 
EUR 1.6 mil)  and USD 6 mil (approx. EUR 4.8 
mil) respectively. Note, however, that UNDP 
mostly acts as an implementing agency for 
projects funded by other donors, for which they 
often compete with local organisations. The 
UN provides only 10 % of the UNDP’s budget, 
the rest is funded by the EU, the Montenegrin 
Government and some other donors (mainly 
the Netherlands, Norway and the UK). The 
same applies for the OSCE which also acts as 
an implementing agency. Most bilateral donors 
do not have a direct presence in Montenegro. 
The Norwegian and Dutch Embassies 
administer their assistance to Montenegro 
from Belgrade. Norway’s involvement amounts 
to EUR 2.5 mil, while the Dutch only provide 
299 Note that the budgetary figures for the OSCE and the 
World Bank could not be obtained.
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assistance through the MATRA programme 
whose total budget for Serbia and Montenegro 
was approximately EUR 670,000 in 2013. The 
UK assistance is administered by the British 
Embassy in Podgorica, whose envelope 
amounted to GBP 540,000 or approx. EUR 
690,000 in 2012/2013 (GBP 520,000 or approx. 
EUR 664,000 in 2011/2012).
As mentioned above, several donors have 
withdrawn from Montenegro. At the time of 
research, SIDA and ADA had already closed 
their operations in Montenegro. The Open 
Society Foundation (OSF) also closed its office 
in Montenegro, though CSOs from Montenegro 
still have access to the OSI global funding 
schemes.300 USAID prematurely closed its 
Good Governance programme, which was 
supposed to last until 2015, in 2013. This was 
part of a wider scaling back by USAID, which 
decided in 2012 to close its offices in nine 
countries. However, at the time of research, 
there were still a few ongoing American 
projects (the Criminal Justice and Civil Society 
Programme and a programme of support to 
state institutions) for which the combined 
budget amounted to USD 500,000 (approx. 
EUR 399,000), as well as the Democracy 
Commission Small Grants (DCSG) administered 
by the Embassy. 301 USAID announced the end 
of its programmes on its website as follows: 
The U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) will mark 
the conclusion of its assistance in 
Montenegro with a June 12 [2013] 
celebration ... The June 12 Gala signifies 
that Montenegro is on the path toward 
European Union accession following 
significant economic, good governance, 
and democratic strides. USAID has 
provided USD 243 mil302 worth of 
300 Interview with an official at the Open Society office in 
Serbia.
301 Interview with an official at the East-West 
Management Institute in Montenegro. Note that the 
Criminal Justice and Civil Society Programme was 
due to close in August 2014.
302 Approx. EUR 194 mil.
assistance to Montenegro over the past 
12 years… Its projects have impacted 
virtually every municipality in the 
country.303 
8.2. Motives for Donor Presence
As in other parts of the Western Balkans, 
donor assistance in Montenegro focuses on 
supporting the EU integration process and 
building effective democratic governance.  
The interviewee from the German Embassy 
explicitly stated those objectives in the 
following terms: 
For us it is quite easy: we want to see 
Montenegro in the EU as a democratically 
consolidated and an economically 
performing state. As simple as that. 
I know it is very general, but it is very 
topical as well, and the democratic 
consolidation process, there we can see 
what our priorities are, and ours is not 
the functioning of the parliament, and it 
is not elections, they function fairly well. 
It is the rule of law and it is the rule of 
administration as part of the judiciary, it 
is the containment of corruption, and it is 
also a better record for the fight against 
organised crime.304
8.3. Plans for the Future
Those donors that remain active in Montenegro 
do not have clear exit strategies. The 
respondent from UNICEF stated that they do 
not have plans to withdraw from Montenegro 
in the near future.  In the long run, their 
presence will depend on the progress made 
on the ‘critical parts of the human rights 
agenda’ that are relevant to UNICEF.305 The 
Germans will also remain in Montenegro 
303 See: http://www.usaid.gov/montenegro/news-
information/press-releases/usaid-celebrates-
success-programs-end
304 Interview with an official at the German Embassy in 
Montenegro.
305 Interview with an official at the UNICEF office in 
Serbia.
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for the next few years. GIZ has been present 
in Montenegro since 2001, and it intends 
to remain in the country until 2017 at the 
earliest. However, although it has some 
involvement in Montenegro, GIZ’s presence 
has been scaled down since Germany 
closed its bilateral development assistance 
programme in Montenegro in 2011. This is 
because Montenegro became an EU candidate 
country and entered the process of accession 
negotiations. GIZ re-oriented its activities 
towards EU projects and projects co-financed 
by other donors. There is only one bilateral 
project left managed by GIZ and several 
regional projects involving Montenegro in the 
fields of biodiversity and climate change.306 KfW 
has a much stronger presence, but it only gives 
loans (not grants), mostly for infrastructure 
projects in the energy sector. The German 
Embassy has access to a regional fund called 
‘Stability Pack for South-Eastern Europe’ 
through which it can fund CSOs, though this 
is not targeted in any way towards CSOs (see 
below).307
8.4. Modalities of Aid Planning 
and Programming among Donors
The modalities of aid planning and the levels 
of involvement of civil society in this process 
vary between donors. The UN agencies 
identify priorities for aid programming by 
coordinating with the Government. The UNDP 
has a Country Program Document (CPD) on 
the basis of which a Country Program Action 
Plan (CPAP) is developed in cooperation with 
the government. Programmes and projects 
are then developed either on the basis of 
needs assessments carried out by UNDP, 
which systematically carries out analyses of 
the situation on the ground (through various 
‘development reports’), or on the basis of the 
priorities identified by the government. UNDP 
306 Interview with an official at the GIZ office in 
Montenegro.
307 Interview with an official at the German Embassy in 
Montenegro.
projects are either funded by other donors (i.e. 
the EU) or by the Montenegrin Government, but 
all of the activities need to fit in the strategic 
priorities defined in the CPD and the CPAP. The 
Government, other donors, and civil society 
are consulted in this process through various 
forums.308 UNICEF also develops a CPD and 
a CPAP which is then sent for approval to the 
Executive Board in New York. This is done in 
cooperation with the government on the basis 
of a situation analysis, which is a key element 
in the planning process. Like UNDP, UNICEF 
consults with civil society in aid programming. 
The UNICEF respondent stated that they 
‘consult quite widely’ with CSOs and that they 
are ‘always open to their ideas’, but admitted 
that these consultations are ‘a bit ad hoc’ as 
there is no formal mechanism for involving 
them in the planning.309 
The priorities of German cooperation also 
involve the authorities in Podgorica, and are 
decided bilaterally between the governments of 
Germany and Montenegro. GIZ then writes the 
projects within the set priorities. Before writing 
the project, GIZ usually carries an assessment 
which includes consultations with the most 
relevant stakeholders. As mentioned above, 
since bilateral cooperation has come to an end, 
most assistance is regional, so the projects 
are in line with regional needs. By contrast, 
the programming for British assistance is 
determined more by London than by local 
consultation. The programme strategies are 
defined by the FCO. The Embassy then develops 
a ‘Country Business Plan’ within these broad 
priorities set in London.310 Although there 
seem to be avenues for consultation with 
local stakeholders, the respondent from 
TACSO claimed that donors are imposing 
their priorities on CSOs, and argued that the 
only way to address this problem is for the 
308 Interview with an official at the UNDP office in 
Montenegro.
309 Interview with an official at the UNICEF office in 
Montenegro.
310 Interview with an official at the British Embassy in 
Montenegro.
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state to take the lead in defining priorities 
in cooperation with civil society. However, 
the respondent conceded that there is a lack 
of capacity for planning, programming and 
implementing among local stakeholders, and 
claimed that it would be better for TACSO to 
work on building these capacities rather than 
delivering training for CSOs that are isolated 
and do not have access to funding.311
Although there are structured procedures in 
place for international donor aid planning, 
one respondent suggested that how a donor 
organisation is run and what programmes 
are prioritised ultimately depends on the 
individuals in charge. As an example, the 
interviewee described how two different 
chiefs at UNDP supposedly had two different 
approaches towards political issues, with one 
engaging in politically sensitive anti-corruption 
activities that were critical of the government, 
and the other choosing to stay away from 
such activities in order not to alienate the 
Montenegrin Government. The interviewee 
added that the nature of donor coordination 
is also affected by informal personal contacts 
amongst individuals working in donor 
agencies.312
8.5. Donor Coordination
The process of EU integration is an important 
factor in Montenegro, so it is not surprising 
that the EU, as the primary donor, has taken 
the lead in organising coordination meetings on 
key issues.313 The interviewee from the British 
Embassy suggested that the EUD has taken 
the lead in donor coordination, because there 
were some issues with project duplication 
in the past. The Delegation organises donor 
coordination meetings on a monthly basis, 
which are attended by officials from the British, 
311 Interview with an official at the TACSO office in 
Montenegro.
312 Interview with an official at the East-West 
Management Institute in Montenegro.
313 Interview with an official at the UNICEF office in 
Montenegro.
German, and American Embassies. There are 
also individuals in charge of donor coordination 
within each ministry, and donors exchange 
internal progress reports among themselves. 
Government ministries occasionally organise 
meetings on specific areas.314 However, there 
is no donor coordination specifically for civil 
society assistance. The interviewee from 
the EUD said that donor coordination in civil 
society is quite limited ‘not because it’s not 
our interest, but because there are basically 
no other donors working in civil society 
development here’.315 The interviewee from 
UNICEF said that the Government is trying 
to create a sectoral mechanism for donor 
coordination within the framework of IPA: 
We are trying to build more of what you 
call a “sector-based approach” in some 
key areas that supports the law sector 
and that supports public administration 
reform which is beginning to bring 
donors together but it has to be led by 
government. Government is trying to 
bring this together and it is primarily 
done through the framework of the IPA 
process.316 
In addition to the high-level and sectoral donor 
coordination, the interviewee from UNDP said 
that there was also coordination at the project 
level, when donors participate in project boards 
as full members or observers, which indirectly 
allows for coordination.317
Many of the respondents felt that donor 
coordination was not as complex in 
Montenegro compared with other places in 
the Western Balkans, since there were so 
few donors left in the country that donors 
knew what their counterparts in the country 
were doing. Moreover, many of the donors 
314 Interview with an official at the British Embassy in 
Montenegro.
315 Interview with an official at the EUD office in 
Montenegro.
316 Interview with an official at the UNICEF office in 
Montenegro.
317 Interview with an official at the UNDP office in 
Montenegro.
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administer their programmes from Belgrade 
and do not have a physical presence in 
Montenegro. According to an official at 
the German Embassy, ‘Recently we had 
donor coordination in the field of corruption 
prevention or corruption-related projects. 
There it boiled down to five donors or so, not 
huge a huge number of projects being run in 
the country… But you know, more or less, 
what the others are doing, like I said, it is 
very small’, and later added, ‘I know all my 
counterparts … and I know more or less what 
they do, and I exchange with them on a regular 
basis. Also, the projects that are run here have 
visibility; it is so small that you get invited to 
all these closing or inauguration events, so 
you have a rough idea, actually a pretty good 
idea, of what is being done here’.318 Thus, it 
is sufficient to have informal coordination 
amongst donors.319
However, the interviewee from TACSO took 
a more critical line and was convinced that 
donors did not have a genuine interest in local 
needs, but rather that they had conflicting 
interests with each other, and as a result, 
donor coordination would ultimately be 
unsuccessful.320
8.6. Donor Assistance  
to Civil Society
As a result of reduced donor presence, funding 
for civil society in Montenegro is relatively 
limited. The main source of project funding for 
CSOs is the EUD which administers the CSF 
and EIDHR programmes. In 2013, the CSF’s 
budget amounted EUR 1 mil, while the EIDHR 
budget for 2012 and 2013 (combined) was EUR 
900,000. With projects ranging between EUR 
100,000-200,000, there are about 5 beneficiary 
organisations per year. According to a EUD 
318 Interview with an official at the German Embassy in 
Montenegro.
319 Interview with an official at the UNDP office in 
Montenegro.
320 Interview with an official at the TACSO office in 
Montenegro.
representative in Podgorica, the priorities of 
the CSF programme are set in consultation 
with local CSOs and they are usually vague so 
that they could accommodate different types 
of activities.321 Nevertheless, some donors 
have criticised the EU for the high financial 
requirements it imposes on beneficiaries, the 
length of its procedures and the unrealistic 
expectations attached to project realisation.
Besides the EU, the German Embassy in 
Podgorica provides small grants to CSOs 
within the ‘Stability Pack for South-Eastern 
Europe’ programme. The priorities of the 
programme are set in Berlin, but they are 
broad enough to accommodate a wide range 
of projects. The Embassy administers these 
grants through a rolling call. CSOs usually get 
in contact with the Embassy before applying 
for funding which is aimed at projects for up 
to a year, without the possibility of renewal. 
According to a German Embassy official, 
the flexibility of this programme allows the 
Embassy to fund short-term initiatives in 
response to un-anticipated issues.322 The UNDP 
also provides project grants to CSOs working 
in the field of social inclusion – 13-15 per cent 
of UNDP’s annual budget goes to civil society. 
In this case, CSOs participate to varying degree 
in the definition of priorities depending on the 
projects. The grants are generally allocated 
through open calls for applications, although 
sometimes the organisations that participated 
in the definition of the project are given priority 
in their implementation.323 Finally, Norway and 
the Netherlands support CSOs in Montenegro 
through programmes that are administered by 
their embassies in Belgrade (see section on 
Serbia). 
The remaining donors exclusively support 
CSOs by engaging them in the implementation 
of projects. As mentioned above, one third 
321 Interview with an official at the EU Delegation officein 
Montenegro.
322 Interview with an official at the German Embassy in 
Montenegro.
323 Interview with an official at the UNDP office in 
Montenegro.
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of the projects funded by the UK Embassy 
are implemented by CSOs, mainly in 
the field of fight against corruption and 
investigative journalism.324 UNICEF, UNDP 
and GIZ occasionally work with CSOs on 
the implementation of activities that fit into 
their programmes and objectives. This type 
of cooperation is established either at the 
initiative of the donor who commissions 
products or services through open bids for 
which CSOs apply, or at the initiative of some 
CSO which approach donors with ideas for 
projects. Nevertheless, for these donors, 
the lead partners are generally government 
institutions. The role of CSOs is limited to 
participating in consultative processes or 
providing specific products or services (i.e. 
training, research, etc.).
9. Serbia
9.1. Levels of Donor Support
There has been a long-standing engagement 
by international agencies in Serbia, with the 
first offices established during the Socialist 
regime. Yugoslavia was the first European 
country to host a UNICEF office, which was 
established in 1947. In the 1990s, UNICEF 
had a major presence in response to the 
humanitarian crisis. After 2000, it has acted 
as a development agency rather than a 
humanitarian organisation.325 There were a 
number of international donors that set up 
missions in Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The Open 
Society Foundation (OSF) established an 
office in Belgrade in June 1991 for the whole 
(Socialist) Yugoslavia. During the 1990s, the 
324 Interview with an official at the UK Embassy in 
Montenegro.
325 Interview with an official at the UNICEF office in 
Serbia.
Foundation primarily focused its activities on 
civil society development in a broader sense, 
i.e., the creation of independent, non-state, 
entities. The foundation also aimed at tackling 
the consequences of war and international 
isolation. In the 2000s, the Fund for an Open 
Society in Serbia (FOS) re-focused its activities 
towards the building of democratic institutions 
and the process of Europeanization, but work 
with minorities has also been a constant 
priority. According to the interviewee from 
FOS, one of their biggest successes has been 
to create a discourse in which Europeanization 
is not just limited to EU accession, but involves 
a normative change in societal values.326 
SCO started its operations in Serbia in 1991 
in response to the refugee crisis. Today, 
the primary focus of Swiss cooperation is 
support for Serbia’s EU integration process.327 
In terms of Dutch development assistance, 
MATRA was conceptualised as a programme 
promoting social transformation after the fall 
of communism. The programme had 12-13 
themes until 2009, when it was re-focused on 
supporting EU integration in the area of the 
rule of law.328 British assistance also started in 
the 1990s with humanitarian projects. Between 
2000 and 2010, DFID focused on the reform of 
the social security.
In the post-2000 period, USAID has provided 
assistance to civil society in Serbia since 2001 
through implementing partners.329 Germany 
started its assistance programmes in Serbia 
in 2000.330 The Balkan Trust for Democracy 
(BTD) was established in 2003 by the German 
Marshall Fund of the United States, Charles 
Stewart Mott Foundation, and USAID with a 
trust fund of USD 36 mil (approx. EUR 28.8 
mil) for a ten-year period that expired in June 
2013. Out of this USD 36 mil, USD 28.5 mil 
(approx. EUR 22.8 mil) has been disbursed in 
326 Interview with an official at the FOS office in Serbia.
327 Interview with an official at the SCO office in Serbia.
328 Interview with an official at the Dutch Embassy in 
Serbia.
329 Interview with an official at the ISC office in Serbia.
330 Interview with an official at the GIZ office in Serbia.
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grants. Between 2012 and 2013, their budget 
decreased by 50 per cent, but BTD plans to 
continue its activities for another 5-7 years 
with a reduced budget. The ERSTE Foundation 
was created in 2005 with three target areas: 
Culture, Social Development, and Europe. 
During this period, EU support, which is the 
most substantial in monetary terms, has been 
conducted through two previous programmes: 
CARDS between 2000 and 2006; and IPA 
between 2007 and 2013. The EU’s annual 
assistance to Serbia totals EUR 196 million, of 
which 180 million will be administered by the 
Serbian Government from 2014. Additionally, 
the EIDHR budget for Serbia is EUR 1.2 mil per 
year, and the CSF budget is EUR 2 mil.
In terms of donor presence, there is a 
perception among some respondents that 
American and European agencies are leaving 
Serbia. For example, the interviewee from the 
ERSTE Foundation said: ‘We see all around that 
many Americans and also many Europeans 
players leave the region so this is not a good 
thing to happen because to my opinion there 
is still a lot of work to do.’331 The respondent 
from the World Bank added that the German, 
Swedish, and Norwegian assistance have 
significantly decreased, and the Austrians 
have left altogether. After the global financial 
crisis, donor countries have also had financial 
problems, which affects their ability to provide 
assistance.332
On the other hand, some donors believe 
that those claims about donor withdrawal 
are unsubstantiated. One reason is that it is 
difficult to reliably pinpoint the level of foreign 
donor assistance in the country. According to 
the respondent from GIZ, for civil society, it is 
difficult to ascertain ‘what is available in terms 
of assistance or budget, or means provided. 
Because, I mean, I don’t even know if Soros 
foundation, which is quite active, publicizes 
figures how much money he spends here. … So 
331 Interview with an official at the ERSTE Stiftung.
332 Interview with an official at the World Bank office in 
Serbia.
it’s difficult really to say …  You see the figures, 
but this is all the public stuff, so to say. What 
goes really into civil society … I think it’s really, 
really hard to find out’.333 The TACSO Resident 
Advisor surmised that the perception of donor 
withdrawal was due to the fact that there has 
been a drastic increase in the population of 
CSOs, which has increased the demand for 
financial support.334 
However, there is no doubt that some 
international agencies have left Serbia. ADA 
closed its Belgrade office in 2012. DFID closed 
its programmes in Serbia in 2010. There are 
two programmes left that are managed by the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), with 
very limited funding. The Re-uniting Europe 
programme is specifically aimed at preparing 
pre-accession countries for the process of 
negotiations with the EU, and assistance from 
the Conflict Prevention programme is available 
in Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. 
DFID had a budget ranging between GBP 
2 and 8 mil (approx.  EUR 2.6 mil and 10.2 
mil) per year, whilst the current budget for 
the British assistance is about GBR 1-1.5 
mil (approx. EUR 1.3-1.9 mil).335 The Dutch 
Embassy closed its development cooperation 
programmes in Serbia and Montenegro in 
2009. The only programme left is the MATRA 
programme for EU candidate countries. The 
budget for Serbia and Montenegro for 2013 
was EUR 670,000. This is essentially for civil 
society.336 As mentioned above, the BTD annual 
budget was decreased by 50 per cent in the 
past year, and is now approximately USD 1 
mil (approx. EUR 800,000) for 2013-2014. 
BTD ended its country activities in Croatia, 
Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova (though it 
still runs regional programmes). Nevertheless, 
BTD plans to stay in the Western Balkans 
until 2018 or 2020 with a reduced budget, 
333 Interview with an official at the GIZ office in Serbia.
334 Interview with an official at the TACSO office in Serbia.
335 Interview with an official from the British Embassy in 
Serbia.
336 Interview with an official from the Dutch Embassy in 
Serbia.
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which they hope will be around USD 1.3-
1.4 mil (approx. EUR 1-1,1 mil)  on a yearly 
basis.337 The OSCE provides very targeted 
support to civil society through its projects, 
but it is a small amount: ‘We have won SIDA 
funded project on security sector reform and 
we have very targeted call for proposals for 
CSOs working in that area, coming up with 
concrete proposals in that area. And this is, 
I think, EUR 8,000 to 10,000 for six months 
or something. So, it’s really very small’.338 
UNDP has gone from largely being a donor to 
an implementing agency. For example, since 
2012, the UNDP is implementing projects 
funded by local municipalities in Serbia. While 
these municipalities used to be the recipients 
of funds provided by UNDP and other donors, 
they are now funding projects implemented by 
the UNDP. The municipalities identify priorities 
and participate in the implementation of these 
projects with the support of the UNDP, which 
provides assistance.339
Despite the evidence of donor withdrawal, 
the research indicated that the Norwegian 
and Swiss assistance has actually been 
increasing. Norway has considerably scaled 
up the assistance delivered by the Embassy 
in Belgrade, which is responsible for Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Macedonia. The Western 
Balkans section in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Oslo administers the bulk of the 
Norwegian development assistance, but the 
Embassy in Belgrade administers the Embassy 
Fund and the Civil Society Fund. According to 
the interviewee from the Norwegian Embassy: 
‘We are this year heading towards, 
or we have allocated this year three 
million dollars, two and a half million 
Euros approximately. It may increase. 
It’s a part of the same funding source 
for cooperation in and with the Western 
337 Interview with an official from the BTD office in 
Belgrade.
338 Interview with an official from the OSCE office in 
Serbia.
339 Interview with an official from the UNDP office in 
Serbia.
Balkan countries. But it’s a separate 
allocation for the Embassy to manage 
for smaller projects. The Embassy Fund 
applies to all three countries, while 
the civil society funding mechanism 
has so far been limited to Serbia in a 
testing period, and we are continuously 
assessing whether to expand, also to 
comprise Montenegro and Macedonia’.340 
The total allocations for Norwegian assistance 
are: EUR 9 mil for Serbia; EUR 3 mil for 
Macedonia; and EUR 2.5 mil for Montenegro. 
The Swiss parliament has voted an increase 
in ODA from 0.4% to 0.5% of Switzerland’s 
GDP on a global level, which also applies to 
the Western Balkans.341 The total funding for 
Serbia has increased from CHF 60 mil (approx. 
EUR 49.8 mil) for the period 2009-2013 to CHF 
75.5 mil (approx. EUR 62.6 mil) for the period 
2014-2017. 
9.2. Motives for Donor Presence
In terms of the motivations for donor 
assistance, most respondents identified 
support for the EU accession process in 
Serbia. For example, the Dutch embassy’s 
MATRA programme is aimed at helping 
pre-accession countries on their path to 
EU integration.342 Supporting the accession 
process in Serbia is a goal even amongst 
bilateral donors – Switzerland and Norway 
– that are not part Member States of the EU. 
According to the interviewee from SCO, ‘even 
though we [Switzerland] are not members of 
the European Union, we believe that Serbia 
is certainly a part of Europe and we support 
the institutions in a variety of sectors’.343 
The Norwegian respondent added that ‘the 
overall objective of our support to Serbia is to 
340 Interview with an official from the Norwegian 
Embassy in Serbia.
341 Interview with an official at the Swiss Cooperation 
Office in Serbia.
342 Interview with an official at the Dutch Embassy in 
Serbia.
343 Interview with an official at the Swiss Cooperation 
Office in Serbia.
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stimulate the EU integration or the integration 
into the regional European structures. So this 
is the overarching objective of what we are 
doing’.344 There were, however, other motives 
expressed by the respondents. For example, 
the representative of the UK Embassy stated 
that the Embassy’s goal was to advance British 
political and economic interests and promote 
British values.345
The motives of some donors reflected a wider 
regional or global strategy. The presence of 
multi-lateral agencies such as the World Bank 
or the UN agencies is part of global strategies, 
and the EU’s EIDHR programme is also a 
global programme. The respondent from the 
ERSTE Foundation highlighted their long-term 
geographic focus: 
All our activities are focusing in Central 
and Eastern Europe. This is our 
geography; we are not discussing every 
year should we go to Asia or Africa. 
Central Eastern Europe is our main 
target, geographically so to say, so this 
is where we started to work and this is 
where we are going to continue…346
9.3. Plans for the Future
No donor is planning to close its activities in 
Serbia in the coming years. However, this may 
change depending on various factors. Levels 
of support and decisions to withdraw are 
determined by the status of EU integration in 
Serbia, economic circumstances, availability 
of alternative sources of funding in the 
country, and donor strategies and priorities 
at the global level. For example, BTD decided 
to withdraw from Croatia because its grant 
schemes were ‘a drop in the sea’ compared to 
the EU funds that are now available there. GIZ 
withdrew from other East European countries 
once they entered the EU. SCO remains present 
344 Interview with an official at the Norwegian Embassy 
in Serbia.
345 Interview with an official at the British Embassy in 
Serbia.
346 Interview with an official at the ERSTE Stiftung.
in Romania and Bulgaria despite the fact that 
these countries are EU Member States, and 
Switzerland has extended its programmes in 
Serbia for another four years. Nevertheless, 
the levels of Swiss presence will also depend 
on the availability of EU funds.347 Similarly, 
UNDP’s presence is strongly influenced by 
EU accession. UNDP sees its intervention as 
complementary to the EU accession process 
and it usually maintains a presence until a 
candidate country has joined the EU. There 
are even some EU countries where UNDP has 
maintained a reduced presence.348
Some donors also cited the financial crisis 
and changes in economic circumstances as 
potential factors affecting donor plans for the 
future. On the one hand, the UK Foreign Office 
funds have been maintained at the same level, 
despite the financial crisis and the austerity 
measures introduced in Serbia.349 However, 
the interviewee from the ERSTE Foundation 
described how the financial crisis has affected 
their activities: 
The financial situation isn’t backing the 
foundation, you can imagine that we 
are affected by all these banking crises 
and economic crises, so our budgets 
don’t grow; we have a kind of stagnation 
of the budget and with these limited 
resources we are doing our core projects 
in the three program lines -  culture, 
social responsibility and Europe - and 
we had a fourth branch so to say, the 
grant clearing activities, which we had to 
decrease over the years because of these 
budget restrictions.350
The FOS respondent put forward a third reason 
for changing levels of support: changes in 
levels of funding in the country from other 
sources. FOS has had a stable budget since 
2003. Its future presence will depend on 
347 Interview with an official at the SCO office in Serbia.
348 Interview with an official at the UNDP office in Serbia.
349 Interview with an official at the British Embassy in 
Serbia.
350 Interview with an official at the ERSTE Foundation.
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social developments in Serbia, which are 
closely related to EU accession, as well as the 
availability of alternative sources of funding 
(i.e. EU, state funding). Nevertheless, FOS is 
not planning to reduce its presence in the next 
2-3 years.351
Finally, the interviewees from the Dutch 
Embassy and SIDA cited changes in global 
strategies that can potentially affect levels 
of support in Serbia. The Dutch government 
closed its ODA programmes in Serbia and the 
Balkans as part of a broader re-organisation 
of Dutch ODA and as a result of diminishing 
funds. The interviewee from SIDA commented 
that, for example, the decision to withdraw 
from Montenegro was done as a calculation 
of ‘give and take’, since SIDA is decreasing its 
countries of operation, so it is necessary to 
prioritise globally. 
There is a certain pressure to decrease the 
number of countries and there is always a look 
at which ones would be less strategic for us at 
this moment, so it is a political decision also. 
Because Swedish Development Cooperation is 
spread all over the world, there a is very strong 
focus on Africa and the poorest countries, so 
there is always this political “give and take” [of] 
which countries should stay, which countries 
should go. And the focus and priorities are 
primarily on Africa, the poorest countries, so 
that [is] why.352
9.4. Modalities of Aid Planning 
and Programming among Donors
The modalities of aid planning vary 
considerably between donors in terms of: 
levels of input from headquarters and local 
offices in developing strategies; consultation 
with local stakeholders (government and civil 
society) in defining priorities; and consultation 
with other donors.
Some donors active in Serbia have a significant 
amount of autonomy in determining aid 
351 Interview with an official at the FOS office in Serbia.
352 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Serbia.
programming. FOS has full autonomy in 
determining its priorities and strategies 
in Serbia. OSI has a global programme 
administered from New York that runs in 
parallel for which Serbian organisations are 
also eligible to the extent that they fit in the 
goals and priorities of the global programme.353 
SCO has recently adopted a decentralised 
approach to aid planning by giving more 
freedom to local offices in the development of 
strategies. Strategies are developed in three 
phases. First, SCO makes an evaluation of 
the previous strategy and its implementation, 
which yields an initial set of recommendations 
on how to develop a new strategy. SCO then 
carries out a ‘partner’s hearing process’ which 
involves government, CSOs and other donors 
with which SDC has cooperated. Further 
information is gathered through participation 
in the donor coordination meetings organized 
by the government. Finally, the SCO in Serbia 
makes a strategy proposal to the headquarters 
which revise the strategy and recommend 
changes.354 UNICEF also has a relatively 
autonomous approach. It develops a five-year 
CPAP in consultation with local stakeholders 
involved in child protection. This Action Plan 
defines the thematic areas of action, which 
is the basis on which UNICEF develops its 
programmes and activities.
In contrast to the autonomous approaches 
outlined above, some donors follow a 
more top-down approach in programming 
their activities, with the home country or 
headquarters having a significant role. 
The priorities of the MATRA programme 
are entirely defined by the Dutch foreign 
ministry. Local actors do not participate in 
defining the priorities of the programme. 
Nevertheless, the Dutch Embassy does have 
full independence in the selection of projects 
that it will support.355 The ERSTE Foundation’s 
strategies are internally developed by the 
353 Interview with an official at the FOS office in Serbia.
354 Interview with an official at the SCO office in Serbia.
355 Interview with an official at the Dutch Embassy in 
Serbia.
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foundation’s advisory board, which includes 
CSO representatives from the region.356 
The priorities of the EU-supported EIDHR 
programme are defined at the global level, and 
CSOs from Serbia are only eligible for one out 
of five priorities of this programme.357 In the 
case of the OSCE, the field missions propose 
programmes that fit the priorities established 
by the OSCE member states at the highest 
level. These priorities are static, so there has 
been no change in thematic areas.358 In the 
case of the UK, the FCO establishes global 
and regional priorities and sub-priorities. The 
Embassy sends a ‘results offer’ to the FCO, 
which does not consist in a set of projects, 
but a set of goals and the envisaged means 
to achieve them. The FCO selects a number of 
objectives that the Embassy will follow and the 
Embassy then develops projects.359 The broad 
objectives and priorities of German assistance 
are agreed at the highest level between the 
German and the Serbian governments. GIZ is 
then asked to develop a programme that would 
meet these priorities through consultation 
with local stakeholders. In some cases, local 
stakeholders (municipalities, CSOs) approach 
the Embassy with their own initiatives. 
Nonetheless, there is some flexibility in the 
field. GIZ has substantial flexibility in the 
allocation of funds, which allows it to adapt 
to changing circumstances. Projects are not 
designed to last for only 2-3 years; they last as 
long as it takes to reach the set objectives.360
An alternative approach used by some 
donors is more bottom-up and involves 
local stakeholders in determining priorities. 
UNDP develops a draft strategy for 5 years in 
cooperation with the government. This draft 
is sent to other donors and development 
agencies for feedback before being approved 
in New York. All the UNDP’s programmes need 
356 Interview with an official at ERSTE Stiftung.
357 Interview with an official at the EUD office in Serbia.
358 Interview with an official at the OSCE office in Serbia.
359 Interview with an official at the British Embassy in 
Serbia.
360 Interview with an official at the GIZ office in Serbia.
to be approved by the Serbian Government.361 
The World Bank office in Belgrade makes 
a proposal that is then refined in separate 
consultations with government and civil 
society. The strategy is then sent to the Board 
for approval.
SIDA, BTD, and the EU CSF apply a more 
‘regional’ approach in aid programming instead 
of focusing on country-based strategies. BTD 
has a set of priorities for all the countries 
in the region. These priorities have not 
changed in recent years.362 The EU’s CSF is a 
regional programme for the IPA countries. It 
consists of a three-year strategy within which 
priorities are defined at the national level.363 
The interviewee from SIDA outlined how they 
formulate a strategy for the Western Balkans: 
This was a very broad participatory 
process. Those areas were the result of 
certain instructions that we received from 
Sweden, but also as result of discussions 
with local actors here, in the first place 
is the SEIO, Serbian EU Integration 
Office, but also in much broader terms 
with other ministries, institutions, with 
other donors, with civil society also. (...) 
So, that is it. We do not call it a regional 
strategy; it is the strategy for the region. 
Do you see the difference? It is build up 
by the bilateral or national component 
and added on; in some areas we do 
see that there is an extra advantage in 
working with the regional approach.364
Some donors carry out consultations with 
local stakeholders in a more selective manner, 
which often involves close cooperation 
with government and different degrees of 
consultation with civil society. As mentioned 
above, UNDP develops their draft strategy in 
cooperation with the government, but they do 
also occasionally consult with CSOs – mainly 
361 Interview with an official at the UNDP office in Serbia.
362 Interview with an official at the BTD office in Serbia.
363 Interview with a second official at the EUD office in 
Serbia.
364 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Serbia.
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CSOs with which UNDP has cooperated – for 
their expertise.365 As part of their ‘partner’s 
hearing process’, the SCO draws heavily on 
the Needs Assessment carried out by the 
Serbian government. SCO considers that the 
Serbian Government has the duty to consult 
with local stakeholders since it is in charge of 
aid planning and donor coordination. The Swiss 
agency only consults with CSOs with which 
it has an established cooperation or which 
are deemed to be able to provide expertise, 
because it does not have the capacity to carry 
out broad consultations with 100-200 people.366 
For the programming of German aid, every 
project has a ministry in the background. GIZ 
only involves CSOs once the project is defined 
in cooperation with government - only those 
CSOs relevant for the project are involved.367 
Norway draws directly on Serbian institutions 
for planning and administering its aid in 
Serbia. The Norwegians have two employees 
sitting in the SEIO. One employee conducts 
programming in close cooperation with the 
different ministries and SEIO, and the other is 
responsible for monitoring and evaluation.368 
UNICEF conducts individual consultations with 
selected CSOs as well as focus groups with 
organisations dealing directly or indirectly with 
children. UNICEF has a strategic partnership 
with the Network of Organisations for Children 
of Serbia (MODS), a network of organisations 
dealing with children, which UNICEF supports. 
UNICEF also consults with organisations 
outside the MODS network, as well as with 
media and business.369 FOS defines its 
priorities through a permanent dialogue 
with CSOs and through an assessment of 
the project proposals that it receives from 
CSOs throughout the year. According to the 
interviewee from FOS, this allows CSOs to put 
forward their ideas instead of being ‘donor-
365 Interview with an official at the UNDP office in Serbia.
366 Interview with an official at the SCO o ffice in Serbia.
367 Interview with an official at the GIZ office in Serbia.
368 Interview with an official at SEIO.
369 Interview with an official at the UNICEF office in 
Serbia.
driven’.370 By contrast, SIDA does not conduct 
direct consultations with CSOs, but it relies on 
the Swedish implementing organisations who 
provide input from local partners. According to 
the respondent from SIDA: 
We [SIDA] are working with three main 
or larger Swedish CSOs, that we have 
a kind of a framework agreement 
with them, on program agreement, so 
they in turn are collaborating with... 
You know each of them has between 
10 and 15 national counterparts. So 
through them, I would say we hope to 
be receiving the inputs and comments 
from their partners. So, it is selective and 
indirect consultation in that sense. We 
do also have direct contact with them, on 
monitoring and follow up sometimes, but 
it is mostly through the Swedish NGOs 
that we work371.
The research found that the EU has the most 
institutionalised form of cooperation with 
local stakeholders. The planning of IPA is 
quite specific because it involves substantial 
involvement of the Serbian Government in the 
definition of priorities and occurs in several 
phases. First, SEIO carries out a ‘needs 
assessment’ and a gap analysis. Second, the 
Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document 
(MIPD) is developed in Brussels on the basis 
of these analyses and other sources such as 
the country Progress Reports. Third, sector 
groups which include government, donors and 
the EUD are established on the basis of the 
MIPD. These sector groups discuss the ‘project 
sector fiches’ which include the entire sector 
through different projects. All national IPA 
components are developed in cooperation with 
the SEIO and the corresponding ministries. The 
priorities and programmes for civil society are 
developed in consultation with local CSOs.372 
These meetings are used to present EU 
programmes to the government and donors 
370 Interview with an official at the FOS office in Serbia.
371 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Serbia.
372 Interview with an official at the EUD office in Serbia.
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and get feedback. These sectoral working 
groups, which are attended by some CSO 
representatives, are also used as a platform 
for donors to exchange information on their 
activities so that there are no overlaps. After 
the consultation process, the MIPD is sent 
for approval to the EU Member States, a 
process that takes 7-8 months. According to 
one of the interviewees from the EUD, the EU 
programmes are very rigid: the priorities are 
set by the MIPD and the Delegation does not 
have much room for manoeuvre. If something 
is not mentioned in the MIPD, it will not 
be financed. For example, the EU stopped 
supporting the healthcare system in Serbia 
in 2011 because this sector was considered 
too corrupt, despite the fact that the EU had 
channelled significant funds to the Serbian 
healthcare system until then.373 The respondent 
from the EUD also added that, from January 
2014, the Serbian Government administered 
IPA as a result of the implementation of DIS. 
However, the civil society programmes will 
remain in the remit of the EUD, because the 
Delegation considers that support for civil 
society in Serbia is done according to political 
lines.374
In terms of IPA civil society planning, SEIO 
established Sector Civil Society Organizations 
(SEKO) mechanism in 2011. This was 
established through a project funded by SIDA 
and the UK. The SEKO mechanism consists 
of seven thematic groups. Each thematic 
platform is administered by some ‘leading 
CSOs’ which have been selected by SEIO. All 
of the leading CSOs are established Belgrade-
based organisations. The functioning of SEKO 
consists of SEIO sending IPA draft documents 
to the different platforms for feedback. The 
SEKO mechanism is exclusively used for 
EU funds, other donors do not draw on this 
mechanism for consultations.
373 Interview with a third official at the EUD office in 
Serbia.
374 Interview with a second official at the EUD office in 
Serbia.
One of the interviewees from the EUD 
highlighted a number of criticisms regarding 
the running of SEKO. The mechanism is 
biased because some CSOs are more active 
than others, so SEKO may not accurately 
reflect the needs of society. Moreover, the 
fact that CSOs are divided in seven thematic 
groups leaves many themes out of the scope 
of planning. To address this shortcoming, the 
EUD has developed a project with the Office for 
Cooperation with Civil Society which aims to 
promote the role of civil society in aid planning 
and EU negotiations, in order to advance 
CSOs participation in SEKO. However, the 
respondent from the EUD suggested that local 
CSOs do not have the capacity to participate in 
aid planning. For example, CSOs often do not 
make a distinction between themes (i.e. the 
fight against corruption) and type of activities 
(i.e. capacity building).375 Another interviewee 
from the EUD raised the concern that it is 
problematic to include CSOs in aid planning, 
since there would be problems with legitimacy 
and a conflict of interest for organisations 
to decide priorities whilst receiving financial 
assistance from the same programmes.376
The interviewee from Civic Initiatives, one of 
the SEKO leading organisations, also said that 
there were a number of shortcomings with 
SEKO377:
 the draft documents are sent on short 
notice, the deadlines are short and the 
documents are in English which prevents 
many organisations from giving feedback.  
Some platforms are too big (e.g. the one 
on Civil Society, Media and Culture has 
180 organisations), so it is very difficult to 
organise genuine consultations;
 there are no funds for organising meetings. 
375 Interview with a second official at the EUD office in 
Serbia.
376 Interview with a third official at the EUD office in 
Serbia.
377 Interview with an official at Civic Initiatives. Civic 
Initiatives is a leading Belgrade-based CSO ‘founded 
in May 1996 by a group of prominent NGO activists 
that were involved in the anti-war movement and 
non-nationalist democratic opposition since 1990’.
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There was one grant which was used to 
organise a few meetings in the first year. 
Since then, 90 per cent of the consultations 
are carried out via e-mail.
 CSOs do not get any feedback on which 
comments have been accepted or rejected.
Thus, according to the respondent from Civic 
Initiatives, SEKO has effectively turned into an 
info service for EU programmes and projects.
The SEIO representative responded to some 
of these critiques stating that they also get EU 
draft documents to comment on a very short 
notice and that they do not have the capacity 
to translate these documents in English. 
Furthermore, they do not have the capacity to 
liaise with CSOs on which comments have been 
adopted or rejected. However, the respondent 
still felt that the SEKO mechanism is useful.378
9.5. Donor Coordination
Since 2012, donor coordination is managed 
by SEIO. Donor coordination is organised 
around ten thematic sectoral working groups 
(SWG), one of which deals with civil society, 
media and culture.379 Each SWG is led by a 
ministry and a leading donor. In addition to 
the SWGs, donors are supposed to organise 
Informal Donor Groups with donors only. 
However, the mechanisms do not seem to be 
operational as yet. The SIDA representative 
claimed that they were the only ones to take 
the initiative to form a donor coordination 
group in the area of environment, but that this 
would take time to establish.380 The Norwegian 
Embassy interviewee added that there were 
some problems in the establishment of this 
coordination mechanism, which is why ‘there 
has been a new attempt to reinvent this 
structure with fewer levels, fewer subgroups, 
fewer sub mechanism, so to speak, which was 
in large degree agreed on and finalized with 
donor community this spring [2013]’.381
378 Interview with an official at SEIO.
379 See: http://www.evropa.gov.rs/Evropa/PublicSite/
AboutUs.aspx
380 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Serbia.
381 Interview with an official at the Norwegian Embassy 
in Serbia.
Despite these teething problems, donors 
welcome the Serbian Government attempts to 
take more ownership over donor coordination. 
For example, the Norwegian Embassy 
interviewee said that: 
We would like to see more of the 
coordination mechanism anchored firmly 
within the Serbian institutions, so that 
their voices can be more frequently heard 
and more systematically heard on all the 
issues which are generally discussed. So, 
we are looking forward to that, simply, 
while we manage as good as we can.382 
The GIZ respondent added: 
The Serbian side also is very much 
interested in becoming, let’s say, more 
and more the owner of in what direction 
this whole business develops. And by 
that I mean in what areas the assistance 
is provided. And this is surprisingly, in 
a very positive way surprisingly, for all 
donors here active [sic].383 
However, the GIZ respondent was also cautious 
about the efficiency of the Government-led 
mechanisms, stating: 
Various approaches have been taken. 
First of all, there always has been quite 
considerable effort put into by the Serbian 
side, trying to coordinate things, with 
medium kind of success. Then this year 
another trial was started to restructure 
the whole thing more sector related.384 
According to the World Bank interviewee, 
donor coordination used to be organised by 
donors in an informal manner until 2012. 
Donors would organise meetings in their 
own areas of interest. This coordination was 
very efficient because the meetings were very 
practical, they were focused on addressing 
the problems faced by the donors in the 
382 Interview with an official at the Norwegian Embassy 
in Serbia.
383 Interview with an official at the GIZ office in Serbia.
384 Interview with an official at the GIZ office in Serbia.
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implementation of their programmes. Since 
SEIO took over coordination in 2012, there 
has been a loss in efficiency because the 
discussions are much more formal. These 
discussions are led by the Government, which 
thematically organises them in accordance 
with the EU chapters, so the mechanism is not 
as operational as it used to be.385
Still, according to respondents from GIZ, 
UNICEF, and the EUD, the current mechanism 
functions well in terms of exchanging 
information and avoiding duplication. Such a 
coordination mechanism is crucial in view of 
the increasing involvement of the government 
in the planning of IPA funds, as stated by an 
official from the Norwegian Embassy: 
It is needed, certainly, with the increasing 
amount of the IPA funding and more 
complex engagement, and heavier 
management of Serbian institution 
themselves. [With the] decentralized 
implementation mechanisms/systems, 
in Serbia, more institutions will be 
involved in managing foreign assistance, 
IPA funding predominantly, and that 
just increases the need for coordination 
and for a horizontal communication. So 
this is, I am sure this will be developed 
further, it has to be’.386 
However, the GIZ respondent voiced concern 
about coordination primarily around EU 
integration, since it may exclude certain 
important issues: 
EU accession is one issue, [a] very 
important issue, but if you look a bit in a 
broader sense, Serbia is a transformation 
country and transformation covers 
also a lot of areas which have nothing 
whatsoever to do with the EU accession. 
And there is also need there and express, 
how do you deal with that.387
385 Interview with an official at the World Bank office in 
Serbia.
386 Interview with an official at the Norwegian Embassy 
in Serbia.
387 Interview with an official at the GIZ office in Serbia.
Ultimately, any donor mechanism will need to 
strike a balance between coordination, whilst 
still managing the diverse donor agendas, as 
the GIZ interviewee pointed out: 
There are a lot of interests involved in 
this game. You can’t just neglect them. 
The American administration has certain 
things that it expects, the German 
administration has certain things it 
expects, the, let’s say, the Swedish have, 
Norwegians, the EUD or Commission 
has. Or the Japanese, who are also still 
active here. So you have to somehow 
try to include this, because if you don’t, 
the consequences, they say OK, you do 
your stuff, and we do our stuff …You run 
a much higher risk of all of the sudden 
finding yourself duplicating things.388
The formal donor coordination mechanism 
currently does not involve private donors, 
such as BTD, ERSTE Foundation and FOS. 
The FOS interviewee said that they are not 
involved in any form of institutionalised 
coordination mechanism. FOS carries out 
bilateral consultations with other donors on 
an ad hoc basis and through participation in 
common projects. It also gives comments 
on the strategies of other donors (i.e. World 
Bank, EU) which also constitutes a form 
of coordination.389 The ERSTE Foundation 
representative conceded that they are not in 
contact with donors working in similar areas of 
civil society support: 
For the time being we didn’t team up 
with, for example, [the] Norwegians are 
super active in Balkans. We know this 
because some NGOs we are supporting 
or working with also get support from 
Sweden, from Norway and so on, so 
we know that this is another possible 
partner to team up. But for the time 
being, we’ve just been collaborating with 
388 Interview with an official at the GIZ office in Serbia.
389 Interview with an official at the Fund for an Open 
Society in Serbia.
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other institutions asking what are you 
doing and how can we somehow [be] 
interlinked.393 
Outside these formalised mechanisms, 
donors often coordinate their activities on 
an ad hoc basis around specific themes. For 
example, various donors mentioned that 
there is a coordination group in the field of 
parliament-related work, and there are also 
groups of donors dealing with South Serbia or 
Sandzak. Amongst bilateral donors, the UK has 
established close cooperation with Norway and 
the Netherlands.394 For SIDA, ‘the ones that 
we most closely have relation and contact with 
is definitely the EUD, and then I would say a 
couple of other bilateral, I would say Germany, 
Norway, Switzerland, in some cases [it] is the 
US, but less [so]’.395 
Most of the coordination in the field of civil 
society takes place at the informal level. Donor 
representatives consult with their peers in 
other agencies when they receive proposals 
from CSOs. These consultations are quite 
efficient because there are not that many 
donors dealing with civil society,396 and there 
are not many CSOs capable of producing good 
projects.397 Another avenue of coordination 
outside the formalised mechanisms has been 
the participation of donors in the steering 
committees of projects dealing with civil 
society. A certain level of coordination occurs 
through the TACSO Local Advisory Groups 
(LAGs), and USAID used to organise meetings 
as part of their major civil society programme, 
the Civil Society Advocacy Initiative (CSAI).
There is also a certain degree of coordination 
through cooperation in thematic areas or 
participation in joint projects. Working together 
allows donors to reduce the administrative 
393 Interview with an official at the GIZ office in Serbia.
394 Interview with an official at the British Embassy in 
Serbia.
395 Interview with an official at the SIDA office in Serbia.
396 Interview with an official with the Norwegian 
Embassy in Serbia.
397 Interview with an official with the Dutch Embassy in 
Serbia.
other foundations, so this is what we 
did. And in a very small scale, bringing 
in some support from companies. For 
example, [the] Vienna Insurance Group 
was supporting the European Fund for 
the Balkans for some special fellowship 
program But European money, from the 
European Union or state money from 
different other donors or institutions that 
haven’t been targeted yet.390 
Although private donors are not present in the 
aforementioned formal donor coordination 
forums, there are some coordination forums 
specifically for private donors such as the 
Grantmakers East Forum (GEF), which brings 
together private donors working in Central and 
Eastern Europe every year.
In addition to the formalised mechanisms 
within Serbia, large international donors have 
their own internal coordination. For example, 
the UN Country Team (UNCT) coordinates the 
work of the different UN agencies in Serbia, 
and USAID’s implementing partners such 
as Institute for Sustainable Communities 
(ISC), National Democratic institute (NDI), 
International Republican Institute (IRI) work 
in close cooperation to maximise the impact 
of their interventions.391 As mentioned above, 
EU accession sets the agenda for donor 
activities and coordination, but according to the 
interviewee from the British Embassy, it is very 
difficult with the EU because their procedures 
are very formal.392 The interviewee from GIZ 
added that the EU rarely consults with other 
donors to find out what they are doing: 
They are the most important player... But 
I think it would also serve them well in 
their own projects if they pay a bit more 
attention to what others do, and not only 
expect the others to come to them, but 
also in their mission having someone 
institutionalised, send their people to 
390 Interview with an official at ERSTE Stiftung.
391 Interview with an official at the ISC office in Serbia.
392 Interview with an official at the British Embassy in 
Serbia.
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project to some institution, why don’t 
you hook it up to the German project? 
So we don’t lose time, we have a bigger 
leverage effect, and we know what they 
are doing, and, apart from that, we are 
convinced [that] what they are doing is 
the right thing.401 
The SCO interviewee gave a similar example 
of how their expertise can link in with wider 
assistance in Serbia and avoid duplication. SCO 
develops projects in line with its comparative 
advantages and the programmes of other 
donors. For instance, the EU and the Council 
of Europe (CoE) had a big project on improving 
human resources in the local administration, 
which is an area in which the SCO has a lot 
of expertise. Instead of developing its own 
fully-fledged project in the same area, the SCO 
developed a small pilot project to test some 
solutions which could be replicated on a larger 
scale within the scope of the EU project.402
Turning to donors as agenda setters, on some 
occasions, small private donors have the lead 
in developing new activities or thematic areas 
that are then taken over by the big bilateral 
or multilateral donors. For example, FOS 
was the pionneer in supporting CSOs in the 
field of transparency and monitoring, and the 
interviewee from FOS said that they started 
supporting a group of organisations in 2004, 
long before this theme became the focus 
of intervention for most bilateral donors in 
Serbia.403 Although this is an example of donor 
programming being influenced by smaller 
donors, for the most part, bilateral donors 
are very much influenced by the EU in the 
planning of their intervention in Serbia. The 
representatives of the Norwegian Embassy 
see their role as complementary to the EU. 
The flexibility of their programmes is geared at 
filling the gaps in the larger IPA engagement. 
401 Interview with an official with the GIZ office in Serbia.
402 Interview with an official with the Swiss Cooperation 
Office in Serbia.
403 Interview with an official with the Fund for an Open 
Society in Serbia.
costs associated with the implementation of 
projects. This applies both to the administrative 
costs of the Serbian administration, which 
otherwise has to interact with a lot of different 
donors, and those of the donors themselves, 
some of which have very limited capacities. 
For example, the World Bank has set up a 
Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) which involves 
various bilateral and multilateral donors in 
a project focused on legal reform. This has 
significantly reduced the costs of administering 
and coordinating projects related to legal 
reform.398 Another example is that most 
projects funded by BTD are co-financed with 
by the EU or other bilateral donors, which 
indirectly allows for coordination.399 The 
Norwegian respondent said that informal 
coordination prevents duplication of assistance: 
When we assess projects (…) and we 
shortlist projects, let’s say we have 20, 
25 of them we want to contract, we will 
do extensive search within the [donor] 
community- of course check USAID, 
the EUD supported projects with this 
organisation, but also with smaller 
foundations, smaller embassies: the 
Dutch, FOS, Civil Rights Defenders, all 
the donors that have money will be this 
way or another asked about particular 
project.400
For the interviewee from GIZ, this type of 
coordination would allow avoiding duplication 
and also give greater leverage on an issue, for 
example: 
Another issue is again legal reform 
where we are in one specific area active 
and have been. The EU was planning on 
doing more, which was good. And then 
the Serbian side said to the EU well, the 
Germans are already working in this 
area, so why instead of tendering this 
398 Interview with an official at the World Bank office in 
Serbia.
399 Interview with an official with the BTD office in Serbia.
400 Interview with an official with the Norwegian 
Embassy in Serbia.
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response mechanism that can be accessed 
within 3 months by CSOs from all three 
countries, and the Civil Society Fund which 
is a long term capacitation mechanism for 
CSOs from Serbia only. Norway is thus one 
of the biggest supporters of civil society in 
Serbia, and it is the only donor that provides 
institutional grants for CSOs. The Dutch 
embassy also provides some project-grants for 
CSOs through the MATRA programme. So does 
the SCO whose representative noted that their 
‘small projects scheme’ might be discontinued 
due to their lack of capacity to administer an 
increasing number of applications.406 Finally, 
private donors such as FOS and BTD – which 
is based in Belgrade but operates across the 
region – provide flexible project grants for 
which CSOs can apply throughout the year.
A number of donors in Serbia still provide 
assistance to CSOs via international 
implementing agencies/organisations, 
although this type of assistance is gradually 
being phased out. USAID’s latest programme 
of support to civil society in Serbia – Civil 
Society Forward – is implemented by ISC 
in cooperation with local partners. This 
programme seeks to build the capacity of a 
select number of Serbian CSOs in order to 
enable them to directly apply for USAID funding 
in the future. As in other WB countries, SIDA 
implements its assistance through three 
Swedish organisations (Olof Palme Center, 
CRD and Kvinna till Kvinna) and the Regional 
Environmental Centre based in Budapest. 
However, at the time of research, SIDA was 
developing a new strategy for civil society in 
the region which involved a shift in modality of 
assistance.407 Finally, SCO has a programme 
geographically focusing on Southern Serbia 
that is implemented by United Nations Office 
for Project Services (UNOPS) and that includes 
a grant scheme for local civil society managed 
by UNOPS.
406 Interview with an official at the Swiss Cooperation 
Office in Serbia.
407 Interview with officials at the Swedish Embassy in 
Serbia.
The interviewee commented that: 
At the national level we believe that the 
Norwegian government to government 
funding has a shorter line of response 
than much of the IPA programing, for 
example. So, we’ve seen examples 
of how we can be able to shape 
engagements which are intermediary 
in terms of larger IPA engagement in 
some sectors where we can simply do 
short term interventions for a year or 
two, while a large program is being 
developed. We try to be adaptive and 
flexible and fill a role in between the 
much larger programs, but still within 
the objective underpinning the overall 
priorities and goals in Serbia in this 
respect.404
The EUD itself underlined that it saw itself as 
the agenda setter. One of the interviewees 
from the Delegation said that the EU is the 
lead donor and that others should adapt their 
programmes to the EU. This is why other 
donors are consulted in the programming of 
IPA, which does not mean that they have a say 
in defining EU priorities.405
9.6. Donor Assistance to Civil 
Society
Donors in Serbia resort to a variety of 
modalities of civil society assistance. As for 
other countries, the most common type of 
assistance is project grant-making. This is 
done on a large scale by the EU through the 
EIDHR and CSF programmes, but also by 
some other donors such as the Norwegian 
Embassy which administers assistance to 
CSOs in Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro. 
As noted above, the Norwegian Embassy has 
two programmes dedicated to civil society: 
the Embassy Fund which is a flexible rapid 
404 Interview with an official at the Norwegian Embassy 
in Serbia.
405 Interview with a third official at the EU Delegation in 
Serbia.
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Some donors provide long-term support to 
CSOs by establishing strategic partnerships 
with local organisations. UNICEF has 
thus developed close collaboration with a 
network of organisations that participate 
in the development and implementation of 
UNICEF’s activities in Serbia. According to the 
UNICEF representative, partners are chosen in 
function of their capacity to contribute to the 
strategic objectives defined by UNICEF – the 
organisation’s expertise is the main selection 
criteria.408 While this mode of assistance limits 
the number of beneficiaries, it gives substantial 
ownership to local organisations which fully 
participate in project development from 
inception to implementation.
Finally, several donors provide indirect 
support to CSOs by involving them in the 
implementation of projects in which the main 
stakeholders are generally state institutions. 
This usually consists in CSOs delivering 
some products or services such as research, 
monitoring or training. For example, while it 
does not provide any grants for civil society, 
GIZ makes financial contributions that are 
‘always linked to a very precisely defined 
input’.409 This approach is based on the 
belief that the capacities of CSOs have been 
sufficiently built up so that donors can draw 
on CSOs for their expertise and treat them like 
partners rather than aid beneficiaries. 
408 Interview with an official at the UNICEF office in 
Serbia.
409 Interview with an official at the GIZ office in Serbia. 
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Conclusions
The research underpinning this report had 
two key objectives: to better understand the 
reasons for the long-term engagement and 
rationales for donor aid programming in the 
Western Balkans; and, somewhat relatedly, to 
examine how the donors who remain active 
in the Western Balkans perceive the Civil 
Society Organisations (CSOs) they support, 
how they conceptualise and value civil society, 
and the mechanisms they employ to support 
them. In other words, we set out to study 
what motivates donors to stay, how and what 
they value in the organisations they fund, 
and how they perceive their mission and the 
sustainability of the endeavour. This is all the 
more pressing in light of the global crisis, the 
political turmoil in the Middle East and North 
Africa, and an anecdotal sense of frustration 
and lethargy amongst the donors still active in 
the region. The course of our research and the 
completion of this report witnessed several 
political uprisings (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Kosovo). Much has been said and written 
by commentators about the political and 
economic challenge that lies ahead for the 
successor states that remain outside of the EU; 
is a European perspective really likely? How 
should the international community respond 
to the plenums in BiH and the resurgent 
authoritarianism in Macedonia? Our findings 
offer little insight into such meta questions. 
Yet it is difficult, when drawing conclusions 
to such an extensive and in-depth research 
project, not to refer to, or at least take heed 
of, the wider political, economic and social 
context. For instance, it is difficult to report 
the overwhelmingly negative attitudes held by 
donors towards CSOs, and the widely held view 
that civil society is sufficiently established and 
not in need of direct support without reflecting 
on the absence of CSOs in the uprisings across 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in early 2014; or to 
record the value placed by donors on short-
term project grants as the favoured mode of 
aid delivery without acknowledging that the 
recipient environmental organisations, for 
example, were unable to act as conduits for, or 
participate in, the citizen protests to save the 
commons.
We therefore wish to divide this concluding 
section of the report in to two: to offer a set 
of conclusions based on the data gathered; 
and a separate section offering a series of 
recommendations in light of the broader 
political context.
The donor assistance to the Western Balkans 
is almost exclusively framed in terms of 
support for the EU integration process. Donor 
intervention in the region should be understood 
as a political effort at helping those countries 
on their European path rather than a long-term 
developmental project. In this context, civil 
society development is not a priority on the 
donor agenda. CSOs are generally perceived 
as means for achieving specific ends, such as 
the promotion of European norms and values. 
From donors’ perspective, a project-based 
civil society that can rapidly respond to their 
ever-changing needs is an ideal instrument 
for pursuing their mission. Therefore, donors 
should not be expected to lead civil society 
development in the region.
The donors who remain active in the region 
overwhelmingly endorse the strategy of 
supporting CSOs indirectly as part of an 
overarching pledge to strengthen democratic 
governance. In other words, they accept the 
rationale of only channelling aid through CSOs 
as part of the endeavour to support state 
institutions and government agencies. This 
marks a significant contrast to the strategy 
of supporting civil society as part of a quest 
to strengthen democracy. It was the latter 
that guided CSO development in Central and 
Eastern Europe in the 1990s.
Perhaps one of the most striking and 
significant findings was the bleak view of CSOs 
and civil society held by the vast majority of 
donors operating in the region. Although those 
donors operating in Serbia and Montenegro 
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held a more positive view of civil society, and 
the Nordic countries’ donors remain committed 
to funding CSOs as a pillar of democracy, 
the overriding view was that building civil 
society is, and should remain, a subordinate 
objective. Even the more positive donors 
perceived civil society to be over-bloated and 
certainly big enough. They see no rationale for 
supporting civil society other than as providers 
of services, or to perform specific functions. 
Funding channelled through civil society is 
seen as wasteful, inefficient and ineffective 
use of scarce resources. More alarmingly, 
CSOs, which donors have funded for, in many 
cases, several years, are not viewed as good 
partners, and there is a reluctance to engage 
with anything more than a very narrow band of 
trusted organisations. CSOs are most valued 
for their role as monitors of government, 
or as conduits for governance reform, but 
only a small number of such organisations 
are deemed worthy in the pursuit of these 
functions.
Most donor representatives in the Western 
Balkans are critical of civil society for being 
overly dependent on, and oriented towards, 
donor support. CSOs are generally considered 
to be ‘donor driven’ insofar as their work 
is substantially shaped by the availability 
of foreign funding. Many organisations are 
deemed to operate as consultancies, designing 
projects in response to the Call for Proposals 
issued by donors rather than according to local 
needs. As a result, many donors perceive CSOs 
as being detached from the local communities 
whose needs they are supposed to address. 
This is seen by many as a major challenge to 
the legitimacy and sustainability of civil society 
in the Balkans.
Interestingly, some donors recognise that their 
practices have substantially contributed to 
this state of affairs. The prevalence of project 
grant-making as the main instrument of donor 
assistance to CSOs has created a highly volatile 
civil society whose survival depends on the 
ability to adapt to donors’ changing priorities. 
The lack of ownership over the definition of 
these priorities is a major obstacle to the 
development of a mature and independent civil 
society in the region. This research shows that 
CSOs are not genuinely involved in the overall 
planning of aid which donors generally carry 
out with the government. Furthermore, CSOs 
have little say in the design and development 
of projects which they implement on behalf of 
donors. The data point to the predominance 
of short-term project grants rather than 
institutional grants as the main mode of donor 
assistance. Notwithstanding some variation 
between donors, the proportion of assistance 
awarded to CSOs that is not aligned to specific 
project objectives is very small indeed.  The 
overall impression is that donors resort to 
CSOs for implementing their agendas on the 
ground rather than for the sake of building a 
strong and robust civil society.
In view of this, CSOs in the WB should strive 
to have more ownership in the definition and 
development of donor funded projects aimed at 
civil society. At the highest level, this involves 
having more say in the identification of the 
areas of intervention and priorities sought by 
foreign donors and recipient governments. 
This requires the establishment of institutional 
mechanisms which would allow CSOs to 
participate in the planning of aid and could be a 
basis for broader involvement of civil society in 
policy-making in the future. This could be done 
along the lines of the SEKO mechanism that 
exists in Serbia, which has many shortcomings 
but still constitutes an example of best 
practice in the region. At the same time, CSOs 
should advocate for donors to deliver more 
assistance through institutional grant-making 
which allows CSOs to have more autonomy 
in their work. As this research shows, several 
donors have already resorted to institutional 
grant-making in order to have CSOs in the 
driving seat in terms of defining priorities and 
developing activities. While institutional grant-
making is not a panacea, it offers a significant 
opportunity for local organisations to grow and 
become more sustainable.
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Recommendations  
and the Way Ahead
We offer the following broad recommendations 
based on the findings of the study:
1.   Donors should recognise the need to further 
develop civil society in the Western Balkans. 
Besides being an instrument for building 
good governance, civil society assistance 
should be reinstated as a mechanism 
for the advancement and protection of 
democracy and human rights in the region.
2.  In channelling their assistance and the 
modalities of aid they deploy, donors need 
to make a fundamental distinction between 
‘politically-engaged’ CSOs (advocacy 
groups) and organisations that exist to 
provide services and run tenured contracts. 
CSOs need to be supported to do advocacy, 
social inclusion / social enterprise activities; 
they need to be working at both elite and 
community levels; there needs to be much 
more diversity and specialization.
3.   CSOs engaged in EU-funded projects 
and supported directly or indirectly by 
the Commission often retain low levels of 
capacity to engage beyond the narrow remit 
of short-term projects, which is a problem 
for democratic governance and can have 
profound implications for the prospects of 
future enlargement.
As the largest and most significant donor in the 
Western Balkans the EU has the opportunity, 
as well as the capacity and authority, to 
address this through the modalities of its 
own assistance, and through its leverage 
of other donors operating in the region. At 
present the EU exerts its influence through 
its Acquis-inspired assistance agenda - which 
has become the dominant framework from 
within which most donors support CSOs - 
delivered through short-term discrete projects. 
Although EU strategies for supporting and 
engaging CSOs in the region have evolved 
quite considerably, there is further need to 
use the assistance envelope to support the 
development of a diverse and multifarious 
‘civil society’ populated by professional CSOs 
engaged in projects, but also by organisations 
connected with grass-roots political campaigns 
and actions, and networks able to channel 
citizen opinions and grievances.
4.  Civil society needs to be actively involved 
in the planning of aid through the 
establishment of institutional structures 
that would allow for genuine consultations 
between donors, governments and CSOs 
over the identification and selection of aid 
priorities. In the long run, these structures 
should allow for increased cooperation 
between government and civil society, and 
increased involvement of CSOs in policy-
making.
5.   Donors should prioritise modalities of 
assistance that give more ownership 
to local CSOs in the development and 
implementation of projects. This involves 
a shift from channelling aid through 
international to local implementing 
partners, and from delivering aid through 
project grant-making to institutional 
grant-making. At the same time, the 
planning capacities of CSOs need to be 
raised for these organisations to take over 
more responsibility and become more 
autonomous.
6.   Domestic support for civil society is the 
most viable alternative to donor funding in 
the long run. While levels of support for civil 
society vary across the region, the evidence 
suggests that most of it is allocated in a 
partial and non-transparent manner. Donors 
should promote and provide assistance for 
reforming state funding for civil society at 
the municipal and central government levels 
in order to increase the prospects for CSO 
sustainability.
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1. Donor strategies  
(Strategic level personnel):
 Discuss the motives for donor presence in 
the country/region:
 Why is your organisation maintaining a 
presence in country X?
 What are the objectives/priorities of your 
organisation in country X?
 How long do you envisage to pursue 
your activities in country X?
 Is this part of wider strategy by your 
country/institutions in terms of 
geographic or thematic priorities you 
purse?
 Discuss how donor strategies are 
developed: 
 Explore the level of input from 
headquarters/ regional and local offices.
- Discuss personal arrangements: 
the extent that the personality/
person in charge sets on or off the 
process. (e.g. difference between a 
very engaged Task Manager in the 
EUD and not so much interested and 
engaged “boss”/Head of Unit)
 To what extent are your priorities 
determined ‘from above’ (i.e. 
governments, congress for USAID, 
etc…)?
-  Explore to what extent donors’ 
strategies are determined by 
‘organisational survival’, that is the 
need to secure funding and show 
measurable results back home.
 Discuss to what extent donors take 
into account local priorities in the 
development of their strategies: 
 How do you find out about local needs/
priorities?
 To what extent do you consult with 
government for defining your priorities?
-  Which government institutions are 
involved in this process? Do you 
have “democratisation/civil society 
conditionality” for funds provided to 
the government?
 To what extent are local CSOs involved in 
programme design? 
- If so, which CSOs?
 Discuss donor coordination:
 Do you take part in any formal donor 
coordination mechanisms?
 To what extent are these mechanisms 
useful for generating cooperation among 
donors? 
 To what extent do these meetings 
influence your decisions? Could you give 
us a specific example of how interaction 
with other donors impacted on your 
work? 
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 To what extent are your policies 
influenced by the strategies of other 
donors? How do you look at the work 
of (other) big donors such as the EU or 
USAID?
 Explore the main approach used by the 
donor:
 ‘Top-down’ approach involving the 
restructuring of state institutions and 
political elites
 ‘Bottom-up’ approach emphasising civic 
engagement, government-civil society 
partnership, deliberation, etc...
 Both, in which case, what is the most 
important?
- Who are the main recipients of your 
assistance (state institutions, CSOs, 
private firms, local communities, 
etc...)?
- Why does your organisation focus on 
these recipients?
 What role do you envisage for civil 
society organisations in your assistance 
programme?
 Focus on CSOs as service providers vs. 
advocacy, lobbying and public policy
 Explore how donors envisage the 
distinction/relationship between political 
elites, states institutions and civil society
 What programmes specifically engage 
with civil society organisations and their 
so far results/impact?
2. Practices and modalities  
(Programme Level Personnel):
 Discuss the details of the programme
 What are the aims and objectives of this 
specific programme? 
 How does the programme fit into the 
broader strategies?
 Are there any available programme 
documents that I could access? 
 Discuss how programmes are turned into 
projects:
 What actions/projects are part of this 
programme?
 How are projects formulated within 
programmatic areas?
 What is the involvement of stakeholders 
(esp. government, CSO, other donors) in 
programming (rules vs. practice)?
 Discuss how the programmes are 
implemented: 
 Do donors contract Western CSOs/
consultancies for the implementation of 
these programmes? If they do, to what 
extent (percent or money value of the 
support)?
 Do they work with local institutions/
CSOs for the implementation of 
programmes? If yes, what are the aid 
modalities used (open vs. restricted 
calls, selection procedure, core vs. 
project support, long vs. short-term, 
coalitions/networks vs. individual 
organisations’ support), timing (from 
priority/objective-setting to the CfP and 
implementation)
 Relationship with local CSOs:
 If the programme is not implemented 
by local CSOs, do you engage with local 
CSOs in any other way?
 If implemented by local CSOs, are these 
organisations that you have worked with 
before? If so, why are you continuing 
working with this organisation?
-  Existing studies suggest that donors 
always work with the same CSOs. 
Explore whether this is still the case 
and, if so, why.
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 Explore how donors control and evaluate 
the implementation of programmes:
 How do you monitor the granted 
assistance? (regular reporting – 
“milestone” reporting – final reporting, 
continuous monitoring – “milestone” 
monitoring – no monitoring, direct 
monitoring – outsourced monitoring)
 How do you evaluate the granted 
assistance? (continuous evaluation 
(for the duration of the project) – 
post-evaluation, internal evaluation 
(by the implementer) – evaluation by 
the contractor – external evaluation, 
financial audit, etc.)
 How is ‘success’ defined? What are the 
benchmarks in this evaluation? (‘process 
results’ vs. ‘impact results’)
 Do donors evaluate the long term impact 
of their programmes? If not, why not? 
 Do you have exit strategy in place and if 
yes, what does it entail (e.g. timeframe, 
process, successors-institutions, CSO 
etc.)
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